Opinion
Civil No. 99-1012 (JAG)
November 13, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
On August 5, 2002, defendant Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") moved for summary judgment on plaintiff Angel Ruiz Rivera's ("Ruiz") claims under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7431-7433, the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as supplemental state law claims (Docket No. 54). On August 22, 2002, Ruiz filed an opposition (Docket No. 70). On September 24, 2002, the Court issued an Opinion and Order granting summary judgment and entered judgment dismissing the case with prejudice; mainly, because Ruiz is not the taxpayer, as defined in the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code"), with standing to sue (Docket No. 82). On October 3, 2002, plaintiff Angel Ruiz Rivera ("Ruiz") moved for the Court to reconsider its decision (Docket No. 86). For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies the motion.
DISCUSSION A. Motion for Reconsideration Standard
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), a party may ask the Court "to amend its judgment based on newly discovered material evidence or because the Court committed a manifest error of law or fact." Colon v. Fraticelli, 181 F. Supp.2d 48, 50 (D.P.R. 2002) (citing Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1997)). Rule 59(e), however, is "aimed at reconsideration, [and] not initial consideration," and thus is not a proper mechanism to advance arguments that should have been presented before judgment was entered, but were not. See Jorge Rivera Surillo Co., Inc. v. Falconer Glass Indus., Inc. 37 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing F.D.I.C. v. World Univ. Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1992)); see also Aybar, 188 F.3d at 16.
B. Ruiz's Motion for Reconsideration
In its Opinion and Order, the Court found that Ruiz did not have standing to sue under the Code because he is not the taxpayer as defined therein. The Code states that the taxpayer can sue the IRS under §§ 7431-7433 only for damages incurred in the collection of his own taxes. (See Docket No. 82 at 7-10). Previously, the Court had dismissed defendant Compañia de Inversiones Urayoan ("CIU") from the case due to the fact that the corporation cannot represent itself and, since he is not an attorney, Ruiz could not represent it. Ruiz had been given ample time in which to find legal representation for CIU, however, he failed to do so. Ruiz argued, and continues to argue, that he should be allowed to continue his case against the IRS because he is the person that the IRS holds solely responsible for the debts of his corporations, Instituto de Educación Universal ("IEU") and CIU. Although he cites to the proper case law establishing that he can be held responsible for IEU and CIU's debts to the IRS, Ruiz has failed to demonstrate that being responsible for their debts makes him the taxpayer, as defined in the Code, and that he can sustain an action under §§ 7431-33. Without this showing, Ruiz has failed to demonstrate that the Court "committed a manifest error of law or fact," Colon, 181 F. Supp.2d at 50, as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Because Ruiz has also failed to submit newly discovered evidence that could affect the Court's decision, the motion for reconsideration must be denied.
Ruiz alleges that he is the sole person responsible for the liabilities of IEU and CIU because they are no longer in existence, their certificates of incorporation having been revoked by the Secretary of State. Ruiz has failed, however, to provide the Court with any evidence, other than his own statements, which would prove that fact. There is not even mention on the record of the date when this alleged revocation occurred. Puerto Rico's General Corporation Law provides that the corporation, "whether [it] expires by [its] own limitation or otherwise, shall continue to exist corporate entity for a period of three (3) years . . . or for any such longer period which the [Court] may, in its discretion, direct for purposes of advancing any suits initiated by the corporation. . . ." 14 P.R. Laws Ann. § 3008. Furthermore,
[w]ith respect to any action, suit or proceeding filed or initiated by or against the corporation . . . within the period of three (3) years, the corporation shall continue as a corporate body after the three-year term, and until all judgments, orders or decrees . . . are fully executed, without the need for any special provision to that effect by the [Court].
Id.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Ruiz's motion for reconsideration.
IT IS SO ORDERED.