Opinion
C. A. 9:21-01249-JD-MHC
06-04-2021
Seneca Roberts, Petitioner, v. M. Travis Bragg, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
The pro se Petitioner, Seneca Roberts, a federal inmate at FCI-Bennettsville, brings this action as an application for writ of habeas corpus (Petition) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se petition filed in this case pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings in the United States District Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996; and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir.1995); and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir.1983).
The Rules Governing Section 2254 are applicable to habeas actions brought under § 2241. See Rule 1(b) of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (the district court may apply any or all of these rules to a habeas corpus petition not filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
Pro se petitions are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a petition filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). However, even when considered under this less stringent standard, for the reasons set forth below, the Petition submitted in this case is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
BACKGROUND
On December 19, 2020, Petitioner filed this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, requesting that prior custody credit be awarded to his sentence. ECF No. 1. On April 27, 2021, the Southern District of Georgia ordered that the present Petition be transferred to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. See ECF Nos. 5, 6.
At the time Petitioner filed the present action in the Southern District of Georgia, he had another § 2241 petition, case number 9:20-cv-02162-JD-MHC (hereinafter referred to as Roberts I), pending in this court. On March 15, 2021, the District Judge granted the respondent's motion for summary judgment in Roberts I and denied Petitioner's writ for habeas corpus with prejudice. See Roberts v. Bragg, No. 9:20-CV-02162-JD-MHC, 2021 WL 965051 (D.S.C. Mar. 15, 2021).
This Court “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record.” See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.' ”).
DISCUSSION
The Petition in this case appears to be identical to the petition filed in Roberts I, with the exception that Petitioner attached a page of the respondent's motion for summary judgment and a page of the Roseboro Order from Roberts I to the Petition in this case. Compare ECF No. 1 in this case with ECF No. 1 in Roberts I. Thus, not only does the analysis presented in the District Judge's order in Roberts I apply with equal weight to this case such that this Petition should be dismissed for the reasons articulated in Roberts I, but the Petition in this case should be dismissed as duplicative, and therefore frivolous.
See Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975) (requiring the court provide explanation of dismissal/summary judgment procedures to pro se litigants).
“[R]epetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 as frivolous.” Paul v. de Holczer, No. 3:15-cv-2178-CMC-PJG, 2015 WL 4545974, at *6 (D.S.C. July 28, 2015) (holding that the complaint “should be summarily dismissed as a frivolous duplicate filing in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency”), aff'd, 631 Fed.Appx. 197 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2016); see also Cottle v. Bell, 229 F.3d 1142, at *1 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Because district courts are not required to entertain duplicative lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e)”); Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that “district courts may dismiss a duplicative complaint raising issues directly related to issues in another pending action brought by the same party.”); Moss v. Dobbs, No. 8-20-CV-01697-JMC-JDA, 2020 WL 7231993, at *2 n.2 (D.S.C. Oct. 16, 2020) (recommending that § 2241 petition be dismissed for the additional reason that it was duplicative of the petitioner's prior habeas action), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 6737668 (D.S.C. Nov. 17, 2020); Harding v. United States, No. 5-18-CV-03248-JMC-KDW, 2018 WL 7823059 (D.S.C. Dec. 17, 2018), (recommending dismissal of the § 2241 petition because it was identical to a pending petition), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Harding v. Antonelli, 2019 WL 1316090 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2019). Therefore, in the interests of judicial economy and efficiency, because the present lawsuit is a meritless duplicate of Petitioner's prior petition, the present case is frivolous and subject to summary dismissal. See Lester v. Perry Corr. Inst, No. 4:12-cv-971-TMC-TER, 2012 WL 1963592, at *3 (D.S.C. May 10, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 1963566 (D.S.C. May 31, 2012), aff'd, 479 Fed.Appx. 509 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (“The District Court clearly had the right to take notice of its own files and records and it had no duty to grind the same corn a second time. Once was sufficient.”).
Plaintiff has paid the filing fee. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), however, notwithstanding the payment of a filing fee, the court must dismiss the action at any time the court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted[.] A district court has inherent authority to dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte. See Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct. for S.D. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) (courts have authority to dismiss a frivolous or malicious lawsuit even in absence of a specific statutory provision); Ross v. Baron, 493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir.2012) (unpublished) (noting that “frivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid”); Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that district courts may dismiss frivolous complaints sua sponte, even when plaintiff has paid the filing fee, noting that “district courts are especially likely to be exposed to frivolous actions, and thus have an even greater need for inherent authority to dismiss such actions quickly in order to preserve scarce judicial resources”).
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition in this action be DISMISSED without requiring Respondent to file a return.
The undersigned is of the opinion that Petitioner cannot cure the defects identified above by amending the Petition, as this Court has already considered these same claims on the merits and dismissed them with prejudice in his previous civil action. See Moore v. Byars, No. 4:13-cv-02454-RMG, 2013 WL 6710273, at *5 (D.S.C. Dec. 18, 2013); see also Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 76 n.1 (4th Cir. 1994).
Petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).