Opinion
No. 41418.
October 19, 1959.
1. Appeal — guardianship proceedings — grantees of incompetent who were not parties to proceedings had no right to appeal from decrees entered therein.
Where person was adjudged an incompetent and guardian appointed and guardian filed suit against defendants to recover a mineral interest which the incompetent had conveyed to defendant, defendant and grantees who were not parties in the guardianship proceedings had no right to appeal from the decrees entered therein. Secs. 1147, 1151, Code 1942.
2. Appeal — who may appeal.
Only those who are actually parties to a suit or who are privies or personal representatives my appeal. Secs. 1147, 1151, Code 1942.
3. Appeal — statutes — who may appeal — "person" — "party".
Statutes allowing a "person" to appeal have been held to give the right to one directly interested although not a party to the action while statutes allowing a "party" to appeal, as a rule, limit the right to those who were original parties to the action or proceedings.
4. Appeal — statutes — who may appeal from chancery decree — "parties" — "legal representatives of parties".
Under the statute limiting the persons who may appeal from a chancery decree to "parties", grantees of an incompetent were not entitled to attack gurdianship proceedings for the incompetent by an appeal in suit to set aside conveyances on the ground that they were the legal representative of the incompetent within the statute. Secs. 1147, 1151, Code 1942.
Headnotes as approved by Gillespie, J.
APPEAL from the Chancery Court of Hinds County; A.F. SUMMER, Chancellor.
Gore and Gore, Harmon W. Broom, Jackson, for appellee.
I. Only those who are actual parties to the suit or who are privies or personal representatives may appeal. Farmers Merchants Bank v. Rushing, 175 Miss. 826, 167 So. 784; Gillespie v. Hauenstein, 72 Miss. 838, 17 So. 602; Hunter v. Stanford, 198 Miss. 299, 22 So.2d 166; Woolbert v. Lee Lumber Co., 151 Miss. 56, 117 So. 354; Ch. 151, Laws 1924; Ch. 214, Laws 1954; Secs. 753, 1148, Code 1942.
Green, Green Cheney, Jackson, for appellants.
I. The guardianship instituted January 13, 1955, as to Taylor J. Peacock, Jr., and those in privity with him, is a nullity, contravening both state and federal constitutions. Ames v. Williams, 72 Miss. 760, 17 So. 762; Baum v. Greenwald, 95 Miss. 765, 49 So. 836; Boatman's Bank of St. Louis v. Fritzlen, CA 8, 135 Fed. 650; Britt v. Allred, 199 Miss. 786, 25 So.2d 711; Carter v. Henry, 87 Miss. 411, 39 So. 690; Cherry v. Bivens, 185 Miss. 329, 187 So. 525; Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U.S. 351, 25 L.Ed. 195; Dingey v. Paxton, 60 Miss. 1038; Ferguson v. Bobo, 54 Miss. 121; Fink v. Henderson, 74 Miss. 8, 19 So. 892; Forsythe v. Ivey, 162 Miss. 471, 139 So. 615; Gholson v. Peters, 180 Miss. 256, 176 So. 605; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 42 L.Ed. 215; Hutchins v. Moore (Miss.), 97 So.2d 748; In re Heard's Guardianship, 174 Miss. 37, 163 So. 685; Laird v. Bethea, 215 Miss. 64, 60 So.2d 526; Logan v. Rankin, 230 Miss. 749, 94 So.2d 330; Moore v. Grillis, 205 Miss. 865, 39 So.2d 505; Moore v. Sykes' Estate, 167 Miss. 212, 149 So. 789; Mounger v. Gandy, 110 Miss. 133, 69 So. 817; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 94 L.Ed. 865; National Union of Marine Cooks v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37, 99 L.Ed. 46; O'Quinn v. State, 131 Miss. 511, 95 So. 513; Ricketts v. Jolliff, 62 Miss. 440; Schmidt v. Humble Oil R. Co., CA 5, 219 F.2d 551; Sinquefield v. Valentine, 159 Miss. 144, 132 So. 81; Smith v. Smith, 211 Miss. 481, 52 So.2d 1; Solomon v. Continental Baking Co., 174 Miss. 890, 165 So. 607; Sorensen v. Jacobson (Mont.), 232 P.2d 332, 26 A.L.R. 2d 1186; Stringer v. Price, 143 Miss. 189, 108 So. 431; Swaney v. White, 230 Miss. 865, 92 So.2d 453, 94 So.2d 610; United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Willmut Gas Oil Co. (Miss.), 100 So.2d 609; Wilby v. State, 93 Miss. 767, 47 So. 465; Yazoo M.V.R. Co. v. Adams, 180 U.S. 28, 45 L.Ed. 419; Yazoo M.V.R. Co. v. Washington, 92 Miss. 129, 45 So. 614; Sec. 156, Constitution 1890; Secs. 2430, 3219, Code 1906; Secs. 430, 753, 1689, 1959, 1861, 6909-01, 6909-02, 6909-05, 6909-06, 6909-07, Code 1942; Anno. 23 A.L.R. 594; 12 Am. Jur., Constitution Law, Sec. 634; 28 Am. Jur., Insane and Other Incompetent Persons, Sec. 14; 5 C.J.S., Sec. 1377 p. 483; 16A C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Secs. 569(4), 599; 44 C.J.S., Secs. 2, 67, 67c pp. 13, 17, 20, 41, 164, 165; 48 C.J.S. 112; 51 C.J. 300; 32 Words Phrases 548, 549; Black's Law Dictionary (3d ed.) 1535; Broom's Legal Maxims 178, 650; Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.) 1773.
II. Assuming initially validity of adjudication of N.C.M., the estate subject thereto in accordance with the paranoia was limited to $2,000 received from Aetna Life Insurance Company. Ames v. Williams, supra; Barney v. Barney, 203 Miss. 228, 33 So.2d 823; Farmers Merchants Bank v. Rushing, 175 Miss. 826, 167 So. 784; Fink v. Henderson, supra; Honeywell v. Aaron, 228 Miss. 284, 88 So.2d 558; In re Estate of Hollingsworth, 226 Miss. 646, 85 So.2d 185; Mounger v. Gandy, supra; Muse v. Muse, 76 Miss. 372, 24 So. 168; Puryear v. Austin, 205 Miss. 590, 39 So.2d 257; Reily v. Crymes, 176 Miss. 133, 168 So. 267; State Highway Commission v. Mason, 192 Miss. 576, 4 So.2d 345, 6 So.2d 468; Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 23 L.Ed. 328; Secs. 428, 429, 431, 831, 1147, 6909, 6909-01; Anno. 59 A.L.R. 838; 44 C.J.S., Secs. 67, 68 pp 164, 169; Broom's Legal Maxims p. 543.
III. Under Section 6909-01, Recompiled Mississippi Code of 1942, assuming, arguendo, all supra to be ill-founded, nevertheless the decrees wherefrom Ridgway appealed are wholly void. Farmers Merchants Bank v. Rushing, supra; Mississippi Power Light Co. v. Coldwater (Miss.), 168 F. Supp. 463; Rowan v. Lamb, 83 Miss. 45, 35 So. 427; Swaney v. White, supra; United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Willmut Gas Oil Co., supra; Secs. 431, 1147, 1690, 6909-03, 6909-04, Code 1942.
ON MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
In 1955, in the Chancery Court of Hinds County, one Peacock was adjudged an incompetent suffering from paranoia. A guardian was appointed to handle his estate. Upon the exhaustion of the funds on hand the guardian was duly discharged. On May 18, 1959, Charlie Scott was appointed guardian of the estate of the said Peacock. On May 20, 1959, Charlie Scott, as such guardian, was authorized by decree to employ attorneys and file suit against appellants to recover certain mineral interests located in Simpson County which the said Peacock had conveyed to appellant Ridgway on February 11, 1957. Ridgway and his grantees filed a bond in the guardianship proceedings seeking to appeal from the decree appointing Charlie Scott as guardian of the estate of the said Peacock, and the decree authorizing the said guardian to employ attorneys and prosecute the suit against appellants. Of course, Ridgway and his grantees were not parties to the guardianship proceedings.
The question here is whether the appellant, C.R. Ridgway and his grantees have the right to appeal from said decrees referred to.
(Hn 1) If appellants have any right to appeal from the decrees in this guardianship matter, it must be found in the statutes. Sections 1147 and 1151 of the Mississippi Code of 1942 provide for appeals "by any of the parties or legal representatives of such parties." Ridgway and his grantees were not parties in the guardianship proceedings and have no right to appeal from the decrees entered therein. (Hn 2) This Court said in Farmers Merchants Bank v. Rushing, 175 Miss. 826, 167 So. 784, that "only those who are actually parties to a suit or who are privies or personal representatives may appeal." This case was thereafter cited in Hunter v. Stanford, 198 Miss. 299, 22 So.2d 166.
(Hn 3) Appellants argue that various proceedings hereinabove referred to were void and that they have a right to attack these proceedings by this appeal because of the purchase by Ridgway from Peacock of the mineral interests involved in the Simpson County suit. They reason that they are the personal representatives of Peacock. We are unable to agree that Ridgway and his grantees are the legal representatives of Peacock within the meaning of Section 1147, Mississippi Code of 1942. The statute limits the persons who may appeal from a decree of the chancery court to "parties". It will be noted that "persons" aggrieved are not allowed to appeal as they are from a judgment or decision of boards and commissions. Section 1195, Mississippi Code of 1942. From the nature of the judgments and decisions of various boards mentioned in Section 1195, persons who are not parties may have a direct pecuniary or other interest in such judgment or decision. Statutes allowing a "person" to appeal have in many cases been held to give the right to one directly interested although not a party to the action. On the other hand, statutes which allow a "party" to appeal, as a rule, limit the right to those who were original parties to the action or proceeding. 4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Section 183, page 557. (Hn 4) The right of appellants to prosecute this appeal is not only denied by the statutes but also by considerations of sound judicial administration. To permit this appeal would, in effect, require every guardian to litigate not only the principal suit against a third party, but his right to bring the suit, and his right to the office of guardian, and possibly any number of other matters arising in the guardianship proceedings.
Motion to dismiss appeal sustained.
Lee, Kyle, Arrington and Ethridge, JJ., concur.