Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-4841.
November 8, 2001
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of November 2001, upon careful and independent consideration of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and after review of the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge Arnold C. Rapoport and petitioner's objections thereto, IT IS ORDERED that:
Magistrate Judge Rapoport's report comprehensively addresses petitioner's claims, including those petitioner reiterates in his objection. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), federal courts will not disturb the rulings of state courts unless they either result in decisions "contrary to, or involv[ing] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or result in decisions "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Rico's case contains neither a contrary or unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor an unreasonable determination of the facts.
In Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the Supreme Court gave guidance on how to interpret the "contrary to" or "unreasonable application" prong of § 2254. According to the Court, application of this test is a two-step process. Id. at 405 — 06. First, the reviewing court must determine whether the state court decision is directly contrary to established Supreme Court precedent, in other words, whether Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome.Matteo v. SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 888 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying the AEDPA test in the Third Circuit); Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 197 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming the Matteo method of inquiry after the Supreme Court's holding in Terry Williams). Second, the reviewing court must determine whether the application of federal law by the state court was specifically unreasonable. This formulation establishes a high standard as an " unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 410 (emphasis in original).
Whether a state court's decision under the second prong of § 2254(d) was based on an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings" remains a highly fact-bound inquiry. As a matter of standard statutory interpretation, this prong of § 2254(d) should be read in conjunction with § 2254(e)(1), which requires a federal court to apply a presumption of correctness to factual determinations made by the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Using these standards, I find that the state court's decision in Rico's case satisfies neither the first nor the second part of § 2254(d)'s threshold for issuance for a writ of habeas corpus. Rico's objections to the magistrate judge's report all center on whether it was constitutional error for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to hold that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) did not mandate that Italian-Americans be considered a cognizable racial group entitled to protection in the jury selection process. As Magistrate Judge Rapoport's report demonstrates, however, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Batson did not so mandate that Italian-Americans be recognized as a cognizable racial group. Mag. Rep. at 10, 13. Petitioner points to no other U.S. Supreme Court precedent that recognizes Italian-Americans as a cognizable racial group so it cannot be said that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania violated "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Furthermore, the state courts did not unreasonably apply federal law.Batson and its progeny established a method for recognizing cognizable racial groups that the circuit courts of appeals have broken down into factors. According to the Third Circuit and the First Circuit, these factors require a defendant to show that the ethnic group is first defined and limited by some clearly identifiable factor or factors; second, that it possesses a common thread of attitudes, ideas or experiences; third, that it shares a community of interests such that the group's interest cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process; and fourth, that the ethnic group has experienced or is experiencing discriminatory treatment and is in need of protection from community prejudices. United States v. DiPasquale, 864 F.2d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 833 n. 11 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognized those tests and applied them in such a manner as to conclude that the Supreme Court had not mandated that Italian-Americans always be recognized as a cognizable group. Commonwealth v. Rico, 711 A.2d 990, 994 — 96 (Pa. 1998). The Supreme Court of the United States might eventually hold that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's application of those tests was incorrect, but, as the Terry Williams Court noted, the potentially incorrect result of an application of law does not make the application unreasonable. Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. And the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's application of United States Supreme Court precedent is likely accurate as in J.E.B. v. Alabama, one of the last major cases interpreting Batson, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion on a close vote may have signaled the end of the expansion of groups to be specially protected during voir dire. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 148 (1994) ("Because I believe the peremptory [strike] remains an important litigator's tool and a fundamental part of the process of selecting impartial juries, our increasing limitation of it gives me pause.") (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Finally, after review of the facts as determined by the state courts, I cannot conclude that there has been an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." In his objections, petitioner quibbles with statements made by the magistrate judge about the voir dire of two of the venire persons. It is, however, the findings of the state courts that are relevant. Given the presumption of correctness under AEDPA and the trial court's unique ability to make determinations of credibility at trial, I find no "unreasonable determination of fact" there.
1. The Report and Recommendation are APPROVE0D and ADOPTED.
2. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED with prejudice.
3. The petitioner having failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, there is no ground to issue a certificate of appealability.
4. The Clerk of the Court shall mark this case closed for statistical purposes.