Summary
In Robbins v. State, 453 So.2d 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), a similar factual situation, we held that when the authorities in the county where a defendant has filed a motion for discharge have knowledge that the defendant is being held in another county, the speedy trial time continues to run and the defendant is not considered "unavailable for trial" under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(e).
Summary of this case from Woods v. StateOpinion
No. 83-2522.
August 3, 1984.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Hillsborough County, Harry Lee Coe III, J.
Jerry Hill, Public Defender, Bartow, and L.S. Alperstein, Asst. Public Defender, Tampa, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
Defendant was convicted of grand theft. He appeals the trial court's denial of his Motion for Discharge on speedy trial grounds. We reverse.
There is no dispute that more than 180 days from defendant's arrest on September 24, 1984, had expired when defendant's motion was filed. The only question is whether the 180-day requirement was inapplicable because defendant had been unavailable for trial under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(e). The state, citing Singleton v. Gross, 436 So.2d 132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), contends that defendant was unavailable in Hillsborough County because he was incarcerated in Pinellas County. The state, citing Rule 3.191(e)(1), also contends that defendant failed to attend proceedings where his presence was required, to-wit: three scheduled arraignments in Hillsborough County. We disagree.
Here, unlike in Singleton, Hillsborough County authorities were aware that defendant was incarcerated in Pinellas County. An accused is entitled to discharge under Rule 3.191 even though during the speedy trial period he was incarcerated in another county. Holmes v. Leffler, 411 So.2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Ramos v. Amidon, 263 So.2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972). His failure to attend the scheduled arraignments in Hillsborough County occurred while he was incarcerated in Pinellas County. It was the responsibility of Hillsborough County authorities, not defendant, to arrange for defendant's presence at Hillsborough County proceedings.
We therefore reverse defendant's judgment of conviction and direct that he be discharged.
GRIMES, A.C.J., and OTT and LEHAN, JJ., concur.