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Rittner v. Kinder

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
Aug 20, 2008
290 F. App'x 796 (6th Cir. 2008)

Summary

holding "district courts may deny a prisoner leave to proceed pursuant to § 1915(g) when the prisoner's claims of imminent danger are conclusory or ridiculous, or are clearly baseless (i.e. are fantastic or delusional and rise to the level of irrational or wholly incredible)"

Summary of this case from Bennett v. Wise

Opinion

No. 06-4472.

August 20, 2008.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.

BEFORE: DAUGHTREY and MOORE, Circuit Judges and DUGGAN, District Judge.

The Honorable Patrick J. Duggan, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.


Plaintiff-appellant Daniel Rittner Sr. ("Rittner") appeals the district court's dismissal of his civil rights action pursuant to the "three strikes" rule in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This court finds that the district court's dismissal of Rittner's complaint was proper, as Rittner previously filed more than three lawsuits that were dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and there is no suggestion that Rittner "is under imminent danger of serious physical injury." We therefore affirm the district court's order.

BACKGROUND

Rittner, an Ohio prisoner, filed a pro se action against defendants-appellants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on August 14, 2006. On September 28, 2006, finding that on at least five prior occasions Rittner filed civil actions that failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the district court issued an opinion and order dismissing Rittner's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.1915(g).

Rittner now appeals that dismissal, contending that the district court incorrectly found that he was not in imminent danger of serious physical injury. Rittner also contends that some or all of his prior actions were improperly dismissed.

ANALYSIS

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prohibits a prisoner from bringing a civil action or appeal if the prisoner has "three strikes." The statute reads:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Thus under the statute, there is an exception to the three strikes rule where the prisoner alleges that he or she is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. Id.

The allegations in Rittner's complaint do not warrant application of the imminent danger exception in § 1915(g). While the Sixth Circuit has not defined the term "imminent danger" for purposes of this section, other Circuits have held that to meet the requirement, the threat or prison condition "must be real and proximate" and the danger of serious physical injury must exist at the time the complaint is filed. See, e.g., Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003); Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 313 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc). Thus a prisoner's assertion that he or she faced danger in the past is insufficient to invoke the exception. Id. Other Circuits also have held that district courts may deny a prisoner leave to proceed pursuant to § 1915(g) when the prisoner's claims of imminent danger are "conclusory or ridiculous," Ciarpaglini, 352 F.3d at 331, or are "`clearly baseless' (i.e. are fantastic or delusional and rise to the level of `irrational or wholly incredible).'" Gibbs v. Cross, 160 F.3d 962, 967 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1733, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992)).

In his complaint, Rittner alleged that the defendants are preventing him from using the prison law library and from obtaining legal assistance and materials, have not properly processed his grievances, and have subjected him to threats and intimidation. Rittner contended that insufficient access to the law library and legal assistance and materials hindered his ability to file and/or prosecute certain lawsuits. There is no indication that Rittner faces imminent physical peril as a result of his alleged inability to file and/or prosecute lawsuits. While Rittner also alleged that he has been intimidated and threatened if he does not stop filing grievances, the examples he provided of such "threats" and "intimidation" either do not constitute threats of physical injury, are described with insufficient facts and detail to establish that he is in danger of imminent physical injury, or are "irrational or wholly incredible."

For example, Rittner alleged that the following response to one of his grievances constituted a threat and intimidation:

The CCNO [Corrections Center of Northwest Ohio] Executive Director is not here to be your legal assistant. You are to work through your Case Manager and Ms. Shambarger as I have directed you in the past. This is frivolous. You are abusing the grievance procedures and my time. Cease and desist.

(Dist. Ct. Doc. 1, ¶ 47, quoting Ex. 15.)

For example, Rittner alleged: "In considering the totality of the facts and information g[]athered by Plaintiff he had good reason to fear for his life. The intimidation was incredible. All the inmates in the unit were w[e]ll aware of the threats received from Dennis and his staff." (Dist. Ct. Doc. 1, ¶ 49.)

For example, Rittner claimed that "the continued responses to his grievances" (i.e. denials, that his grievances are frivolous, and the he must stop abusing the grievance process) "lead [him] to fear for his life." (Dist. Ct. Doc. 1, ¶ 48.) Rittner also alleged that a private investigator working for him "firmly warned [him] of the threats against him made by Dennis" and advised him: "YOU NEED TO STOP MAKING COMPLAINTS, YOU ARE GOING TO GET HURT." ( Id., ¶ 62.)

As indicated previously, Rittner also contends that some or all of the prior actions on which the district judge based his "three strikes" finding were improperly dismissed. The issue of whether Rittner's earlier cases were correctly dismissed, however, is not within the purview of this appeal and Rittner never appealed those decisions directly.

CONCLUSION

In summary, we find that the district court properly determined that Rittner was subject to the three strikes rule and that his complaint failed to suggest that he was "under imminent danger of serious physical injury." Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court's order dismissing Rittner's complaint pursuant to § 1915(g).


Summaries of

Rittner v. Kinder

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
Aug 20, 2008
290 F. App'x 796 (6th Cir. 2008)

holding "district courts may deny a prisoner leave to proceed pursuant to § 1915(g) when the prisoner's claims of imminent danger are conclusory or ridiculous, or are clearly baseless (i.e. are fantastic or delusional and rise to the level of irrational or wholly incredible)"

Summary of this case from Bennett v. Wise

holding that, for a plaintiff to meet the imminent danger exception, the threat of serious physical injury "must be real and proximate."

Summary of this case from Foster v. O.D.R.C.

finding other circuits have denied a prisoner leave to proceed in forma pauperis when the prisoner's claims of imminent danger are "conclusory or ridiculous," Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003), or are "'clearly baseless' (i.e. are fantastic or delusional and rise to the level of 'irrational or wholly incredible')"

Summary of this case from McGee v. Unknown Part(y)(ies)

finding other circuits have denied a prisoner leave to proceed in forma pauperis when the prisoner's claims of imminent danger are "conclusory or ridiculous," Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003), or are "'clearly baseless' (i.e. are fantastic or delusional and rise to the level of 'irrational or wholly incredible')"

Summary of this case from McGore v. Hofbauer

concluding allegations "that the defendants are preventing [plaintiff] from using the prison law library and from obtaining legal assistance and materials, have not properly processed his grievances, and have subjected him to threats and intimidation" do not demonstrate imminent danger of serious physical injury

Summary of this case from Nyenekor v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons

providing that the imminent danger exception only applies where the danger is "real and proximate and the danger of serious physical injury . . . exist at the time the complaint is filed" and that that past danger is insufficient

Summary of this case from Phillips v. Miller

noting that, to satisfy the imminent-danger requirement, the threat of serious physical injury "must be real and proximate" at the time the complaint is filed

Summary of this case from Harris v. Parker

explaining that, to meet the requirement of § 1915(g), "the threat or prison condition 'must be real and proximate' and the danger of serious physical injury must exist at the time the complaint is filed"

Summary of this case from McClain v. Madison Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't

explaining that, to meet the requirement of § 1915(g), "the threat or prison condition 'must be real and proximate' and the danger of serious physical injury must exist at the time the complaint is filed"

Summary of this case from Shabazz v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr.

explaining that, to meet the requirement of § 1915(g), "the threat or prison condition 'must be real and proximate' and the danger of serious physical injury must exist at the time the complaint is filed"

Summary of this case from Bennett v. Hardeman Cnty. Prison

providing that the imminent danger exception only applies where the danger is "real and proximate and the danger of serious physical injury . . . exist at the time the complaint is filed" and that past danger is insufficient

Summary of this case from Moore v. Hicks

defining imminent danger

Summary of this case from Gresham v. Smith

defining imminent as "[n]ear at hand . . .; impending; on the point of happening; threatening, menacing, perilous. Something which is threatening to happen at once, something close at hand, something to happen upon the instant . . . and on the point of happening."

Summary of this case from MIZE v. INNOCENTES SATOR

stating that while the Sixth Circuit has not defined the term "imminent danger" other Circuits have held that for the imminent danger exception to apply to a particular case, the prison condition must be "`real and proximate' and the danger of serious physical injury must exist at the time the complaint is filed

Summary of this case from Vandiver v. Correctional Medical Services
Case details for

Rittner v. Kinder

Case Details

Full title:Daniel L. RITTNER, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Leslie KINDER, Corrections…

Court:United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit

Date published: Aug 20, 2008

Citations

290 F. App'x 796 (6th Cir. 2008)

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