Opinion
CIVIL ACTION, 01-3553, SECTION "T"(1)
April 25, 2002
Be Fore the Court is a Niotion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 8) filed on behalf of the Defendant, the United States of America. The parties waived oral argument and the matter was taken under submission on April 24, 2002. The Court, having considered the arguments of the parties, the Court record, the law and applicablejurisprudence, and noting that the Plaintiff did not file an opposition, is fully advised in the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
I. BACKGROUND:
Margaret Deni Ard Rigdon was allegedly involved in a slip and fall which occurred on March 9, 1 999, at the U.S. Post Office in Husser, Louisiana. Margaret Deni Ard Rigdon alleges that she sustained personal injuries as a result of this accident and has brought the instant suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. William Rigdon claims a loss of consortium due to his wife, Margaret Deni Ard Rigdon's alleged fall.
According to Barbara West, Paralegal Specialist in the United States Postal Service in the Law Department field office in Dallas, Texas, William Rigdon has not filed an administrative datnage claim (Standard Form 95) with the United States Postal Service under the provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
See Exhibit A to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or in the altemativeMotion for Summary Judgment.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS:
A. Law on Summary Judgment
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment should be granted only "it the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Stults v. Conoco Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins. Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992)). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party mist come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex. Inc. v. M/V RISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, the Court notes that substantive law determines the materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In some instances, as in the case at hand, a motion for summary judgment is unopposed. However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the Court to examine a motion for summary judgment on its merits, and to grant an unopposed motion only "if appropriate." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
B. Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists
The Defendant claims that because William Rigdon has not filed an administrative damage claim (Standard From 95) with the United States Postal Service under the provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), his claim for loss of consortium should be dismissed for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the FTCA. In support of this, Defendant submits the affidavit of Barbara West, Paralegal Specialist in the United States Postal Service in the Law Department field office in Dallas, Texas. In this affidavit, Ms. West attests that a search through the database Wat tracks administrative tort claims reveals a claim made by Margaret Deni Ard Rigdon, but does not reveal a claim from William Rigdon. Unfortunately, this sole affidavit does not demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material fact at this time.
Although it is well settled that the filing of an administrative claim is a jurisdictional requirement and "is an absolute prerequisite to maintaining a civil action against the Government for damages arising from a tortious occurrence due to the negligence of a federal employee;" there is no reqtiirement that a spouse with a loss of consortium claim must file a separate administrative claim from the spouse with the physical injury. Numerous cases have held that a husband and wife may submit a single Standard Form 95, sc long as the form sets forth sufficient facts to warrant an agency investigation and to constitute notice of the spouse's claim.
See Meeker v. United States 435 F.2d 1219, 1220 (8th Cir. 1970);Ducharme v. Merrill National Laboratories, 574 F.2d 1307, 1311 (5th Cir. 1978).
See Eskine v. United States, 1995 WL 495903 (E.D.La.).
See Champagne v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 488 (E.D.La. 1983);Dondero v. United States, 775 F. Supp. 144 (D.Del. 1991).
In the instant case, the lack of a Standard Form 95 from William Rigdon is not dispositive of the issue. If it can be shown that there is no mention of William Rigdon's loss of consortium claim on Margaret Deni Ard Rigdon's Standard Form 95, then summary judgment dismissing William Rigdon's loss of consortium claim may be warranted. However, without proof of the lack of a loss ofconsortium claim on Margaret Deni Ard Rigdon's Standard From 95, summaryjudgment in favor of the Defendant cannot be granted.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternativ, Motion for Summary Judgment (Doctiment 8) filed on behalf of Defendant, the United States of America, be and the same is hereby DENIED.