Opinion
Richard H. Edwards, Blaine, Edwards & Wideman, St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiff.
Thomas J. Guilfoil, Jim J. Shoemake and John W. O'Neil, Jr., Guilfoil, Symington, Petzall & Shoemake, St. Louis, Mo., for defendants.
MEMORANDUM
NANGLE, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court upon defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff brought this suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ss 1332 and 1337 seeking monetary damages. Plaintiff alleges, in Count I of the complaint,
Plaintiff further alleges that this requirement constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade in that plaintiff was precluded from selling his services to a team which would assure him compensation should he be injured. Plaintiff prays for damages in the amount of $600,000.00 under the anti-trust laws.
In Count II of the complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant Jets breached the contract between the parties by refusing to pay plaintiff's salary for the 1976 football season, and further breached the same contract by unilaterally terminating the same,
by refusing to pay for medical and hospital care, by refusing to pay necessary travel expenses, and by refusing to exercise the option to renew plaintiff's contract for the 1977 football season. Plaintiff prays for an award of $200,000.00.
In Count III of the complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant Jets breached its implied covenant not to impair plaintiff's rights to receive the benefits of the contract, by wrongfully concealing from plaintiff the true nature of his physical condition and injury. Plaintiff prays for damages in the amount of $200,000.00.
Plaintiff has not responded to the instant motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the following facts appear to be undisputed:
On July 29, 1977, the Honorable Earl R. Larson, United States Senior District Judge for the District of Minnesota, entered an order approving a stipulation and settlement of a class action entitled Alexander v. National Football League, No. 4-76C 123. The class which had been certified in that cause was "the class consisting of all professional football players who have been under contract to one or more of the defendants at any time since September 17, 1972". Id., order of March 4, 1977. Defendant Jets herein was named as a defendant in that suit. By order of Judge Larson, notices of the hearing on the proposed settlement of the class action were sent to all members of the plaintiff class at the last known address; additionally, publication of the notice was made in two publications and released to the wire services. Members of the class were given an opportunity to object; plaintiff herein did not do so. The settlement, which was approved by the court, provides in relevant part:
The agreement is dated March 4, 1977 and was approved by the court on July 29, 1977. Plaintiff filed this suit on September 21, 1977. It is clear that defendants' motion
for summary judgment must be granted as to Count I of the complaint. Said count alleges a violation of the anti-trust laws stemming from defendants' use of the Standard Player Contract. Such claim is embraced in the covenant not to sue contained in the settlement of the Alexander case and is binding upon plaintiff herein. See Richard's Lumber and Supply Company v. United States Gypsum Company, 545 F.2d 18, 20 (7th Cir. 1976) wherein the court held that a covenant not to sue, contained in the settlement of a prior class action suit, precluded the plaintiff, who had been a class member, from proceeding. The court stated that "in the absence of proof that it was the product of duress, such a release is fully enforceable". Id. at 20. Plaintiff has made no claim of duress herein. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted as to Count I of the complaint.
In Count II, plaintiff alleges that defendant Jets breached the 1976 contract by refusing to pay plaintiff's salary for the 1976 season, unilaterally terminating the contract, refusing to pay medical expenses, refusing to pay travel expenses and refusing to exercise the option to renew the contract.
On November 7, 1974, plaintiff and defendant Jets entered into three separate contracts: one covered the time period from November 7, 1974 through May 1 following the close of the football season commencing in 1974 (the 1974 contract); one covered the time period from May 1, 1975 until May 1 following the close of the football season commencing in 1975 (the 1975 contract); and the last covered the time period from May 1, 1976 until May 1 following the close of the football season commencing in 1976 (the 1976 contract). The 1976 contract, which is the subject of Count II of the complaint, provides in pertinent part:
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he sustained a serious and permanent injury to his ankle in the course of playing professional football on September 28, 1975. He further alleges that on July 22, 1976, defendant Jets unilaterally terminated his contract as a result of the injury.
Defendant Jets clearly had the contractual right to terminate plaintiff because of his injury if he were unable to establish, to the satisfaction of the Club physician, his excellent physical condition. Plaintiff does not allege that he was, in fact, in excellent condition. Thus, the Court concludes that the termination of the 1976 contract was not improper. See Hennigan v. Chargers Football Company, 431 F.2d 308, 318 (5th Cir. 1970).
Plaintiff also asserts that defendant Jets breached the contract by refusing to pay his salary for the 1976 season. The contract, however, clearly specifies that payment of salary is due only for his services under the term of the contract, or any balance owing thereunder upon termination. Since the contract was terminated prior to the performance of any services thereunder, no payments can be made. Similarly, plaintiff's claim that defendant breached the 1976 contract by refusing to pay medical expenses and travel expenses is without merit. The 1976 contract clearly states that medical payments are due only for injuries incurred in the performance of services "under this contract". Since plaintiff's injury predated the 1976 contract, there can be no breach of the 1976 contract for failure to pay medical expenses. Sample v. Gotham Football Club, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 160, 165 (S.D.N.Y.1973).
Plaintiff has admitted in deposition that the claim that defendant Jets breached the contract by failing to pay travel expenses owing under the 1976 contract is without merit.
Equally without merit is plaintiff's claim that defendant Jets breached the contract by failing to exercise the option to renew the contract. The option clause states that "(t)he Club may" renew the contract. The Court fails to see how this discretionary right, vested in defendant Jets, can form the basis of a claim of breach of contract.
In Count III, plaintiff asserts that defendant Jets breached its implied covenant not to impair plaintiff's rights to receive the benefits of the contract by wrongfully concealing from plaintiff the true nature of his physical condition and injury. In Brinkman v. Buffalo Bills Football Club, etc., 433 F.Supp. 699 (W.D.N.Y.1977), the plaintiff brought suit asserting failure to provide required medical care in breach of the contract, negligent failure to provide medical care, and negligent pronouncement that the plaintiff was able to pay. The court held that such claims were barred by virtue of the New York State's Workmen's Compensation Law:
Accordingly, the Court concludes that defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted with reference to Count III as well.
Appropriate orders will issue.