Opinion
CV176037355S
11-28-2018
Rosalie RIVERA v. Officer Armando ELIAS
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETER EMMETT WIESE, JUDGE
I
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This § 1983 action arises out of an interaction between the plaintiff, Rosalie Rivera, and the defendant Officer Armando Elias on April 19, 2014, around 4 p.m. outside a shopping center in New Britain. On September 11, 2018, the plaintiff filed the operative amended complaint against both Officer Elias and the defendant city of New Britain alleging the following facts. The plaintiff entered a store, leaving her husband, Carlos Rivera, outside with the plaintiff’s three children and nephew in her vehicle. The plaintiff exited the store to find two police officers questioning her husband. After the plaintiff told Officer Elias that she was the mother of the children in the vehicle, Officer Elias immediately, forcefully grabbed the plaintiff’s arm and twisted it behind her back while slamming her face against the car window; Officer Elias then slammed the plaintiff’s body into her vehicle two more times. Officer Elias handcuffed the plaintiff and forced her into the back of his police vehicle, closing the door on her leg, which had gotten stuck outside of the police vehicle.
Although the plaintiff’s amended complaint does not clearly delineate any counts, it may be construed from paragraphs 1, 17, 21, and 23 that the plaintiff seeks redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Connecticut constitution for claims of alleged false arrest, excessive force, and failure to read the plaintiff her Miranda rights.
On January 22, 2018, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to the entire complaint on the ground that all of the plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the following: (1) the official capacity claim against Officer Elias is merely redundant of the claim against the city of New Britain; (2) there was probable cause for the plaintiff’s arrest; (3) any force used was objectively reasonable and not excessive; (4) there is no private, civil cause of action for fifth amendment Miranda violations; and (5) there is no private cause of action available under the Connecticut constitution. The motion was accompanied by a memorandum of law and the following evidence: the Case/Incident Report of Officer Joseph Milhomens (Exhibit A) and the Supplemental Report of Officer Elias (Exhibit B). On March 1, 2018, the defendants filed a supplemental memorandum of law with a sworn affidavit of Officer Elias (Exhibit C). On May 25, 2018, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion, and submitted the following evidence: an affidavit of Carlos Rivera dated July 31, 2014 (Exhibit A) and images of two Facebook comments made by Officer Elias (Exhibits B and C). On June 8, 2018, the plaintiff filed a supplemental memorandum of law with an affidavit of the plaintiff. On September 4, 2018, the plaintiff also submitted an affidavit of Carlos Rivera dated August 31, 2018. On July 2, 2018, the defendants filed a reply to the plaintiff’s opposition.
The court granted the plaintiff’s September 11, 2018 request to amend her complaint so that paragraph three now clearly alleges that Officer Elias was acting in his individual capacity, not in his official capacity. This ground, thus, is no longer an issue to be addressed in this memorandum.
By agreement of the parties, the plaintiff’s false arrest claim has been abandoned and, thus, is no longer an issue to be addressed in this memorandum.
The defendants also filed a second supplemental memorandum of law on April 16, 2018, which included the following evidence: a certified copy of the disposition of the plaintiff’s criminal charges (Exhibit D) and an excerpt of the plaintiff’s response to the defendants’ first set of interrogatories (Exhibit E). This memorandum and evidence, however, relate only to the now abandoned false arrest claim.
II
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). "In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not to decide issues of material fact ... but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) RMS Residential Properties, LLC v. Miller, 303 Conn. 224, 233, 32 A.3d 307 (2011). "[T]he court’s role is not to weigh the credibility of the parties, which falls within the province of the finder of fact ... When a court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, is confronted with conflicting facts, resolution and interpretation of which would require determinations of credibility, summary judgment is not appropriate." (Citation omitted.) Straw Pond Associates, LLC v. Fitzpatrick, Mariano & Santos, P.C., 167 Conn.App. 691, 710, 145 A.3d 292, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 930, 150 A.3d 231 (2016). "[T]he trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ... The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bozelko v. Papastavros, 323 Conn. 275, 282, 147 A.3d 1023 (2016).
III
DISCUSSION
A. Excessive Force
The defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff’s excessive force claim fails as a matter of law because (1) all force used was objectively reasonable; (2) the plaintiff’s injuries were de minimis; and (3) rude or offensive comments do not give rise to excessive force. The seminal case addressing excessive force claims brought under § 1983 is Graham v. Connor. 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). The Supreme Court held that "all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest ... should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its reasonableness standard ..." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 395. "[P]roper application [of this indefinable reasonableness standard] requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 396. The ultimate inquiry is "whether the officer’s actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them ..." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 397. "Given the fact-specific nature of the inquiry, granting summary judgment against a plaintiff on an excessive force claim is not appropriate unless no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the officers’ conduct was objectively unreasonable." Amnesty America v. West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 123 (2d Cir. 2004).
Connecticut courts typically rely on the persuasive authority of the Second Circuit to guide their analysis of excessive force claims brought under § 1983 as well as their analysis of qualified immunity claims. See Red Maple Properties v. Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 730, 739 n. 7, 610 A.2d 1238 (1992) ("In deciding to adopt the analysis of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, [this Supreme Court of Connecticut] recognize[s] that [t]he decisions of the federal circuit in which a state court is located are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of a federal statute. This is particularly true in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases, where the federal statute confers concurrent jurisdiction on the federal and state courts ... We do not believe that when Congress enacted the concurrent jurisdiction provision of § 198 that it intended to create such a disparate treatment of plaintiffs depending on their choice of a federal or state forum." [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).
In the present case, there remain outstanding factual disputes regarding the nature and extent of the force used. According to paragraphs 9 through 14 of the amended complaint, the plaintiff’s affidavit, and Carlos Rivera’s two affidavits, Officer Elias allegedly immediately, forcefully grabbed the plaintiff’s arm, slammed her face against her car window, slammed her body into her car twice, forced her into the back of his police vehicle, and slammed the door on her leg all while the plaintiff remained placid. The defendants, however, deny all allegations of use of force. According to Officer Elias’ incident report, the plaintiff allegedly was loudly yelling in Officer Elias’ face obnoxiously, was visibly confrontational, and was refusing to follow instructions to quiet down and allow the officers to continue their investigation. When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "the court’s role is not to weigh the credibility of the parties, which falls within the province of the finder of fact ... When a court ... is confronted with conflicting facts, resolution and interpretation of which would require determinations of credibility, summary judgment is not appropriate." (Citation omitted.) Straw Pond Associates, LLC v. Fitzpatrick Mariano & Santos, P.C., supra, 167 Conn.App. 710. Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the force used was "excessive" in light of the facts, circumstances, and various factors that must be considered. Further, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Officer Elias’ conduct was objectively unreasonable. Finally, "[i]f the force used was unreasonable and excessive, the plaintiff may recover even if the injuries inflicted were not permanent or severe." Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 924 (2d Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied as to the excessive force claim.
In Robison, the court denied summary judgment of an excessive force claim where similarly, the defendant state trooper "pushed [the plaintiff] against the inside of the door of her car, yanked her out, threw [her] up against the fender, and twisted [her] arm behind [her] back," causing only bruises. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 923-24 (2d Cir. 1987).
B. Qualified Immunity
The defendants argue that even if the plaintiff had set forth a viable excessive force claim, Officer Elias would be entitled to qualified immunity. "State courts follow federal precedent in interpreting the doctrine of qualified immunity." Outlaw v. Meriden, 43 Conn.App. 387, 395, 682 A.2d 1112, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 946, 686 A.2d 122 (1996). "[Q]ualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6, 134 S.Ct. 3, 187 L.Ed.2d 341 (2013). "As a general rule, police officers are entitled to qualified immunity if (1) their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights, or (2) it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their acts did not violate those rights." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Weyel v. Catania, 52 Conn.App. 292, 296, 728 A.2d 512, cert. denied, 248 Conn. 922, 733 A.2d 846 (1999).
Regarding the first inquiry of whether a right is clearly established, "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." (Emphasis added.) Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Regarding the second inquiry of whether the objective reasonableness standard is met, officers are entitled to qualified immunity "if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on [the legality of the conduct at issue]" given the factual circumstances. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986); see also Crone v. Connelly, 74 Conn.App. 788, 798, 813 A.2d 1084 (2003), aff’d, 267 Conn. 581, 840 A.2d 552 (2004).
In the present case, the defendants have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating no genuine issue of material fact as to either prong that would entitle Officer Elias to qualified immunity. Pursuant to the first prong of the qualified immunity test, the defendants cannot show that Officer Elias’ conduct did not violate a "clearly established constitutional right" because (1) the right to be free from excessive force, arising under the fourth amendment, was clearly established in Graham; and (2) this inquiry cannot be answered on summary judgment because of the outstanding factual disputes as to the nature and reasonableness of any force used. See Mills v. Fenger, 216 F.App’x 7, 8-9 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[b]ecause whether force is excessive turns on its reasonableness ... [s]ummary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is not appropriate when there are facts in dispute that are material to a determination of reasonableness" [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Pursuant to the second prong of the test, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendants have not demonstrated that there is no genuine issue of material fact that an objectively reasonable officer in Officer Elias’ position would have believed his or her acts did not violate the clearly established right to be free from excessive force. When applying this standard to the plaintiff’s alleged facts, the defendants have failed to demonstrate that no reasonable jury could find that it was objectively unreasonable for Officer Elias-or any reasonable officer-to believe it was constitutionally sound to slam the plaintiff’s body into her vehicle two additional times and intentionally close the police vehicle door on her leg when the plaintiff allegedly showed no active resistance or noncompliance, did not attempt to evade arrest by flight, and posed no immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others. The defendants may not rely on bare assertions without the submission of legal or evidentiary support. It is not enough, without explanatory case law or other support, to merely assert that "Officer Elias is entitled to qualified immunity, because a reasonable officer on the scene could have believed that the small amount of force the plaintiff alleges was used ... was objectively reasonable under the circumstances." Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied as to the qualified immunity claim.
C. Fifth Amendment Miranda Violations
In their memoranda of law in support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff’s fifth amendment claim fails as a matter of law because there is no established private, civil cause of action for alleged Miranda violations. The plaintiff does not respond to the defendants’ contention. In Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772, 123 S.Ct. 1994, 155 L.Ed.2d 984 (2003), the Supreme Court explained that "violations of judicially crafted prophylactic rules do not violate the constitutional rights of any person." The Miranda exclusionary rule was established "as a prophylactic measure to prevent violations of the right protected by the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause-the admission into evidence in a criminal case of confessions obtained through coercive custodial questioning." Id. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held in Chavez that the police’s "failure to read Miranda warnings to [the plaintiff] did not violate [the plaintiffs] constitutional rights and cannot be grounds for a § 1983 action." Id. Both the Second Circuit and the United States District Court of Connecticut have reiterated this holding. See Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. Safer, 156 F.3d 340, 346 (2d Cir. 1998) ("plaintiff’s cannot base a § 1983 claim solely on a law enforcement officer’s failure to administer Miranda warnings"); see Traylor v. Hammond, 94 F.Supp.3d 203, 213-14 (D.Conn. 2015) ("a police officer’s failure to read Miranda warnings to an individual does not violate such individual’s constitutional rights and cannot be grounds for a § 1983 action" [internal quotation marks omitted]).
The plaintiff alleges that she was not read her Miranda rights as required by the fourth amendment to the United States constitution. The court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), discussed the issuance of Miranda warnings in the context of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination ("[t]he requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege"). This memorandum, like the defendants, presumes that the plaintiff intended to make a claim of failure to read her Miranda rights under the fifth amendment.
Here, the plaintiff alleges in paragraph 17 of the amended complaint that she was never read her Miranda rights. Pursuant to Chavez, supra, 538 U.S. 772, however, an officer’s failure to read a plaintiff her Miranda rights is not, by itself, a constitutional violation or grounds for a § 1983 action. In the present case, there were no coercively obtained, self-incriminating statements that "were used against the plaintiff[ ] in a criminal proceeding." See Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. Safer, supra, 156 F.3d 346. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to this claim only.
D. State Constitution Claims
The defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff’s claims under the Connecticut constitution fail as a matter of law because there is no private right of action available. Our Supreme Court has recognized a limited private cause of action for money damages against state officers based on violations of article first, §§ 7 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution. Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23, 710 A.2d 688 (1998). Although both parties correctly assert that the court in Binette, supra, 48, held that "[w]hether to recognize a cause of action for alleged violations of other state constitutional provisions in the future must be determined on a case-by-case basis," this instruction has no relevant bearing on the present case. When the complaint is construed broadly and realistically, it can be reasonably inferred from paragraphs 1 and 21 of the amended complaint that the plaintiff alleges a violation of article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution. See Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 559, 864 A.2d 1 (2005) ("[t]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court" [internal quotation marks omitted]). Thus, the court does not need to reach the "case-by-case" analysis test for recognizing any new right to a cause of action; the facts as alleged here qualify as an already recognized Binette claim under § 7.
Article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution provides in relevant part: "The people shall be secure in their persons ... from unreasonable ... seizures ..."
Article first, § 9, of the Connecticut constitution provides: "No person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly warranted by law."
Paragraph 1 of the amended complaint states: "This is an action for money damages and other relief to redress the deprivation of civil rights under section 1983 of the Constitution of the U.S. and the State of Connecticut." Paragraph 21 of the amended complaint states: "The plaintiff had a clearly established Constitutional right to be free from unlawful arrest and unreasonable force."
Whether the facts of the present case are sufficiently similar to or as egregiously actionable as the facts in Binette is not before the court on this motion for summary judgment. Ultimately, the court in Binette already created a private cause of action for claims such as the plaintiffs and, thus, the defendants have failed to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff’s claims under the state constitution fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied on this ground.
IV
CONCLUSION
The defendants’ motion for summary judgment is hereby denied as to the excessive force, qualified immunity, but granted as to the fifth amendment Miranda violations claim and state constitutional claims.