Opinion
E075206
04-07-2021
In re S.Z., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.Z., Defendant and Appellant.
The Law Offices of Cynthia A. de Petris and Cynthia A. de Petris for Defendant and Appellant. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Anna M. Marchand and Prabhath D. Shettigar, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIJ1800217) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Cheryl C. Murphy, Judge. Affirmed. The Law Offices of Cynthia A. de Petris and Cynthia A. de Petris for Defendant and Appellant. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Anna M. Marchand and Prabhath D. Shettigar, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
C.Z. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating her reunification services with respect to her daughter, S.Z., after 18 months of services. For several reasons, Mother argues that the court should have continued her reunification services for another six months. We conclude that her arguments are meritless, and we affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
I. Detention, Jurisdiction, and Disposition
Thirteen-year-old S.Z. came to the attention of the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) in April 2018. Officers had arrested Mother on felony charges of corporal injury to a child. Mother reportedly hit S.Z. with a wooden spoon and pulled S.Z.'s hair, causing welts on her arms and redness and swelling on her head. Mother told the officers that if S.Z. were taken into protective custody, they would find that she had fractures and broken bones. S.Z. told the social worker that Mother hit her almost every day and that she wanted never to go back home.
Mother had adopted S.Z. in 2013 and was S.Z.'s sole parent. Mother reported that S.Z. had attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and fetal alcohol syndrome and that S.Z.'s psychiatrist and therapist were in Los Angeles. S.Z. took several psychotropic medications.
DPSS filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), alleging that mother had physically abused S.Z. (Unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code.) At the detention hearing, the juvenile court detained S.Z. from Mother. S.Z.'s counsel stated that S.Z. was adamant about not visiting Mother, and counsel asked the court to find visitation detrimental. Mother's counsel argued that the court did not have sufficient information to find that visits would be detrimental. He asked the court to order visits but "that the child not be physically forced to attend those visits." The court ordered visitation to occur in a therapeutic setting "after the therapist deem[ed] the visitation appropriate." It also ordered that S.Z. was "not to be forced to visit with the mother."
When interviewed for the jurisdiction and disposition report, S.Z. stated that Mother had started hitting her when she was seven or eight years old. S.Z. had not told anyone until recently because Mother said that no one would believe her or take her in if she reported Mother. While S.Z. was "[m]aybe" willing to talk to Mother, she did not want to live with or visit Mother. Before her adoption by Mother, S.Z. had been a dependent of the juvenile court because of sexual abuse, physical abuse, and substance abuse by her biological parents.
Mother's counsel did not permit DPSS to interview Mother. DPSS recommended that the court deny Mother reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), which authorizes denial of reunification services when jurisdiction is based on infliction of severe sexual abuse or severe physical harm to the child or a sibling.
The jurisdiction and disposition hearing was held in July 2018. At the hearing, DPSS indicated that the parties had reached an agreement. DPSS had filed an amended petition and recommended that the court grant Mother reunification services, and it submitted on the prior visitation order. Mother submitted on DPSS's amended report and amended petition and asked that the parties "move forward as quickly as possible on visitation," because no visitation had occurred yet.
The court found the allegations of the amended petition to be true—namely, that Mother had physically harmed S.Z., including by hitting S.Z. with a wooden spoon and causing welts, bruising, and red marks. The court removed S.Z. from Mother's custody and ordered reunification services. The court continued the prior visitation order and specifically authorized conjoint therapy "when appropriate" to initiate visitation as soon as possible.
S.Z.'s case plan required individual counseling, monthly psychiatric appointments to evaluate and monitor her psychotropic medications, consistent medical and dental examinations, and visitation consistent with the court's order. The court authorized DPSS to submit a case plan for Mother within 10 days via ex parte application.
II. Six-Month Review Period
The record contains no evidence that DPSS submitted Mother's case plan within 10 days of the July 2018 disposition hearing. But in October 2018, DPSS submitted a case plan update in connection with a hearing to review S.Z.'s psychotropic medication progress. (S.Z. had her psychiatric evaluation and was diagnosed with ADHD, bipolar disorder, and panic disorder, and she was taking medications to treat those conditions.) The case plan for Mother required a psychotropic medication evaluation, individual counseling, and parenting classes.
At a child and family team meeting in October 2018, Mother informed DPSS that S.Z.'s doctor had previously recommended neurological and neuropsychological testing to confirm S.Z.'s fetal alcohol syndrome diagnosis. DPSS asked the court to authorize neurological and neuropsychological examinations for S.Z., and the court did so at the October 2018 hearing to review the child's medication progress.
S.Z. was taking her medications regularly and participating in weekly individual counseling sessions, as well as therapeutic behavior support services three times per week. She also had a mental health case manager who regularly met with her to assess her ongoing mental health needs. DPSS had placed her in a group home, and after several initial incidents, she had adjusted well to the placement. DPSS submitted a report on S.Z.'s psychotropic medication stating that S.Z. had a neurological examination in November 2018.
Mother took her first parenting class in December 2018, but the provider then canceled the classes because of low attendance and planned to resume after the holidays. Mother refused to begin counseling on the advice of her criminal attorney. She said that she would start counseling after her criminal case was resolved.
S.Z. refused in-person visitation with Mother during the reporting period. S.Z. expressed anxiety and fear about seeing Mother. But she had weekly telephone contact with Mother supervised by the group home staff.
At the six-month review hearing in January 2019, Mother indicated that DPSS had incorrectly reported that S.Z. had received a neurological examination. DPSS agreed, saying that a psychological examination had taken place, but the neurological examination had yet to be done. DPSS indicated that it was awaiting Medi-Cal approval for the examination.
As to visitation, Mother asked the court to mandate that S.Z. "be involved in these therapeutic calls once a week." Mother also argued that S.Z.'s behavior contradicted the claim that S.Z. was anxious and fearful about having contact with Mother. Mother said that S.Z. had contacted her through Facebook, email, and text message when S.Z. wanted gifts or something else.
The court found that DPSS had made reasonable efforts to return S.Z. to a safe home through the provision of reasonable services. The court further found that Mother had made minimal progress in her case plan and that returning S.Z. to Mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to S.Z., and the court continued Mother's reunification services for another six months. The court again ordered that all contact between Mother and S.Z. occur in a therapeutic setting, and it ordered that "[t]he phone calls should obviously still continue."
III. Twelve-Month Review Period
In April 2019, Mother told DPSS that she was willing to have her evaluation and begin counseling, even though her criminal attorney had advised against those services. DPSS submitted a service referral for Mother that same day. Mother had successfully completed her parenting classes.
S.Z.'s group home manager reported that S.Z.'s primary care physician had submitted a request to Medi-Cal for a brain scan and brain mapping to assess S.Z. for neurological disabilities. The request was still pending. S.Z. continued to receive weekly therapy and monthly medication management. She was ready to transition out of the group home to a lower level of care, such as a therapeutic foster home. S.Z. identified a teacher with whom she had a strong bond, and she asked DPSS to explore placement with the teacher. S.Z. was still refusing in-person visitation with Mother, but S.Z.'s group home therapist supervised their telephone calls, which occurred "on a daily to weekly basis." S.Z. was uncertain whether she wanted to return to Mother's custody "because she did not want the things that happened between them to happen again."
Mother was not present at the 12-month review hearing in June 2019 because she was recovering from surgery. Mother's counsel submitted on DPSS's report and recommendation to continue reunification services. The court found that DPSS had made reasonable efforts to return S.Z. to a safe home through the provision of reasonable services. The court also found that Mother had made minimal progress in her case plan and that returning S.Z. to Mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to S.Z., and it continued Mother's reunification services for another six months. S.Z.'s teacher had moved to North Carolina, and the court authorized S.Z. to visit the teacher for two weeks. The court also authorized DPSS to submit a referral for assessment of the teacher's home under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) (Fam. Code, § 7900 et. seq.).
IV. Eighteen-Month Review Period
In September 2019, DPSS reported that Mother was waiting to complete surgical dental procedures before having her evaluation and beginning counseling.
S.Z. had moved to a new foster home and was seeing a new psychiatrist. She continued to take her medications regularly. DPSS submitted a referral for wraparound services and therapeutic behavior support services, through which S.Z. would receive counseling. S.Z.'s mental health case manager, whom she saw regularly, was also researching equine therapy for S.Z. near her new placement. The ICPC evaluation of S.Z.'s teacher in North Carolina was pending. The teacher intended to participate in S.Z.'s wraparound services via teleconference.
S.Z. reported that at her latest physical examination, her doctor said that she did not need a brain scan or brain mapping, and S.Z. did not want to have those procedures. The nurse reported that there was no pending request or referral for a neurological examination, but the nurse intended to request S.Z.'s records and give them to the doctor for further review.
S.Z. was still refusing in-person visitation with Mother. During the reporting period, Mother had given S.Z. a number of gifts for her promotion from middle school and her birthday. S.Z. loved Mother but did not feel safe returning to Mother's custody. She wanted to live with her teacher in North Carolina. The court authorized S.Z. to visit the teacher during the Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays.
DPSS recommended that the court terminate Mother's reunification services but not set a section 366.26 hearing. Instead, DPSS recommended that S.Z. remain in foster care with a goal of legal guardianship, assuming that the ICPC evaluation approved S.Z.'s teacher for placement.
Before the 18-month review hearing, Mother filed a declaration requesting six more months of reunification services. She declared that the social worker neglected her and S.Z. during the first six months of reunification and caused a rupture in their relationship. She also pointed out that S.Z. had not undergone a neurological examination yet, despite the court having authorized it over a year ago. Mother insisted that S.Z.'s counsel had blocked conjoint therapy and in-person visitation by wrongly insisting that S.Z. was afraid of Mother; S.Z. was never afraid of Mother during their weekly telephone calls, and S.Z. never hesitated to ask Mother for gifts. And Mother explained that DPSS had not given her referrals for a psychiatric evaluation and counseling until November 2019. When Mother called the listed agencies, one said that it no longer worked with the county, and the other said that it needed to speak to the social worker and "get a different type of referral." Mother had been out of town for three weeks over the holidays but had not received any messages about those services.
The 18-month review hearing was continued several times and eventually occurred in February 2020. At the hearing, the court asked deputy county counsel what had happened with the referral for Mother's counseling. Counsel explained that DPSS submitted the referral for counseling in April 2019, and in September, Mother indicated that she would go to counseling after her dental surgery. There was then some issue with the funding for Mother's counseling, and DPSS asked whether her insurance could pay for it, but she indicated that it would not. DPSS gave her the referrals in November 2019 and none after that because the 18-month review hearing was imminent.
The court concluded that it was not in S.Z.'s best interests to extend reunification services another six months, nor were there any exceptional circumstances warranting a six-month extension. The court noted that by statute, Mother was entitled to only 12 months of services, and the court had made a reasonable services finding at each of the prior review hearings. It observed that Mother had not completed the counseling component of her case plan, and there had been no in-person visitation for at least a year, primarily because S.Z. did not believe that she would be safe with Mother and did not want to see her.
The court found that DPSS had made reasonable efforts to return S.Z. to a safe home through the provision of reasonable services. It further found that Mother failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in her case plan and that return of S.Z. would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child. The court moreover found that there was no substantial probability of return if Mother was given six more months of reunification services, and it terminated her reunification services.
The court found a compelling reason that a section 366.26 hearing was not in S.Z.'s best interests—namely, that S.Z. was not a proper subject for adoption and that no one was willing to accept legal guardianship at that time. It ordered that S.Z. remain in out-of-home placement with a permanent plan of legal guardianship. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3).) The court authorized DPSS to place S.Z. with her teacher as soon as the home received ICPC approval.
DISCUSSION
I. Reasonableness of the Case Plan and Reunification Services
Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion and violated her due process rights by refusing to continue her reunification services for an additional six months. She argues that an extension was warranted because she and S.Z. did not receive reasonable reunification services. Mother has forfeited her arguments in large part. To the extent that she has not forfeited them, the arguments lack merit.
A. Mother's Services During the Six- and 12-Month Review Periods
Mother forfeited her challenge to the reasonableness of services during the six-and 12-month review periods. In dependency proceedings, the dispositional order is the judgment and thus is an appealable order. (A.M. v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 506, 512.) With exceptions not relevant here, any subsequent order is appealable as a postjudgment order. (Ibid.; In re T.G. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 687, 692.) Reasonable services findings are reviewable on appeal from the orders made at the corresponding review hearings. (In re T.G., at pp. 692-696.)
"An appeal from the most recent order in a dependency matter may not challenge earlier orders for which the time for filing an appeal has passed." (Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1018 (Sara M.); accord In re T.G., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 692.) "'Permitting a parent to raise issues going to the validity of a final earlier appealable order would directly undermine dominant concerns of finality and reasonable expedition,' including 'the predominant interest of the child and state.'" (Sara M., supra, at p. 1018.)
In this case, Mother specifically challenges the reasonableness of services provided during the six-month review period. But she did not seek review of the court's reasonable services finding after the six-month review hearing, nor did she seek review of the reasonable services finding after the 12-month review hearing. Those findings have long been final, and she has thus forfeited any challenge to them. (Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 811.) A parent may not "wait silently by until the final reunification review hearing to seek an extended reunification period based on a perceived inadequacy in the reunification services occurring long before that hearing." (Los Angeles County Dept. of Children etc. Services v. Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1093.)
The three cases on which Mother relies do not convince us otherwise. In T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, the parent sought writ review of the orders at the 12-month review hearing. (Id. at pp. 1233, 1237.) The court considered the adequacy of services during the six-month review period because the delays and nonprovision of services "spilled over" to the 12-month review period. (Id. at p. 1236, fn. 3.) Consistent with T.J. v. Superior Court, in one of the following subparts, we address the claimed delay in services that spilled over to the 18-month review period.
In the second case on which Mother relies, Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415, there was no argument that the parents had forfeited their challenge by failing to appeal prior reasonable services findings. "'It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions that are not considered.'" (In re K.T. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 15, 18-19.) And the third case, Serena M. v. Superior Court (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 659, supports our forfeiture conclusion. There, the court explained that "[o]rdinarily" its "review would be limited to that period following the last reasonable services finding, which if unchallenged is final and binding." (Id. at p. 675.) But the case presented a unique situation—the juvenile court combined the six-, 12-, and 18-month review hearings and determined the reasonableness of reunification services for the first time at the combined hearing. (Id. at pp. 668, 675.) The appellate court thus permitted the parent to challenge the reasonableness of visitation during the entire reunification period. (Id. at p. 675.) This case does not present those unique circumstances.
In sum, Mother forfeited her argument that she did not receive reasonable services during the six- and 12-month review periods.
B. The Visitation Order
Mother argues that the court abused its discretion by giving S.Z. complete control over whether visitation occurred. But Mother also forfeited her challenge to the visitation order.
At the detention hearing, the court ordered visitation to occur in a therapeutic setting after S.Z.'s therapist had deemed visitation appropriate, and it also ordered that visitation occur only with S.Z.'s consent. The court adopted that visitation order at the disposition hearing as part of the case plan. By failing to seek review of the dispositional order, Mother forfeited any challenge to the case plan as ordered, including the visitation order. (Sara M., supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1018; John F. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 400, 405 [parents forfeited their challenge to the court's order failing to provide for in-person visitation as part of the case plan].) She forfeited her challenge for the additional reason that, at the detention hearing, her counsel agreed to the condition that S.Z. should not be "physically forced" to attend visits. (In re Richard K. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 580, 590 ["[A] party is precluded from urging on appeal any point not raised in the trial court. . . . He who consents to an act is not wronged by it"].) Mother's later request that the court mandate weekly therapeutic calls does not change our conclusion. After Mother's request at the six-month review hearing, the court ordered that the already-occurring weekly calls continue. But Mother did not request that the court mandate in-person visitation. And if she was dissatisfied with the court's order, she could have appealed it. She did not.
Even if Mother had not forfeited her argument, and assuming that the court erred by giving S.Z. control over whether visitation occurred, Mother's argument would not require reversal. That is because she fails to demonstrate prejudice.
Mother generally argues that the court's erroneous reasonable services finding violated her right to due process, but the cases that she cites are inapposite. They discuss what due process requires before a court terminates parental rights. (See In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 222-224; In re Daniel G. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1215-1216.) They do not stand for the broad proposition that an erroneous visitation order or erroneous reasonable services finding amounts to a violation of the parent's due process rights. And this case does not involve termination of Mother's parental rights. The court did not set a hearing under section 366.26 to consider termination. On the contrary, the court found that S.Z. was not a proper subject for adoption and that legal guardianship was the child's permanent plan.
In any event, whether we apply the People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 test for errors of state law or the more stringent test for constitutional errors, any error was harmless. (In re J.P. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 789, 798 ["The harmless error analysis applies in juvenile dependency proceedings even where the error is of constitutional dimension"].) Mother does not challenge the court's requirement that in-person visitation begin only when approved by S.Z.'s therapist, nor does she point to evidence that S.Z.'s therapist ever approved in-person visitation as opposed to telephonic visitation. Accordingly, even if the court had not given S.Z. power to refuse visitation, the therapist's rejection of in-person visitation would have prevented it.
For these reasons, Mother forfeited her challenge to the visitation order, and even if she had not, she has not established prejudice.
C. Mother's Services During the 18-Month Review Period
Mother has not forfeited her challenge to the reasonableness of services during the 18-month review period, given that she timely appealed from the orders at the 18-month review hearing. She argues that DPSS did not make reasonable efforts to provide referrals for her psychiatric evaluation and counseling. Even if DPSS did not provide reasonable services, any error was harmless.
In dependency cases, the social services agency must make a good faith effort to implement a family reunification plan by identifying the problems that led to the parent's loss of custody, offering services to remedy those problems, maintaining reasonable contact with the parent, and making reasonable efforts to assist the parent when compliance proves difficult. (In re T.G., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 697.) "'The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.'" (Ibid.) We review the juvenile court's reasonable services finding for substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
If the juvenile court does not bypass reunification services, a parent generally is entitled to 12 months of services for a child who was age three or older when removed from the parent's custody. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) At the 12-month review hearing, the court may continue reunification services for up to six more months under limited circumstances: The court must find a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the parent's custody within the extended time period, or it must find that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent. (§§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A); 366.21, subd. (g)(1).)
At the 18-month review hearing, the court's power to continue reunification services for another six months is even more limited. (§ 366.22, subd. (b).) The court must determine, by clear and convincing evidence, that the best interests of the child would be served by additional services for a parent who falls into one of the following categories: (1) the parent is "in a court-ordered residential substance abuse treatment program" and is "making significant and consistent progress" in that program; (2) the parent was a minor or a nonminor dependent at the time of the initial hearing in the matter and is "making significant and consistent progress in establishing a safe home for the child's return"; or (3) the parent was recently released from "incarceration, institutionalization, or the custody of the United Stated Department of Homeland Security" and is "making significant and consistent progress in establishing a safe home for the child's return." (Ibid.) In addition, the court must find a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the parent's custody within the extended time period, or it must find that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent. (Ibid.; accord Earl L. v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1504.)
Here, on the advice of her criminal attorney, Mother refused to have her psychotropic medication evaluation or go to counseling for much of the reunification period. Approximately one month before the 12-month review hearing, Mother told DPSS that she was willing to have her evaluation and begin counseling. That was at the end of April 2019. DPSS did not provide Mother with referrals until November 2019—seven months later. And when Mother called the listed agencies, one no longer worked with the county, and the other needed to speak to the social worker before working with Mother. Mother did not receive any more referrals before the 18-month review hearing in February 2020. On this record, the court found DPSS had provided reasonable services.
Insofar as that finding was not supported by substantial evidence, any error was harmless. That is because Mother was not entitled to another six months of reunification services, regardless of whether she received reasonable services during the 18-month review period. She received the statutorily mandated 12 months of services and did not timely challenge those reasonable services findings. And she does not fall into the narrow category of parents entitled to 24 months of services—she was not in a residential substance abuse treatment program, she was not a minor or nonminor dependent at the time of the detention hearing, and she was not recently released from custody or institutionalization. (§ 366.22, subd. (b).) Moreover, the court expressly found that additional services did not serve S.Z.'s best interests, a finding that Mother does not challenge on appeal. The finding that additional services were in the child's best interests was necessary to continue services. (Ibid.) Accordingly, under section 366.22, subdivision (b), Mother was not entitled to another six months of services even if she did not receive reasonable services during the 18-month review period.
As discussed, the court did not set a section 366.26 hearing to consider termination of parental rights. But even if it had, any error in the reasonable services finding would still be harmless. The juvenile court may not terminate parental rights if "[a]t each hearing at which the court was required to consider reasonable efforts or services, the court has found that reasonable efforts were not made or that reasonable services were not offered or provided." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(2)(A), italics added.) Thus, if the court never finds that reasonable services were provided, it may not terminate parental rights. But when, as here, the court makes two unchallenged reasonable services findings that become final and binding, the court may terminate parental rights, regardless of whether it finds reasonable services at the third review hearing.
Mother does not analyze whether the reasonable services finding constituted harmless or prejudicial error. Instead, she presumes that the claimed error requires automatic reversal and additional services. Without any analysis, she cites In re K.C. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 323, at page 334, for the proposition that an erroneous reasonable services finding "'must be reversed.'" In re K.C. is inapposite. The parent in that case challenged what appeared to be the first reasonable services finding. (Id. at p. 328.) The appellate court observed that parents typically are entitled to 12 months of reunification services, and if the agency does not prove that the parents received reasonable services at the 12-month review hearing, the court must extend reunification services to the end of the 18-month period. (Id. at p. 329.) The court held that the reasonable services finding was not supported by substantial evidence, and the court reversed with directions to afford the parent more services "unless new circumstances" on remand supported a finding that additional services were unwarranted. (Id. at p. 334.) In re K.C. did not address prejudice at all. Nor did it address the remedy when the parent has received more than the statutorily mandated 12 months of services and fails to challenge the adequacy of services until the 18-month review hearing.
For these reasons, Mother's challenge to the reasonableness of her services during the 18-month review period lacks merit.
D. S.Z.'s Case Plan and Services During the 18-Month Review Period
Mother also argues that DPSS and the court failed to develop a "unique case plan" that took account of S.Z.'s medical needs, and she specifically faults DPSS for failing to get S.Z. the neurological examination approved by the court.
To the extent that Mother is challenging S.Z.'s case plan, she has forfeited that argument. The court adopted S.Z.'s case plan at the disposition hearing in July 2018. Mother did not appeal from the dispositional order, so she may not belatedly challenge the case plan. (Sara M., supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1018.)
As to the services provided to S.Z., Mother has not shown why the failure to obtain a neurological examination for the child means that Mother did not receive reasonable services. She merely states that DPSS's "lack of attention to obtaining proper care for [S.Z.] hindered reunification efforts since [S.Z.] needs a tremendous amount of care to function at the best of her ability." The conclusory statement that reunification efforts were hindered does not carry Mother's burden of showing reversible error.
In any event, even if DPSS's efforts to obtain the neurological examination were inadequate, the record contains substantial evidence that the agency complied with the case plan for the child and was sufficiently addressing the child's medical and mental health issues during the 18-month review period. S.Z. was continuing to see a psychiatrist and regularly taking her psychotropic medications. DPSS had submitted a referral for wraparound services and therapeutic behavior support services near S.Z.'s new foster home, and S.Z. was still seeing her mental health case manager, who was researching options for equine therapy. In addition, the child had routine physical and dental examinations during the period.
In sum, Mother forfeited her challenge to S.Z.'s case plan, and the failure to get S.Z.'s neurological examination did not render Mother's or S.Z.'s services unreasonable.
II. Detriment Finding
Mother argues that DPSS failed to establish that returning S.Z. to Mother's custody would be detrimental. She further argues that the court erred by failing to state the factual basis for its detriment finding. She contends that the remedy for those errors is to extend her more reunification services. The arguments are meritless.
At the 18-month review hearing, the court must return the child to the parent's custody unless it finds that return of the child "would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. The social worker shall have the burden of establishing that detriment." (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) "[T]he court shall specify the factual basis for its conclusion that return would be detrimental." (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(2).) "The failure of the parent or legal guardian to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental." (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) We review the juvenile court's detriment finding for substantial evidence. (In re A.J. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 154, 160.)
First, the court set forth the factual basis for its conclusion that returning S.Z. to Mother would be detrimental. The court expressly noted that Mother had not engaged in counseling and that there had been no in-person visitation for over one year. The court thus found that Mother failed to participate regularly in her case plan and make substantive progress in it. All of those facts constituted the basis for its detriment finding. Mother suggests that the court also had to "state the social worker met her burden of establishing detriment." But there is no requirement that the court make that express finding. It was implicit in the court's detriment finding that the social worker had carried her burden in the court's view.
Second, substantial evidence supports the court's detriment finding. Mother never had her psychotropic medication evaluation, nor did she ever attend counseling. By the time of the 18-month review hearing, S.Z. had been out of Mother's custody for approximately 22 months. There had been no in-person visitation during that time. S.Z. was anxious and fearful about seeing Mother, given the physical harm that Mother had inflicted on her, and the child did not feel safe returning to Mother's custody. There was thus no showing that Mother could safely interact with S.Z., which was especially important when jurisdiction was based on the nonaccidental infliction of physical harm on a child who had also been physically abused by her biological parents. The evidence amply supported the conclusion that returning S.Z. to Mother's custody posed a substantial risk of detriment to S.Z.'s physical or emotional well-being.
Mother asserts that the court erroneously delegated its decisionmaking powers to the social worker by relying on the social worker's statements. The argument is misplaced. The plain terms of the relevant statute require the court to "review and consider the social worker's report and recommendations" in determining detriment. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) The court properly considered the social worker's report and the related arguments of deputy county counsel. But nothing in the record shows that the court abdicated its factfinding and decisionmaking role in the manner suggested by Mother.
For all of these reasons, Mother's challenge to the detriment finding fails.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating Mother's reunification services is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. RAPHAEL
J.