Opinion
Civil Action 7:20-3601-DCC-KFM
02-02-2022
Casey A. Roach and Emily K. Harkins, Plaintiffs, v. Samuel W. White, Office of the Union County Sheriff, Union County Sheriff's Office, and Reggie Ellison, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the court on the defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 34). The plaintiffs brought this action alleging claims of negligence/gross negligence, malicious prosecution, and violation of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d)(D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under § 1983.
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS PRESENTED
On Friday, March 16, 2018, Tracey Wade ("Ms. Wade") and Jessica Harmon ("Ms. Harmon") were traveling separately on Peach Orchard Road in Union, South Carolina around 7:45 a.m. (doc. 34-3, Wade dep. at 12:20-13:7; body cam file 1 at 1:39-45, 5:09-13). Traffic was heavy that day, as it was a school day and Peach Orchard Road is close to Union High School (doc. 34-3, Wade dep. at 13:1-7). Both Ms. Wade and Ms. Harmon saw a small boy ("JR") on the side of the road unattended (id. at 13:11-14; body cam file 1 at 1:39-45). Ms. Wade and Ms. Harmon stopped their vehicles, and JR crossed the road (doc. 34-3, Wade dep. at 13:9-15). When JR was in the road, Ms. Wade got out of her vehicle, picked up JR, and took him into a yard of a nearby residence at a mobile home park (id. at 13:15-19). JR had his shirt on backwards and his shoes on the wrong feet (body cam file 1 at 0:04-15, 1:26-32). Ms. Wade placed JR in the custody of bystanders who were in the yard and then moved her vehicle into the mobile home's driveway (doc. 34-3, Wade dep. at 13:17-21). Ms. Harmon also went to the nearby mobile home (body cam file 1 at 1:20-5:13). Several individuals called 9-1-1 (doc. 34-3, Wade dep. at 13:21-22; body cam file 1 at 4:49-57).
Deputies Leon Lancaster ("Deputy Lancaster") and Reggie Ellison ("Deputy Ellison") (collectively "the deputies") responded to the mobile home shortly before 8:00 a.m. (docs. 34-4, Lancaster dep. at 21:22-22:2; 34-5, Ellison dep. at 30:5-20). Deputy Lancaster activated his body camera and captured a significant amount of the events at issue (see body cam files 1-6). The deputies talked to witnesses, and the South Carolina Department of Social Services ("DSS") was called (doc. 34-4, Lancaster dep. at 22:19-24:10; body cam file 2 at 3:10-14). About ten to 20 minutes after he arrived, Deputy Lancaster did not see anyone looking for JR and thus drove to a different mobile home park across the road (doc. 34-4, Lancaster dep. at 24:14-25:5; see body cam files 1, 2). Deputy Lancaster made contact with individuals who informed him that JR may belong to the residents of a mobile home next door (doc. 34-4, Lancaster dep. at 25:21-26:12). This mobile home was occupied by Emily Harkins ("Ms. Harkins") and Casey Roach ("Mr. Roach") (collectively "the plaintiffs") (see id.; doc. 36-2, Roach dep. at 6:3-12). Deputy Lancaster walked to the plaintiffs' trailer, encountered Ms. Harkins, confirmed that she was JR's mother, and informed her that JR was across the street (body cam file 2 at 2:37-3:05). Deputy Lancaster deduced from his “years of experience” that the plaintiffs were not looking for JR and had no idea that he was missing or of his whereabouts (doc. 34-4, Lancaster dep. at 44:2-24). Mr. Roach, Ms. Harkins, and Deputy Lancaster then went to the nearby mobile home where JR was located (id. at 28:23-29:5).
While at the nearby mobile home with JR, Deputy Lancaster informed Mr. Roach that DSS had been called (body cam file 3 at 2:15-30). Deputy Ellison also informed Mr. Roach and Ms. Harkins that he needed to get some basic information from both of them (id. at 2:30-35). Mr. Roach replied, "I don't answer questions" (id. at 2:34-378). Deputy Ellison began gathering information from Ms. Harkins, and Deputy Lancaster informed Mr. Roach, "You can answer them here or you can answer them at the jail house" (id. at 2:39-48). Mr. Roach responded, "That's fine" (id. at 2:44-46). Deputy Ellison then asked Mr. Roach, "What do you mean you don't answer questions?" (id. at 2:47-50). Deputy Lancaster instructed Mr. Roach to give JR to Ms. Harkins, and Mr. Roach asked, "What am I being arrested for?" (id. at 2:50-57). Deputy Lancaster responded, "Child neglect" (id. at 2:56-58). Mr. Roach asked, "For being asleep?" (id. at 3:59-3:02). Deputies again informed Mr. Roach that he could answer questions there on scene or he could answer them "later" (id. at 3:00-14). Mr. Roach stated that he worked 40 hours per week and he and Ms. Harkins were asleep when JR exited the mobile home (id. at 3:12-27). Mr. Roach asked again, "Is that child neglect?" (id.). Deputies informed the plaintiffs that if the child "gets out and crosses a highway, and causes a scene like he did this morning, it's neglect" (id. at 3:25-32). Deputy Ellison began to gather basic information from Mr. Roach, and Mr. Roach again asked the deputies if he was under arrest (id. at 3:54-4:29). Deputy Ellison stated, "Not yet. If you don't cooperate, you're going to be" (id. at 4:29-35). Mr. Roach gave answers to some basic information, but he refused to answer where he was employed (id. at 3:54-5:11). At that point, Mr. Roach was arrested (id. at 3:54-5:50). Deputy Lancaster remained on the scene with Ms. Harkins and gathered basic information from her (id. at 5:50-11:51). Ms. Harkins indicated that JR had never gotten out before (id. at 6:35-54).
Betsy Hudson ("Ms. Hudson"), an agent with DSS, then arrived and obtained information from Ms. Harkins (body cam file 3 at 31:20-39:50). Deputy Lancaster subsequently informed Ms. Harkins that she was being arrested (id. at 40:20-40). Arrangements were made for custody of the plaintiffs' children, and Ms. Harkins was taken into custody (body cam file 4 at 27:20-35:40).
According to the plaintiffs, they moved into their mobile home with their three minor children at the end of 2017 (doc. 36-2, Roach dep. at 6:3-12, 25:1-2). For a short time period on and around March 16, 2018, the plaintiffs allowed two of their friends, Mary Roark ("Ms. Roark") and Freddie Sinclair ("Mr. Sinclair"), to live with them due to homelessness (id. at 45:13-47:15; doc. 36 at 2). The mobile home had a front and back door, both of which had locks (doc. 36-2, Roach dep. at 63:16-25). Mr. Roach testified that the locks worked correctly and that they routinely locked their doors at night (id. at 65:4-5).
Mr. Roach testified that on March 15, 2018, he arrived home from work around 7:30 p.m. (doc. 34-6, Roach dep. at 41:12-21). Thereafter, he ate dinner, took a shower, watched movies with Ms. Harkins and his sons, and went to bed around 11:00 p.m. (id. at 45:2-12, 42:18-20; doc. 36-2, Roach dep. at 41:21-22). After Mr. Roach went to sleep and into the next morning, Ms. Harkins stayed up cleaning (doc. 36-2, Roach dep. at 49:17-21; doc. 36-3, Harkins dep. at 34:4-10). Ms. Harkins testified that, at that time, JR was sleeping mostly during the day and staying awake at night (doc. 36-3, Harkins dep. at 34:4-24). On the night of March 15, 2018, JR stayed up with Ms. Harkins and assisted her with the cleaning (id. at 34:7-12).
Ms. Harkins testified that on the morning of March 16, 2018, one of her children ("CR") left for school and exited the mobile home from the back door, and Ms. Harkins locked the door behind him (doc. 36-3, Harkins dep. at 45:2-25). Mr. Roach testified that he was awakened between 6:00 a.m. and 6:30 a.m. by the sounds of the dryer and CR as he was leaving for school (doc. 36-2, Roach dep. at 50:22). Mr. Roach then called for Ms. Harkins and JR to come and get in bed with him (id. at 66:7-10). Between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m., Ms. Harkins and JR got into bed with Mr. Roach (doc. 36-3, Harkins dep. at 33:2-13). Ms. Harkins initially watched JR play video games while in bed but subsequently dozed off (id. at 33:11-18). Ms. Harkins believed that all of the doors to the mobile home were locked when she dozed off (id. at 45:23-46:8). Ms. Harkins testified that, about a month after the incident, Mr. Sinclair told her that he left the front door open that morning (id. at 53:2-6).
Ms. Harkins testified that, prior to the deputies' arrival, she woke up and discovered that JR was not beside her (doc. 36-3, Harkins dep. at 23:22-24:12). Ms. Harkins stated that she got out of bed and began searching for him (id. at 24:3-5). Ms. Harkins noticed that the front door was open, so she stepped outside and saw her neighbor (id. at 24:9-15). Her neighbor informed her that JR was across the street (id. at 24:16-18). Ms. Harkins testified that she was unaware that Deputy Lancaster was at or around her mobile home when her neighbor informed her that JR was across the street (id. at 24:1922). Ms. Harkins then went inside and told Mr. Roach that JR was across the street (id. at 26:8-11, 21-22). Mr. Roach jumped out of bed and exited the mobile home through the back door (id. at 28:22-29:1). Mr. Roach and Ms. Harkins then went to the mobile home across the street (id. at 29:4-7). When they arrived, Mr. Roach took JR into his arms and explained that JR had "done this one other time. He didn't go this far, though" (body cam file 3 at 1:10-17). In his deposition, Mr. Roach acknowledged that CR had told him that JR had left the house once before without him or Ms. Harkins knowing about it (doc. 41-1, Roach dep. at 79:12-20). Afterwards, Mr. Roach planned to get extra locks and "[w]hatever [he] could get to try to baby-proof the doors" (id. at 82:5-11). However, Mr. Roach did not take these steps until after the incident on March 16, 2018 (id. at 82:12-17).
Deputy Ellison presented information about his investigation to a magistrate judge and explained in his affidavit that the plaintiffs "did allow [their] four year old child to leave the residence and cross Peach Orchard Road unattended causing traffic to stop in both directions" (doc. 36-7 at 2-3). The magistrate judge determined that there was probable cause and issued warrants (id.). The plaintiffs were charged with violating South Carolina Code § 63-5-70 (id.). After making bond, Mr. Roach was released on March 17, 2018, and Ms. Harkins was released on March 19, 2018. Union County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Union/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (last visited January 26, 2022). The charges against the plaintiffs were ultimately dismissed by the solicitor's office because DSS ruled their case to be unfounded (doc. 34-1 at 4). See Union County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Union/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (last visited January 26, 2022).
The court takes judicial notice of the records in the plaintiffs' criminal cases in South Carolina in Case Nos. 2018A4410100131, 2018A4410100130. See https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Union/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (last visited January 26, 2022); see also Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that [t]he most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Union County Court of Common Pleas on September 3, 2020, alleging causes of action for negligence/gross negligence against Sheriff Samuel White (“Sheriff White”), Office of the Union County Sheriff, and the Union County Sheriff's Office; malicious prosecution against Sheriff White, Office of the Union County Sheriff, and the Union County Sheriff's Office; and violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights against Deputy Ellison (doc. 1-1). The defendants removed the matter on October 14, 2020, based on federal question subject matter jurisdiction (doc. 1). On December 16, 2021, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (doc. 34). The plaintiffs filed a response on January 4, 2021 (doc. 36), and the defendants filed a reply on January 25, 2022 (doc. 41).
II. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment: “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). As to the first of these determinations, a fact is deemed “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings; rather, he must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id.
B. Section 1983
The plaintiffs brought a claim against Deputy Ellison pursuant to § 1983 for allegedly unlawfully arresting and seizing them in violation of their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights (doc. 1-1 at 7-8). The defendants argue that Deputy Ellison is entitled to summary judgment on this claim because he had probable cause for the plaintiffs' arrest (doc. 34-1 at 6-13).
Section 1983 "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
The Fourth Amendment, which is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961), provides for "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures" and that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Thus, to succeed on a claim of illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that the seizure was effected without probable cause. See Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff must show that the officers arrested him without probable cause); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) ("The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause.").
Probable cause is an objective standard, United States v. Gray, 137 F.3d 765, 769 (4th Cir. 1998), and "determined from the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest." Brown, 278 F.3d at 367. ”[P]robable cause to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed an offense." Humbert v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, 866 F.3d 546, 555 (4th Cir. 2017). Moreover, "[w]hile probable cause requires more than a bare suspicion, it requires less than that evidence necessary to convict." Gray, 137 F.3d at 769 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, reasonable officers need not "resolve every doubt about a suspect's guilt before probable cause is established." Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1991).
Ordinarily, officers are not liable for an arrest of an individual pursuant to a facially valid warrant due to the existence of probable cause. See Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998); see e.g., Quarles v. Weeks, 815 Fed.Appx. 735, 737-38 (4th Cir. 2020). However, an officer's material false statements or material omissions in obtaining the warrant can negate such probable cause. See Miller v. Prince George's Cnty., MD, 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007). To succeed on his claim, a plaintiff arrested pursuant to a warrant must show that an officer "deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the truth made material false statements in his affidavit or omitted from that affidavit material facts with the intent to make, or with reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit misleading." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). With respect to omissions, "[r]eckless disregard can be evidenced if the officer entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements[, ] . . . had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported, or failed to inform the judicial officer of facts he knew would negate probable cause." Quarles, 815 Fed.Appx. at 738 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). However, "[a] plaintiff's allegations of negligence or innocent mistake by a police officer will not provide a basis for a constitutional violation." Miller, 475 F.3d at 627-28 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
The undersigned finds that the plaintiffs have failed to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Deputy Ellison had probable cause for their arrests pursuant to South Carolina Code § 63-5-70. This statute provides in relevant part:
(A) It is unlawful for a person who has charge or custody of a child, or who is the parent or guardian of a child, or who is responsible for the welfare of a child as defined in Section 63-7-20 to:
(1) place the child at unreasonable risk of harm affecting the child's life, physical or mental health, or safety;
....S.C. Code Ann. § 63-5-70.
As set out above, when determining the existence of probable cause, courts look at the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge at the time of the arrest. Here, at the time of the plaintiffs' arrest, witnesses had informed the deputies that they saw JR, a very young child, unattended on the side of a road with heavy traffic; JR went into the road, stopping traffic on both sides; one witness took JR to a nearby mobile home; and 9-1-1 was called (docs. 34-4, Lancaster dep. at 22:19-24:10; 34-5, Ellison dep. at 30:9-20; body cam file 1 at 0:01-2:00). The deputies encountered JR with his shirt on backwards and his shoes on the wrong feet (body cam file 1 at 0:04-15, 1:26-32). After about ten to 20 minutes after they arrived, there was still no parent or guardian searching for JR (doc. 34-4, Lancaster dep. at 59:8-13; see body cam files 1, 2). Deputy Lancaster was able to locate the parents in a mobile home across the street (doc. 34-4, Lancaster dep. at 24:1428:3; body cam file 2 at 2:37-3:05). Based on his interaction with the plaintiffs and Ms. Harkins' reaction after being informed that JR was across the street, Deputy Lancaster deduced from his “years of experience” that the plaintiffs were not looking for JR and had no idea that he was missing or of his whereabouts (doc. 34-4, Lancaster dep. At 44:2-24). Deputy Lancaster testified as follows in his deposition:
It's my experience -- cause people losing children, or kids slipping out of this house -- I have seen, you know, other occasions -- that the parents are hysterical. There are all to pieces. Like, I don't know what I'm gonna do; I need help; you got to come help me find my child; he was here a minute ago and now he is not. But you had twenty, thirty minutes that I'm aware of, they did not know where that child was and I'm under contentions that they did not know, after supposed taking care of this kid for twenty-four hours a day. Some way or another they lost twenty, thirty minutes.(Id. at 44:12-24). Deputy Lancaster asked Ms. Harkins how JR got out of the mobile home, but Ms. Harkins' answer is inaudible on the body camera footage (body camera file 2 at 3:00-10). However, at multiple points, Mr. Roach indicated that they had been asleep (body cam file 3 at 3:00-48). Further, Mr. Roach informed the deputies that JR had "done this one other time" (id. at 1:10-17). Examining the facts and circumstances within Deputy Ellison's knowledge at the time of the arrest - even when viewing in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs - were sufficient to warrant a reasonable person in believing that the plaintiffs had placed JR in an unreasonable risk of harm. Moreover, the fact that the plaintiffs were ultimately not prosecuted for the offense is of no consequence to this analysis, as evidence sufficient to convict is not required to establish probable cause. Gray, 137 F.3d at 769.
The plaintiffs argue that the Deputy Ellison did not have probable cause to arrest them because the deputies did not conduct an adequate investigation prior to arresting them (doc. 36 at 13-16). Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that, to have probable cause, Deputy Ellison needed to investigate how JR exited the mobile home, the circumstances of JR leaving the mobile home, and whether the parents did or failed to do something that placed JR in an unreasonable risk of harm (id. at 13).
As an initial matter, the plaintiffs have failed to cite any authority supporting their argument. Moreover, their argument seeks more than what is required by our precedent. "[T]he Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that law enforcement officers are not required to conduct exhaustive investigations to establish probable cause." Hayduk v. Cannon, C/A No. 6:19-cv-03355-BHH-JDA, 2020 WL 2308697, at *7 (D.S.C. Apr. 14, 2020) (collecting cases). Stated differently, "reasonable law enforcement officers are not required to exhaust every potentially exculpatory lead or resolve every doubt about a suspect's guilt before probable cause is established." Wadkins v. Arnold, 214 F.3d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see McKinney v. Richland Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 431 F.3d 415, 418-19 (4th Cir. 2005) ("The fact that [the officer] did not conduct a more thorough investigation before seeking the arrest warrant does not negate the probable cause established by the victim's identification."). "The question before [the court] is not whether [the officer] exhausted every potential avenue of investigation[, ]" Wadkins, 214 F.3d at 543, but whether the officer had probable cause based on the facts and circumstances within his knowledge at the time of the arrest. See Battle v. Jones, C/A No. 6:15-cv-4960-BHH-KDW, 2016 WL 7800306, at *6 (D.S.C. Dec. 20, 2016) ("[T]he law does not require that a police officer conduct an incredibly detailed investigation at the probable cause stage. Accordingly, the inquiry is whether an officer has reasonable grounds on which to act, not whether it was reasonable to conduct further investigation....") (quoting Crouch v. City of Hyattsville, C/A No. DKC 09-2544, 2012 WL 6019296, at *6 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 2012)). The Fourth Circuit has recognized, however, that officers' actions may be unreasonable and negate probable cause when they fail to investigate readily available exculpatory evidence of which they are aware. See Clipper v. Takoma Park, Md., 876 F.2d 17, 20 (4th Cir. 1989); Smith v. Reddy, 101 F.3d 351, 357 (4th Cir. 1996).
Here, as set out above, the deputies had probable cause for the plaintiffs' arrests. Moreover, it is clear that the deputies conducted a detailed investigation. The deputies spoke with witnesses, JR, the plaintiffs, neighbors, Mr. Sinclair, and Ms. Roark. Moreover, Deputy Lancaster gathered information from the plaintiffs and asked how JR got out of the mobile home. Further, the deputies attempted to gather information from Mr. Roach, but Mr. Roach replied, "I don't answer questions." In addition, the deputies likely would not have been able to discover that Mr. Sinclair had left the door open, as Ms. Harkins stated that Mr. Sinclair told her about this about one month after her arrest. While it is possible that the deputies could have asked more questions, such argument could be made regarding every investigation. See Torchinsky, 942 F.2d at 264 ("It will, of course, always be possible to contend in court that an arresting officer might have gathered more evidence, but judges cannot pursue all the steps a police officer might have taken that might have shaken his belief in the existence of probable cause."). Additionally, the plaintiffs have presented no allegations of Deputy Ellison being aware of readily available exculpatory evidence yet failing to pursue it. Because the deputies conducted an investigation and, based on the facts and circumstances within their knowledge at the time of the arrest, had probable cause for the plaintiffs' arrest, the undersigned finds that the plaintiffs' argument is unavailing.
The plaintiffs also argue that Deputy Ellison's affidavit before the magistrate judge negates any probable cause because it was materially misleading (doc. 36 at 18-19). In his affidavit submitted to the magistrate judge, Deputy Ellison provided that the plaintiffs "did allow [their] four year old child to leave the residence and cross Peach Orchard Road unattended causing traffic to stop in both directions" (doc. 36-7 at 2-3). The plaintiffs submit that Deputy Ellison's use of the word "allow" communicated to the magistrate judge that the plaintiffs knew and permitted JR to leave their home unattended and cross the road (id.).
However, as noted by the defendants, "allow" has several definitions, some of which encompass the factual allegations here. While "allow" may mean to give explicit permission, it may also mean to permit through inaction. See Allow, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/allow (defining "allow," among other definitions, as "to give permission to or for; permit" and "to permit by neglect, oversight, and the like"). While Deputy Ellison could have been more specific in his word usage, the undersigned cannot conclude that he intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth made material false statements to the magistrate judge. Rather, Deputy Ellison used a term which, by some definitions, can include the factual allegations at issue.
The plaintiffs further argue that the deputies lacked probable cause because Mr. Roach was not arrested for child neglect but actually for failing to answer the deputies' questions (doc. 36 at 17-18). The plaintiffs note that Deputy Ellison told Mr. Roach that he would be arrested if he did not cooperate and that Mr. Roach was arrested shortly after he refused to answer where he was employed (id.). However, even if Deputy Ellison had the subjective state of mind to arrest Mr. Roach for not answering questions, such motive would not remove the existence of probable cause. The Supreme Court of the United States has explained as follows:
Our cases make clear that an arresting officer's state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause. That is to say, his subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause. As we have repeatedly explained, the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action. [T]he Fourth Amendment's concern with reasonableness allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent. [E]venhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original); see Tyree v. United States, 417 Fed.Appx. 364, 366 (4th Cir. 2011) ("While discovery into the officer's subjective state of mind may have relevance to the malice element of the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim, a lack of probable cause may not be inferred from malice.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, because Deputy Ellison had probable cause for Mr. Roach's arrest, any improper subjective state of mind is irrelevant for this analysis. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the district court grant summary judgment to Deputy Ellison on the plaintiffs' § 1983 claim.
The defendants further argue that Deputy Ellison is entitled to qualified immunity (doc. 34-1 at 13-18). Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits as long as the conduct in question does not "violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Thus, qualified immunity is lost if an official violates a constitutional or statutory right of a plaintiff that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that an objectively reasonable official in the official's position would have known of the right. Id.
To determine whether qualified immunity applies, a district court must determine whether a plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all and whether the particular right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-56 (2014) (per curiam); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). "The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Here, as discussed above, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Deputy Ellison violated their constitutional rights. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the district court find that Deputy Ellison is entitled to qualified immunity.
C. Malicious Prosecution
The defendants further argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim, which is alleged against Sheriff White, Office of the Union County Sheriff, and the Union County Sheriff's Office (doc. 34-1 at 19-20). To succeed on a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show: "(1) the institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings; (2) by or at the instance of the defendant; (3) termination of such proceedings in [the] plaintiff's favor; (4) malice in instituting such proceedings; (5) lack of probable cause; and (6) resulting in injury or damage." Pallares v. Seinar, 756 S.E.2d 128, 131 (S.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In South Carolina, probable cause is similarly defined as existing "when the circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that a crime has been committed by the person being arrested." State v. George, 476 S.E.2d 903, 911 (S.C. 1996). Moreover, the chapter containing the statute under which the plaintiffs were arrested defines probable cause as "facts and circumstances based upon accurate and reliable information, including hearsay, that would justify a reasonable person to believe that a child subject to a report under this chapter is abused or neglected." S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-20(22).
Based on the reasons set out above, the undersigned finds that the plaintiffs have failed to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding a lack of probable cause under either federal or state law. Consequently, because the lack of probable cause is an essential element of a malicious prosecution claim, the undersigned recommends that the district court grant summary judgment for the defendants on this claim.
D. Negligence
The defendants also argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs' negligence cause of action, which is alleged against Sheriff White, Office of the Union County Sheriff, and the Union County Sheriff's Office, because it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations (doc. 34-1 at 18-19). The parties agree that the statute of limitations for this claim is two years (id.; doc. 36 at 24). Specifically, the South Carolina Tort Claims Act ("SCTCA") provides that for tort claims against governmental entities and their employees in South Carolina, "any action . . . is forever barred unless an action is commenced within two years after the date the loss was or should have been discovered . . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-110; see id. § 15-78-70(a) (the SCTCA provides the "exclusive remedy for any tort committed by an employee of a governmental entity.").
As set out above, the plaintiffs were arrested on March 16, 2018, and they filed the instant matter in state court on September 3, 2020. The plaintiffs do not dispute that more than two years passed from the time of their arrests to the time of the filing of this case (doc. 36 at 24). Nevertheless, the plaintiffs assert that summary judgment should be denied, as the question of when they should have known or discovered that they had a claim is best reserved for a jury (id.). Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that this case involves questions of law beyond the general knowledge of average citizens (id.). Moreover, the plaintiffs argue that there was no preliminary hearing, the case was not presented to a grand jury, and the charges were subsequently dismissed, delaying their realization that their arrests may have been without probable cause (id.).
It is undisputed that the plaintiffs did not file this action within the two-year time frame. Moreover, cases in this district elicit that the statute of limitations for claims surrounding an allegedly unlawful arrest begin to run at the time of the arrest. See e.g., McDonald v. Anderson Cty Sheriff's Off., C/A No. 8:19-cv-3212-HMH-KFM, 2020 WL 7033450, at *6 (D.S.C. Nov. 5, 2020) (finding that a plaintiff's state law negligence claim based on an alleged false arrest was time-barred when he did not file the complaint until over two years after the date of his arrest), R&R adopted by 2020 WL 7029942 (D.S.C. Nov. 30, 2020); Lyles v. Tracy, C/A No. 3:16-3882-JFA-PJG, 2018 WL 3120675, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 27, 2018) (finding that the statute of limitations for the plaintiff's false arrest claim began to run on the date of her arrest, even when the charges were subsequently dismissed by the solicitor), R&R adopted by 2018 WL 2355223 (D.S.C. May 24, 2018); Brown v. Leonard, C/A No. 2008-UP-039, 2008 WL 9832870, at *5 (S.C. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2008) (holding that a negligent supervision claim based on a deputy's arrest of the plaintiff had been filed outside of the statute of limitations because the statute began to run on the date of the arrest, not on the date that the plaintiff's charges were nolle prossed). Consequently, the undersigned recommends that the district court find that the plaintiffs' negligence cause of action is time-barred.
The plaintiffs also reference a state law claim for false arrest in their response regarding the statute of limitations (doc. 36 at 24). The plaintiffs may be referring to their negligence claim based on the alleged false arrest. However, to the extent that they are arguing a distinct claim, the plaintiffs did not bring a state law claim for false arrest in their complaint (see doc. 1-1). Moreover, even if they had, such claim would also be barred by the SCTCA statute of limitations.
III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 34) be granted.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).