Opinion
04-22-00119-CR
10-25-2023
Timothy Cantu DEL RIO, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
DO NOT PUBLISH
From the 437th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020CR5483 Honorable Melisa C. Skinner, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
IRENE RIOS, JUSTICE
In a single issue, appellant Timothy Cantu Del Rio challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for evading arrest or detention with a motor vehicle, a third-degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.04(a), (b)(2)(A). We affirm.
Background
During one evening in December 2019, several officers from the San Antonio Police Department gathered at a Motel 6 to conduct a criminal investigation and execute an arrest warrant on Del Rio. According to the officers who testified at trial-Officer Jacob Fenimore, Officer Christopher Sanchez, and Detective Johnny Orona-all of them wore their police uniforms that December evening as well as their body cameras. When Del Rio left his hotel room with Amanda Salazar, his then girlfriend and a witness that testified on his behalf at trial, the officers began approaching Del Rio as he and Salazar walked towards Del Rio's car. However, before officers could detain Del Rio, he drove off in his car with Salazar. Law enforcement arrested Del Rio in Uvalde later that night.
Subsequently, Del Rio was charged with evading arrest or detention with a motor vehicle, a third-degree felony. See id. After a jury found him guilty, Del Rio elected the trial court to assess his punishment. The trial court sentenced Del Rio to four years in prison after Del Rio pled true to a habitual offender allegation in the indictment, enhancing his punishment range to a second-degree felony. See id. § 12.42(a).
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under that standard, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine, based on that evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom, whether any rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19).
The jury is the sole judge of the credibility and weight to be attached to the testimony of a witness. Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In this role, the jury may choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties. Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Further, the jury is permitted to draw multiple reasonable inferences from facts as long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and therefore defer to that determination. Id.
Furthermore, in reviewing legal sufficiency challenges, the reviewing court must consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, as well as any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (stating the evidence-sufficiency standard of review is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. For evidence to be sufficient, the State need not disprove all reasonable alternative hypotheses that are inconsistent with the defendant's guilt. See Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903; Cantu v. State, 395 S.W.3d 202, 207-08 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref'd). Rather, a court considers whether inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
Sufficiency is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Byrd v. State, 336 S.W.3d 242, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). "Such a charge is one that 'accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.'" Byrd, 336 S.W.3d at 246 (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).
Here, a hypothetically correct jury charge would instruct the jury to find Del Rio guilty of evading arrest or detention with a vehicle if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Del Rio intentionally fled from a person he knew was a peace officer attempting to lawfully arrest or detain him, and (2) Del Rio used a vehicle while he was in flight. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.04(a), (b)(2)(A). A person acts intentionally with respect to the nature of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct. Id. § 6.03(a). "A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist." Id. § 6.03(b).
Analysis
Del Rio challenges only one element of the offense. He contends the evidence is insufficient to prove that he knew the men who approached him in the parking lot were officers who were attempting to arrest or detain him. Namely, Del Rio argued during closing statements at trial and claims on appeal that the motel area was poorly lit, the officers were dressed in dark clothing, and he did not see or hear anything identifying the officers as police.
Salazar echoed Del Rio's claims through her testimony claiming when she and Del Rio left their hotel room, it was dark and the parking lot where Del Rio's car was parked was not well lit. Salazar then explained while they walked towards the car, she saw somebody in dark clothing and thought the person was wearing a mask. Because of recent criminal activity in the area, she became scared and told Del Rio. According to Salazar, Del Rio indicated he saw it too and to keep walking. When they got to the car, Del Rio started the car, and they left immediately. Salazar claimed everything happened very fast, and she did not hear anyone say anything, including identifying themselves as police.
Nonetheless, the State revealed during its cross-examination of Salazar that within months before Del Rio's trial, she told an officer with the San Antonio Police Department, in an unrelated incident, that she feared Del Rio being released from jail and hurting her, possibly prompting Salazar to lie on Del Rio's behalf.
Moreover, the State, during its case in chief, presented a very different scenario than Del Rio claimed happened that December evening. In addition to Officer Fenimore, Officer Sanchez, and Detective Orona, two other officers were at the scene as well. And while the officers and detective acknowledged their police uniforms were dark navy, Officer Fenimore, for example, described his uniform as including his silver embroidered badge and the words "Police" written in large block letters on the back of the uniform. Additionally, while the officers and detective also conceded it was dark outside when they approached Del Rio, and that the light source for the parking lot came from lights mounted on the motel, the officers and detective did not agree with defense counsel that there was no light in the parking lot where Del Rio's car was parked.
Additionally, and most noteworthy, the evidence included the officers' and detective's personal accounts of approaching Del Rio and their accompanying body camera footage. Specifically, Officer Fenimore began identifying himself as police approximately ten to twenty yards away as he ran towards Del Rio's car. When Officer Fenimore was less than ten yards from Del Rio's car, Del Rio drove away. Officer Fenimore recalled seeing Del Rio's face when Del Rio was in the car, but Officer Fenimore is unsure whether Del Rio saw Officer Fenimore.
Officer Christopher Sanchez testified that as he and the other officers began approaching Del Rio, Officer Sanchez and the other officers identified themselves as the police and commanded Del Rio to stop, but Del Rio did not follow the commands. Rather, Del Rio got into his car and because of where Officer Sanchez was positioned next to Del Rio's car, as Del Rio began driving away, Officer Sanchez had to place his hand on the car to help him avoid being hit by Del Rio's car. Officer Fenimore saw Del Rio almost hit Officer Sanchez. Officer Sanchez also described the officers' identification of themselves as police "to a necessary degree" and as "pretty loud[.]"
Detective Johnny Orona testified he said, "[s]top," and "[p]ut your hands up," more than once when Del Rio was making his way to his car. Additionally, Detective Orona heard at least one other officer if not two shout "police," "relatively loud" that it "[s]hould have been heard through the whole parking lot." Detective Orona explained that he opened the driver's car door and was going to attempt to pull Del Rio out of the car but feared that he would be hit by the car as Del Rio drove away from the motel.
All three of the officers' and detective's body camera footage supports their testimonies, showing a chaotic scene, where law enforcement is running after presumably Del Rio yelling various commands for him to stop and identifying themselves as police, while Del Rio's car is shown being driven out of the motel parking lot.
For an evading arrest or detention conviction, "it is essential that a defendant know the peace officer is attempting to arrest him." Jackson v. State, 718 S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); see Redwine v. State, 305 S.W.3d 360, 362 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet ref'd) (noting that a person commits the offense of evading arrest or detention under 38.04 only if the person "knows a police officer is attempting to arrest him but nevertheless refuses to yield to a police show of authority"). A person's knowledge is a fact question for the jury and may be proven through circumstantial evidence. See Robles v. State, 664 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Clay v. State, 389 S.W.3d 874, 878 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2012, pet. ref'd). The jury may "use common sense and apply common knowledge, observation, and experience gained in ordinary affairs when drawing inferences from the evidence." Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
Despite Del Rio's assertion that he did not know the men approaching him were officers and were trying to arrest or detain him, the jury-as the sole judge of the credibility and weight to be attached to the testimony of witnesses-could have believed the officers' and detective's testimonies at trial. See Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360. We conclude a rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Del Rio knew the men approaching him were officers who were lawfully attempting to arrest or detain him but he intentionally fled from them using a motor vehicle. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. The evidence was therefore sufficient to support Del Rio's conviction for evading arrest or detention by motor vehicle. We overrule Del Rio's single issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.