Opinion
No. CV07-5002634
September 27, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
The defendant Middlesex Hospital seeks to dismiss this action which plaintiff brings pursuant to General Statutes Sec. 31-290a alleging a claim of unlawful termination arising out of her application for workers' compensation benefits. The sole issue is whether plaintiff initially filed a complaint alleging unlawful discharge with the Workers' Compensation Commission, thereby precluding her from pursuing this action in Superior Court.
The controlling facts are as follows. Plaintiff, who was an employee of Middlesex Hospital in Middletown, Connecticut, was injured while in the course of her employment and applied for and received workers' compensation benefits. In early March 2006 the Hospital filed a so-called Form 36, giving notice of its intention to terminate plaintiff's compensation benefits. Plaintiff immediately filed an objection, noting that "[c]laimant fired by employer because of work injury" and that "[c]laimant entitled to 308 benefits." Construing the plaintiff's objection as "a complaint of discharge or discrimination" under Sec. 31-290a, the Chairman of the Workers' Compensation Commission assigned the matter on March 15, 2007 for a hearing. On April 9, 2007 an informal hearing was conducted before the Chairman. On April 19, 2007, plaintiff requested a preformal hearing, citing as her reason "31-290a — unlawful termination." On June 19, 2007, the plaintiff withdrew from the Compensation Commission her claim of wrongful termination and filed this action the following day.
General Statutes Sec. 31-290a(a) provides that "[n]o employer . . . shall discharge . . . any employee because the employee has filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits." Sec. 31-290a(b) further provides that "[a]ny employee who is so discharged or discriminated against may either: (1) Bring a civil action in Superior Court . . . or (2) file a complaint with the chairman of the workers' compensation commission" (emphasis supplied). This section does not prescribe a particular format or content of the complaint. Courts construing these provisions have concluded that "once an employee selects a particular forum within which to bring his claim under the statute, he may not later attempt to bring the same claim in the alternative forum." Fortier v. C M Technology, Inc. 1995 WL 283896 at *3 (Conn.Super.Ct. May 4, 1995).
Plaintiff does not deny that Sec. 31-290a(b) requires a claimant to elect her forum for pursuing a claim of retaliatory discharge, and that such election is binding. Rather, she argues that she did not make such an election because she did not "file a complaint with the chairman of the workers' compensation commission" and therefore is not bound by the provisions of Sec. 31-290a(b). Plaintiff argues that while she did reference the claim of retaliatory discharge in her requests for hearing dated March 12 and April 19, 2007, those references do not constitute a "complaint filed with the chairman of the workers' compensation commission" within the meaning of Sec. 31a-290a(b).
As always, in determining the meaning of a statute, the analysis begins with the language of the statute itself. "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case. In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes Sec. 1-2z directs us first to consider to the text of the statute itself . . ." Winsor v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 101 Conn.App. 674, 682 (2007). In this case Sec. 31-290a(b) does not define complaint or specify the form or content of such a complaint. "In the absence of a statutory definition, "it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary." Id., at 683. "Complaint" is defined in The American Heritage College Dictionary, 3rd ed. as "a cause or reason for complaining; a grievance." The verb "to complain" is defined as "to make a formal accusation or bring a formal charge." Id. Given the broad definition of complaint, as understood in its everyday usage, the plaintiff's requests for hearings with specific reference to Sec. 31-290a coupled with the allegation that she was "fired because of work injury" would appear to constitute a "complaint" within the broad meaning of that term.
Resolution of this case, however, is not dependent on a parsing of the word "complaint." Under all of the circumstances, given plaintiff's course of conduct, her argument that her requests for hearings and invocation of the decision making process of the workers' compensation commission did not constitute a complaint cannot be sustained.
In the context of this case it seems clear that the plaintiff's intent in filing the requests for hearings and her specific reference to the retaliatory discharge prohibition of Sec. 31-290a was to indeed file a complaint with the chairman. The chairman himself interpreted the request for a hearing as the filing of a complaint as evidenced by his letter to the Eighth District directing that a hearing be scheduled. "Pursuant to C.G.S. Sec. 31-290a, the above captioned matter concerning a complaint of discharge or discrimination under said statute has been assigned to your office for a hearing or other appropriate action." Further, the notice of informal hearing refers to Sec. 31-290a and specifically notes that plaintiff's counsel "has requested this Emergency hearing." At no time during this process did plaintiff object to such hearings or indicate that she did not want the Chairman to consider and resolve her Sec. 31-290a claim.
In light of plaintiff having at least twice requested hearings in connection with her claimed unlawful discharge, having attended those hearings, having argued the claim of unlawful discharge and having specifically invoked Sec. 31-290a, it is reasonable to conclude that her course of conduct did constitute the filing of a complaint with the chairman of the commission, and that she should not now be heard to assert otherwise. C.R. Klewin Northeast v. Bridgeport, 282 Conn. 54, 87 (2007).
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted.