Opinion
Rehearing Denied Feb. 27, 1973.
Lattimer, Robb & Naylor, Pueblo, for plaintiff-appellant.
Murphy, Morris & Murphy, David H. Morris, Colorado Springs, for defendant-appellee.
DWYER, Judge.
Richard D. Robb, plaintiff-appellant, and Anita Roselle Robb, defendant-appellee, were married in 1951 and divorced by decree dated March 29, 1971. In the decree the court retained jurisdiction of the undetermined issues of permanent alimony and property division. On August 9, 1971, the parties entered into a 'Stipulation and Agreement' which provided for division of property and also provided that defendant waived her right to permanent alimony.
The stipulation was presented to the court for approval. The court, after a pre-trial hearing, refused to approve the stipulation and set the case for hearing. At the hearing on August 24, 1971, the plaintiff presented the stipulation and offered evidence concerning its negotiation and execution. Plaintiff took the position that the stipulation was binding upon the court. The defendant offered evidence concerning the financial situation of the parties and also testified concerning her health and her ability to work.
The court found that the stipulation was entered into without fraud, duress, or undue influence. However, the court found that the agreement was unfair because of the waiver of alimony and ordered plaintiff to pay alimony in the sum of $1.00 per month. On appeal, the sole issue is whether the court had power to refuse to approve the stipulation of the parties in the absence of a showing of fraud, duress, or undue influence.
Where the parties to a divorce action ask the court to approve their agreement concerning alimony and property division, the court has power to approve the agreement or to refuse to approve it. See Hizel v. Hizel, 132 Colo. 379, 288 P.2d 354; Hobbs v. Hobbs, 72 Colo. 190, 210 P. 398. Whether the agreement should be approved is a matter lying within the sound discretion of the trial court. The power of the court to disapprove such a contract is not limited to contracts obtained by fraud or duress but extends as well to contracts which are unfair or inequitable.
It is unnecessary to detail the factual basis for the court's refusal to approve the stipulation. Suffice it to say, the record fully supports the court's finding and order.
Judgment affirmed.
COYTE and SMITH, JJ., concur.