Opinion
No. 06-18-00016-CR
08-30-2018
RONNIE RICKS, JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 5th District Court Bowie County, Texas
Trial Court No. 14F1149-005 Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following a jury trial, Ronnie Ricks, Jr., was convicted of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit a felony and was sentenced to thirty-five years' imprisonment. On appeal, Ricks claims that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to view a silent video recording of a portion of his interview with a police detective regarding Ricks' alleged involvement in the crime. Because the trial court did not err in the admission of the recording, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02 (West Supp. 2017).
I. Background
Ricks, who was a sergeant in the Texas Army National Guard, was in New Boston, Texas, for an Army drill on the weekend of November 15, 2014. Ricks, along with other members of his unit, stayed at a local hotel that weekend. On the evening of November 15, some of the unit members attended a presentation in room 105 of the hotel. Ricks attended the presentation, as did Jane Smith. Following the presentation, unit members held a birthday celebration for Smith, during which Smith, Ricks, and other members of the unit consumed alcohol. Smith testified that she drank a few drinks and felt fine. Then, approximately fifteen minutes after having consumed a drink Ricks made for her, Smith began to feel sick and dizzy, with blurred vision. She described blacking out for a few minutes and then regaining consciousness. When Smith appeared to be intoxicated and sick, one of the unit members escorted her to her room. After handing Smith a wet rag and placing a trash can next to her bed, the escort left Smith's room. Smith went to sleep while fully clothed. At some point after that, Smith realized that her jeans were being pulled down. She recalled that someone was having sexual intercourse with her and that she could not breathe. She did not see who was in the room with her. Smith felt paralyzed and could not move. Eventually, Smith passed out again.
The victim, who was a member of the Army National Guard unit, was identified at trial as Jane Smith. We, likewise, utilize that pseudonym to protect the victim's identity.
The unit member who escorted Smith to her room asked another member to contact him by cell phone, to avoid the appearance of impropriety. Phone contact was made approximately five minutes later, and it was reported by the escort that Smith was in her room and that he had returned to his room.
When Smith awoke the following morning, she was sore and believed that she had been sexually assaulted. Smith was upset and contacted a sergeant by email to report the incident. She told the sergeant that the unit member who escorted her to her room the previous evening had sexually assaulted her, since she knew that he had been in her room. During the assault, however, she could not see the person. Smith eventually spoke with a New Boston police officer and reported that she had noticed a ring in her hotel room that did not belong to her. That ring was turned over to the New Boston Police Department. The ring's discovery altered the course of the investigation.
Ricks admitted that his wedding ring was missing.
Jasmine Baker, an investigator with the New Boston Police Department, investigated the reported unauthorized entry into Smith's hotel room and the ensuing sexual assault. After having taken Smith's statement, Baker interviewed the other soldiers who were present in room 105 of the hotel on the evening of the alleged assault, including Ricks. She read Ricks his Miranda rights, and he waived those rights. The interview was recorded. Several minutes into the interview, however, Ricks indicated that he wished to terminate the interview. Before the State's introduction of the recorded interview as an exhibit at trial, defense counsel indicated that he had no objections "until it gets down to where he says, he hints that he did not want to talk anymore. That's pretty much right at the end. If you can cut it off there."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The video recording of Ricks' interview continued for approximately ten minutes after Ricks indicated that he did not wish to continue the interview. The State asked that the remainder of the video recording be played to the jury, with the sound muted, for the purpose of showing Ricks' demeanor. The defense objected to this procedure, arguing that the muted video reflected nonverbal communication by Ricks and violated his Miranda right to remain silent. The trial court overruled Ricks' objection and determined that the State was entitled to play the muted video depicting Ricks' demeanor. As a result of that ruling, the jury was shown the audio and video portion of the recorded interview to the point that Ricks indicated he no longer wished to speak. The jury was then permitted to view only the video portion of the remainder of the recording.
The majority of this portion of the recording depicts Ricks seated behind the interview table without being questioned.
Although the State argues that this objection has not been preserved for appellate review, it is evident from the context of the discussion between defense counsel, the State, and the trial court that Rick's objection was based on his right to remain silent.
The trial court stated that it was "going to overrule the objection and find that he's been advised that he's entitled to leave." The trial court continued, "The Court's also going to find the state's entitled to continue to play video of his demeanor at the time, but not the audio that accompanies it, since he's indicated he wishes to have no further conversations."
II. Analysis
A trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and will be upheld "if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case." Ramos v. State, 245 S.W.3d 410, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).
Consistent with the Fifth Amendment guarantee that "'[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,' . . . law enforcement officials, before questioning a person in custody, must inform him that he has the right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used against him in court." Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). "If a person in custody does invoke his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, then the admissibility in court of statements obtained thereafter depends on whether the person's right was 'scrupulously honored.'" Id. (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975)). Miranda does not, however, protect a statement that is not the result of custodial interrogation. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Arthur v. State, 216 S.W.3d 50, 56 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.).
Custodial interrogation, as defined by the Supreme Court, is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. A determination of whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes is based on a "reasonable person" standard. Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Consequently, "A person is in 'custody' only if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest." Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). As stated in Dowthitt, there are four general situations which may constitute custody:
(1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, (2) when a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he cannot leave, (3) when law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted, and (4) when there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he is free to leave.Id. at 255. Here, Ricks voluntarily submitted to questioning and was then permitted to leave. When Ricks showed up for questioning, Baker informed him that he was not detained or under arrest. Baker specifically asked Ricks if he was willing to talk with her, and he indicated that he would do so. After Ricks informed Baker that he no longer wished to speak, she informed him that he was free to leave at any time and that she was not holding him against his will. Baker then accompanied Ricks to the door. It was only then, however, that Ricks decided to remain seated for a while. After several more minutes, and some intervening conversation between Ricks and Baker, Ricks indicated that he wished to leave, and he did leave.
These circumstances indicate that Ricks was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. Ricks was not physically deprived of his freedom in any significant way, having been questioned on a voluntary basis for less than one hour. Ricks was told that he was free to leave at any time and that he was not being held against his will. He was never informed that he could not leave. Baker, therefore, did not "create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted." Id. And, regardless of whether Baker had probable cause to arrest Ricks, she informed Ricks that he was free to leave at any time, and he did leave. We, therefore, conclude that Ricks was not in Miranda custody during Baker's station-house questioning as displayed to the jury. See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1122-25 (1983) (per curiam) (defendant was not in custody when he voluntarily came to police station, gave a statement after brief questioning, and then was allowed to return home); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 493-95 (1977) (per curiam) (suspect who voluntarily came to police station, was immediately informed that he was not under arrest, participated in a short interview, and left the police station without hindrance was not in custody); Meek v. State, 790 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (defendant not in custody when he came to station voluntarily, was permitted to go unaccompanied to his car during interviews, and "a few hours" later was allowed to leave unhindered); Brossette v. State, 99 S.W.3d 277, 281-82 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. dism'd) (defendant not in custody at time of statement when he voluntarily came to the police station, gave a statement, was not handcuffed or restrained in any way, and left after giving the statement); Bates v. State, 15 S.W.3d 155, 158 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. ref'd) (interrogation not controlled by Miranda when suspect voluntarily followed officer to station, was informed by officer that he was free to leave, and was permitted to leave after interview).
Because Ricks was not in Miranda custody at the time of Baker's questioning, the questioning was not controlled by Miranda. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 (volunteered statements not barred by Fifth Amendment); Camarillo v. State, 82 S.W.3d 529, 535 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (voluntary oral statement admissible if it does not "stem from custodial interrogation"); Lam v. State, 25 S.W.3d 233, 239 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (Miranda does not apply to voluntary statements resulting from non-custodial interrogation); see Bates, 15 S.W.3d at 159 ("Mere recitation of Miranda warnings is more indicative of proper cautiousness than it is of an officer's intent to arrest."). Consequently, the trial court did not err in admitting the muted video recording.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Bailey C. Moseley
Justice Date Submitted: August 23, 2018
Date Decided: August 30, 2018 Do Not Publish