Opinion
NO. 2011-CA-002182-MR
03-15-2013
PUNKAJ RISHI APPELLANT v. DEBORAH LYNN HUDDLESTON APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT J. Russell Lloyd Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: B. Mark Mulloy Louisville, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAULA SHERLOCK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-501083
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: DIXON, LAMBERT, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES. DIXON, JUDGE: Punkaj Rishi ("Husband") appeals from a decision of the Jefferson Circuit Court that resolved a dispute over marital real estate between Rishi and his ex-wife, Deborah Lynn Huddleston ("Wife"). Finding no error, we affirm.
Husband and Wife were divorced in 2005, and the trial court adopted the parties' property settlement agreement, which included the allocation of a multi-million-dollar marital estate. Post-decree litigation ensued regarding the disposition of a vacation home located in Florida. In October 2011, in a well-reasoned opinion, the circuit court explained the underlying facts of this case as follows:
On April 19, 2005, the Court entered a Decree dissolving the parties' marriage and incorporating their Property Settlement Agreement. In the Property Settlement Agreement, the parties' agreed that they would sell the residence located at 16163 Captiva Drive in Lee County, Captiva, Florida (hereinafter referred to as "Captiva"). Pursuant to the agreement, [Husband] was to be responsible for any and all obligations associated with said property until the date of sale. From the proceeds of the sale of the residence, the parties were to first pay any and all indebtedness, fee, fine, license or other cost secured by or incurred as a result of ownership of said residence, specifically, the credit line account #xx-xx1939 at UBS/Paine Webber. The parties used the UBS/Paine Webber account #xx-xx1939 to purchase Captiva, to purchase [Husband's] home at 3524 Winterberry and the loan to Stuart Huddleston (Huddleston loan).
After the Captiva portion of the UBS/Paine Webber account 1939 was paid, the parties agreed that [Husband] would be reimbursed for payments and obligations paid pending the sale of Captiva. The parties would then equally divide the remaining balance of the proceeds from the sale of Captiva.
However, shortly after the parties entered the agreement, the following events occurred: 1) the parties' split the Captiva portion of the UBS/Paine Webber account #xx-xx1939 with [Wife] opening a separate UBS/Paine Webber account #xx-xx0400 in the amount of
$850,000; 2) [Husband] sold his Winterberry home and paid off the portion of the UBS/Paine Webber account used to purchase Winterberry as well as the remaining Captiva portion of the UBS/Paine Webber account #xx-xx1939; 3) the Huddleston Loan portion of the UBS/Paine Webber account #xx-xx1939 was satisfied; and 4) both [Husband] and [Wife] contributed payments toward the responsibilities and obligations associated with Captiva. After these transactions, the account balance for the UBS/Paine Webber account #xx-xx1939 was zero and the account was closed.
The parties are in dispute as to why the initial Captiva portion of the UBS/Paine Webber #xx-xx1939 account was divided. [Wife] claims that [Husband] requested that she take on a portion of the debt and collateralize it against her personal assets in order to free up investment credit for [Husband]. [Husband] alleges that the original agreement called for the equal split of the Captiva portion of the UBS/Paine Webber account xx-xx1939 as set forth in the exhibit attached to the Property Settlement Agreement.
Nonetheless, the agreement is silent as to any division of the Captiva portion of the debt or satisfaction of said debt except from the proceeds from the sale of Captiva. Since the parties apparently modified their Marital Settlement Agreement but failed to reduce the modification terms to writing, the only remedy the Court can provide that is equitable to both parties is to divide the future proceeds from the sale of Captiva consistent with the parties' original intent as expressed in their Property Settlement Agreement.
Accordingly, upon the sale of Captiva, the parties shall first pay the balance of UBS/Paine Webber account xx-xx0400 that remains from the $850,000 transfer that occurred in February 2005 as it is the only traceable indebtedness to the Captiva portion of the UBS/Paine Webber account xx-xx1939. Secondly, [Husband] shall be reimbursed for this payment of the Captiva portion of the UBS/Paine Webber account with the proceeds from the sale of Winterberry. Lastly, since each party
contributed towards the obligations associated with Captiva during the pending sale, each shall be reimbursed for the expenses they paid. If there are not funds remaining to fully repay each, they shall divide the remaining proceeds in proportion to their contribution for payment of expenses. If each is repaid fully and any funds remain from the sale, such funds shall be equally divided between the parties.
The parties each tendered motions to alter, amend, or vacate the court's order. On November 18, 2011, the court rendered an order amending its judgment to include an additional provision that Husband was solely responsible for a $324,604.32 mortgage he had unilaterally taken out on the Captiva property in 2010.
Husband now appeals, arguing that the court improperly modified the parties' settlement agreement by ordering him to pay half of Wife's $850,000 debt (plus interest) associated with her ownership interest in Captiva. Husband asserts Wife failed to show the settlement agreement was unconscionable, thus the court's modification of the agreement was not warranted. See Brown v. Brown, 796 S.W.2d 5, 8-9 (Ky. 1990).
Wife argues that the trial court's decision requiring the parties use the proceeds from the eventual sale of Captiva to pay the debt on account xx-xx0400, traceable to Captiva, did not constitute a "modification" of the settlement agreement; rather, Wife contends the court was merely attempting to enforce the terms of its original judgment. We agree.
The terms of a property settlement agreement "are enforceable as contract terms." Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.180(5). The interpretation and construction of a contract is a question of law; consequently, appellate review is de novo. Frear v. P.T.A. Industries, Inc., 103 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Ky. 2003).
Based upon our review, the record indicates that the court's order was an attempt to enforce the terms of the parties' settlement agreement, despite Husband's deviation from the clear terms of the agreement. Here, as he did below, Husband attempts to justify his decision to extinguish the xx-xx1939 debt by citing a spreadsheet attached to the settlement agreement as "Exhibit A." Husband contends the spreadsheet indicated the parties agreed to divide the Captiva debt prior to selling the property. This argument is unpersuasive. As the trial court noted, the plain language of the settlement agreement does not indicate any intention to divide the Captiva debt prior to sale; rather, the agreement explicitly contemplated that the parties would sell the Captiva property and pay off the associated debt with the proceeds from the sale. During the hearing, the court emphasized that it was obligated to enforce the agreement so the parties would be in positions relative to what they anticipated under the terms of the settlement. The trial court clearly retained the authority to enforce its own judgment "and remove any obstructions to such enforcement." Akers v. Stephenson, 469 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Ky. 1970). We find no error in the court's interpretation and enforcement of the settlement agreement.
For the reasons stated herein, the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT J. Russell Lloyd
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: B. Mark Mulloy
Louisville, Kentucky