Opinion
# 2014-041-070 Claim No. 124807 Motion No. M-85636
12-04-2014
GEORG ROBEDEE v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Claimant's attorney: GEORG ROBEDEE Pro Se Defendant's attorney: HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Paul F. Cagino, Esq. Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claim alleging that police officer forced claimant/vehicle operator to wear seatbelt that limited claimant's vision while driving, thereby causing claimant's automobile accident, is dismissed for failure to state a cause of action and failure to comport with the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act 11 (b).
Case information
| UID: | 2014-041-070 |
| Claimant(s): | GEORG ROBEDEE |
| Claimant short name: | ROBEDEE |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | The caption has been amended, sua sponte, to reflect the only proper defendant. |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 124807 |
| Motion number(s): | M-85636 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | FRANK P. MILANO |
| Claimant's attorney: | GEORG ROBEDEE Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Paul F. Cagino, Esq. Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | December 4, 2014 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Defendant moves, in lieu of answering, to dismiss the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a cause of action. In particular, defendant argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the claim fails to adequately set forth the nature of the claim as required by Court of Claim Act 11 (b) and because the allegations of the claim fail to state a cognizable cause of action.
The claim seeks to recover for damages to claimant's vehicle, and increased vehicle insurance costs, resulting from a traffic accident on June 19, 2014 at a "Ravena, N.Y. Shopping Plaza." Claimant alleges that the "[a]ccident was caused by the Police Officer That Forced Me To Put on The Seat Belt Against My Will." Claimant appears to allege that wearing the seat belt prevented her from turning her head to the right when she entered the highway where the accident presumably occurred.
The claim does not state or explain how, when or where the police officer "forced" claimant to wear her seat belt "against [her] will." The claim does not set forth the time of day the accident happened, nor does it specifically state where on "9w" the accident happened. It does not identify any other vehicles involved in the accident or state whether police investigated the accident.
Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) provides that:
"The claim shall state the time when and place where such claim arose, the nature of same, and the items of damage or injuries claimed to have been sustained and the total sum claimed. . . ."
A claim against the State is permissible only as a result of the State's waiver of sovereign immunity and the statutory requirements conditioning suit must therefore be strictly construed (Kolnacki v State of New York 8 NY3d 277, 280 [2007]). The Kolnacki court noted that the requirements of section 11 (b) are "substantive conditions upon the State's waiver of sovereign immunity" (quoting Lepkowski v State of New York, 1 NY3d 201, 207 [2003]) and that the failure to satisfy any of the conditions is a jurisdictional defect (Kolnacki, 8 NY3d at 280-281). The Kolnacki decision stresses that "nothing less than strict compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the Court of Claims Act is necessary" (Kolnacki, 8 NY3d at 281).
The strict pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) were reiterated in Rivera v State of New York (52 AD3d 1075, 1076 [3d Dept 2008]):
"Statutory conditions placed on claims against defendant must be strictly construed, mandating a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction if the claim does not meet the substantive pleading requirements found in Court of Claims Act § 11 (b)."
The Rivera court reminded that:
"The Court of Claims Act does not require [defendant] to ferret out or assemble information that section 11 (b) obligates the claimant to allege" (Rivera, 52 AD3d at 1076, quotingLepkowski 1 NY3d at 208).
The standard of review in assessing whether a claim complies with section 11 (b) as to adequately stating the nature of the claim is well-settled:
"What is required is not absolute exactness, but simply a statement made with sufficient definiteness to enable the State to be able to investigate the claim promptly and to ascertain its liability under the circumstances. The statement must be specific enough so as not to mislead, deceive or prejudice the rights of the State. In short, substantial compliance with section 11 is what is required . . . . Conclusory or general allegations of negligence that fail to adduce the manner in which the claimant was injured and how the State was negligent do not meet its requirements" (Heisler v State of State of New York, 78 AD2d 767, 768 [4th Dept 1980]; see Cendales v State of New York, 2 AD3d 1165, 1167 [3d Dept 2003]; Sega v State of New York, 246 AD2d 753, 755 [3d Dept 1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 805 [1998]).
Claimant has failed to comply with the substantive pleading requirements of section 11 (b) and the Court therefore lacks jurisdiction over the claim.
The claim also fails to satisfy Court of Claims Act 11 (b) in that it fails to allege facts stating a cognizable cause of action and the Court thus lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.
In De Hart v State of New York (92 Misc 2d 631, 634 [Ct Cl 1977]), the court noted as follows:
"Although the precise wording of section 11 does not appear to require that a claim state a valid cause of action, the cases are clear that without such a statement a claim is legally deficient and subject to fatal attack, Patterson v State of New York, 54 AD2d 147; Davis v State of New York, 28 AD2d 609; Weinstein v New York State Thruway Auth., 27 Misc 2d 503."
In reviewing a motion brought pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) alleging failure to state a cause of action the court should determine "whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 (1994). The "criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one" (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; Rappaport v International Playtex Corp., 43 AD2d 393, 394-395 [3d Dept 1974]; Gizara v New York Times Co., 80 AD3d 1026, 1027 [3d Dept 2011]).
Claimant's allegations fail to state, or even imply, a valid negligence cause of action. Claimant is required by law to wear a seat belt while operating a motor vehicle (Vehicle & Traffic Law 1229-C [3]). Nothing in the claim states or implies that claimant is exempt from the law. The police officer breached no duty owed to claimant in allegedly requiring claimant to comply with the law. More importantly, the claim fails to allege facts tending to show that any act or omission of the police officer was a proximate cause of the claimant's accident. Claimant knew that she was unable to turn her head to the right with her seat belt affixed, yet she chose to operate her vehicle and enter the highway anyway. Claimant's actions as alleged in the claim supercede any alleged act or omission of the police officer.
The defendant's motion to dismiss the claim is granted. The claim is dismissed.
December 4, 2014
Albany, New York
FRANK P. MILANO
Judge of the Court of Claims
Papers Considered:
1. Notice of Motion, filed August 26, 2014;
2. Affirmation of Paul F. Cagino, dated August 25, 2014, and annexed exhibit;
3. Notarized statement of Georg Robedee, dated September 18, 2014.