Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-152 Erie
March 25, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Michelle Richter, through her parent and legal guardian, Linda Tate, (hereinafter "Plaintiff"), instituted this action against the School District of the City of Erie and various officials and administrators of the school district, (hereinafter "Defendants"), seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages for alleged violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et. seq., as amended by Pub.L. 105-17 at § 615(I)(3)(A) 1997; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101. Presently pending before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend her Complaint to delete certain requested forms of relief. For the reasons that follow, we shall grant the Defendants' motion and deny the Plaintiff's motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff attended school in the Millcreek Township School District from kindergarten through ninth grade. Complaint ¶ 23. From kindergarten through eighth grade, she received learning support services at Millcreek. Complaint ¶ 23. Beginning in ninth grade, she received both learning support and emotional support services. Complaint ¶ 23. On January 20, 1999, Plaintiff was seen at the Sarah Reed Outpatient Mental Health Clinic and diagnosed with major depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder, attention deficit disorder, and oppositional defiant disorder. Complaint ¶ 24. She was also diagnosed with bipolar affective disorder in April of 1999. Complaint ¶ 24. Plaintiff and her family moved to the City of Erie in the summer prior to her tenth grade year, and she attended the Sarah Reed Partial Program for her tenth grade school year (1999-2000). Complaint ¶ 25. It was her intention to begin the eleventh grade (2000-2001) at Strong Vincent High School, the high school closest to her home. Complaint ¶ 25.
A Comprehensive Evaluation Report ("CER") dated June 5, 2000 concluded and recommended that the Plaintiff continue to be eligible for special education services "because of a serious emotional disturbance and a learning disability as a secondary diagnosis." Complaint ¶ 26. An Individualized Education Program ("IEP") dated June 27, 2000 provided that, in addition to learning support services, Plaintiff would have two time out cards to use per day in the event she needed to access either the Student at Risk person, the emotional support teacher or the learning support English teacher. Complaint ¶ 27. The IEP determined that the Plaintiff's "grouping" was Emotional/Learning Support, with the emotional support component of her program being two percent (2%). Complaint ¶ 27. A Notice of Recommended Assignment ("NORA") dated June 27, 2000, provided that the Plaintiff's educational placement would be at Central High School. Complaint ¶ 29. Plaintiff was told by Defendant Chrisman that Defendant District did not offer emotional support services at Strong Vincent. Complaint ¶ 29. Plaintiff was also told that she could not attend Strong Vincent because she had been categorized as an "Emotional Support" student. Complaint ¶ 29.
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the Defendant District's custom, policy and practice of not offering emotional support services to students at Strong Vincent High School, Central High School has a high number of students in the population with known behavior and emotional problems. Complaint ¶ 30. She further alleges that the Defendants knew or should have known of the foreseeable dangers inherent in concentrating so many students with known emotional and behavioral problems in one school. Complaint ¶ 30. Plaintiff complains that throughout the school year, she was repeatedly subjected to physical, verbal and sexual assaults, intimidation, and harassment by her fellow students. Complaint ¶¶ 31, 33, 37-39, 41, 51, 53, 55. Despite reporting this conduct to various teachers and administrators, little or nothing was done to stop this conduct. Complaint ¶¶ 31, 34, 35-36, 39-40, 41, 43, 44-47, 50, 52, 54. Plaintiff was ultimately placed on homebound instruction by her psychiatrist. Complaint ¶¶ 59-60.
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' actions have deprived her of her rights under § 1983, IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA. Complaint ¶¶ 66-71. She seeks declaratory relief to the effect that the Defendants violated her rights under IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA and/or the United States Constitution. Complaint p. 20. She also seeks injunctive relief requiring the Defendants to provide her with an education in a school in which her safety is not threatened, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Complaint p. 20.
Defendants move to dismiss, in part, based upon the Plaintiff's failure to exhaust the administrative remedies called for under IDEA. In addition to opposing the Defendants' Motion, Plaintiff now seeks to amend her Complaint in order to delete her request for declaratory and injunctive relief, and seek only compensatory damages and costs.
Given our disposition on this jurisdictional issue, it is unnecessary to reach the Defendants other arguments.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) may present either a facial or a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. Mortensen v. First Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3rd Cir. 1977). A motion which makes a facial challenge to a complaint requires that the court consider the allegations of the complaint as true and make all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. Id. In the case of a factual challenge to the complaint, the court is free to consider and weigh evidence outside the pleadings to resolve factual issues bearing on jurisdiction and to "satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Id. Plaintiff's factual allegations need not be accepted as true. Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1021 (3rd Cir. 1997). The court may consider facts not in the complaint. Id. Consequently, the plaintiff must present "affidavits or other competent evidence that jurisdiction is proper." Dayhoff, Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287, 1302 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1028 (1996). In their Rule 12(b)(1) Motion, the Defendants do not rely on extrinsic evidence outside the pleadings. Their arguments regarding lack of subject matter jurisdiction are based upon the application of legal principles to the facts as alleged in the Complaint, as opposed to a factual challenge to the basis of jurisdiction. Therefore, we must consider the allegations in the Complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor. Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891.
With respect to the Plaintiff's Motion to amend her Complaint, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that leave to amend a pleading "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Although the decision to grant or deny leave to amend a complaint is committed to the sound discretion of the district court, leave should, consistent with the command of Rule 15(a), be liberally granted. Gay v. Petsock, 917 F.2d 768, 772 (3rd Cir. 1990); Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 518-19 (3rd Cir. 1988). The United States Supreme Court has articulated the following standard to be applied in evaluating whether to grant or deny leave to amend:
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. — the leave sought should, as the rules require, be "freely given."Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 183 (1962).
III. DISCUSSION
We focus first on the Defendants' argument that the Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing suit since it is jurisdictional in nature. See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 493 (3rd Cir. 1995). We shall then direct our attention to the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend her Complaint.
A. Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to IDEA, "children with disabilities" are entitled to "a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs . . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (d). "Children with disabilities" includes not only those traditionally recognized as handicapped, such as those children with mental retardation, hearing impairments, speech or language impairments and visual impairments, but also those with "serious emotional disturbance . . . who by reason thereof, need special education and related services." 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (3)(A). IDEA requires state and local educational agencies receiving federal assistance under the Act to establish and maintain procedures to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (a). Among these safeguards are the right to a due process hearing before an administrative officer, and the right to institute a civil action after receiving an adverse decision at the administrative level. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (f)(1) and 1415(i)(2).
In Pennsylvania, the statutory vehicle for special education is found in the Public School Code of 1949, 24 P.S. § 13-1371, et seq. Section 13-1372 provides for the adoption of regulations by the State Board of Education for the education of "exceptional children." These regulations appear at 22 Pa. Code §§ 14.101 through 14.162. Regulations concerning the "procedural safeguards" are found at 22 Pa. Code §§ 14.161 and 14.162. The regulations allow parental involvement in matters concerning the child's educational program, and allow parents to obtain administrative review of decisions they deem unsatisfactory or inappropriate.
The Department of Education regulations relating to "Special Education Services and Programs" were originally found at 22 Pa. Code §§ 14.1 through 14.74. Effective June 9, 2001 however, those sections were reserved and the new special education regulations are now codified at 22 Pa. Code §§ 14.101 through 14.162. See 31 Pa. Bull. 3021.
IDEA requires that an aggrieved party must exhaust a state's administrative procedures before bringing an IDEA claim in state or federal court. Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon School Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 281 (3rd Cir. 1996). The exhaustion requirement serves several important purposes: it enables the agency to develop a factual record, to apply its expertise to the problem, to exercise its discretion, to correct its own mistakes, and promotes accuracy, efficiency, agency autonomy, and judicial economy. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969). In addition, before bringing claims under other statutes "seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter," the administrative procedures set forth in section 1415 "shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter." 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1). Thus, a plaintiff may not circumvent IDEA's exhaustion requirement by taking claims that could have been brought under IDEA and "repackaging them as claims under some other statute — e.g., section 1983, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, or the ADA." Jeremy H., 95 F.3d at 281; citing W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 495-96 (3rd Cir. 1995) (citing the legislative history of § 1415(f) [renumbered as 1415(l)] as stating that "parents alleging violations of section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are required to exhaust administrative remedies before commencing separate actions in court where exhaustion would be required under [IDEA].") (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-296, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985)). Therefore, although the Plaintiff has asserted claims under § 1983, the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, she may obtain the relief sought pursuant to those claims only to the extent that she exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to the IDEA claim unless excused. Exhaustion is excused where recourse to the IDEA administrative proceedings would be futile or inadequate, or where the relief sought in a civil action is unavailable in an IDEA administrative proceeding. W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 495-96 (3rd Cir. 1995).
Here, it is undisputed that the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under IDEA. Relying on W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3rd Cir. 1995), the Plaintiff argues that since monetary relief is not available in an IDEA administrative proceeding, she is not required to exhaust the administrative remedies referenced in § 1415(l). We begin our analysis with the Third Circuit's holding in W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3rd Cir. 1995).
In Matula, the plaintiff brought suit on behalf of her son pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act and IDEA, alleging that her son had been deprived of his right to a free appropriate public education. Through the administrative process, the plaintiff ultimately succeeded in having her son evaluated, classified as neurologically impaired and provided with special education services. She then sought damages for the defendants' alleged persistent refusal to evaluate, classify and provide necessary educational services to her son for the period of time before the school agreed to provide these services. Matula, 67 F.3d at 488.
In examining the exhaustion requirement, the Third Circuit first noted that the exhaustion requirement may not be circumvented by casting an IDEA claim as a § 1983 action predicated on IDEA. Matula, 67 F.3d at 495. The court observed:
Beginning with the plain language of [§ 1415(l)] . . . it is apparent that the exhaustion requirement is limited to actions seeking relief "also available" under IDEA. We held supra that damages are available in a § 1983 action, but IDEA itself makes no mention of such relief. Hence by its plain terms [§ 1415(l)] does not require exhaustion where the relief sought is unavailable in an administrative proceeding.
Moreover, the legislative history of [§ 1415(l)] clarifies that "[e]xhaustion of the [IDEA] administrative remedies would . . . be excused where . . . resort to those proceedings would be futile." (citation omitted).
Accordingly, we have held that, where the relief sought in a civil action is not available in an IDEA administrative proceeding, recourse to such proceedings would be futile and the exhaustion requirement is excused. (citation omitted).Matula, 67 F.3d at 496. The court held that it would be futile for the plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies because the relief sought was unavailable in the IDEA administrative proceedings. Id. In so holding however, the court noted that all issues between the parties had already been settled, which caused the court to express a reservation as to whether the administrative tribunal would even have been competent to hear the plaintiffs IDEA claim. Id. In finding that exhaustion was excused, the court also found it significant that the child's classification and placement had been resolved in numerous administrative proceedings, and a factual record had been developed. Id. See also O.F. v. Chester Upland School District, 2000 WL 424276 (E.D.Pa. 2000) (exhaustion excused since plaintiff sought monetary relief and there was already an administrative factual record developed).
Relying on Matula, we recently found exhaustion excused in Ronald D. v. Titusville Area School Dist., 159 F. Supp.2d 857 (W.D.Pa. 2001), and granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to add claims under IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act to seek monetary damages. However, our decision in Ronald D. was driven in large measure by the fact that the child's present educational situation was not at issue, since the parents had resolved their dispute with the school district. Ronald D., 159 F. Supp.2d at 862. Importantly, in Ronald D. there was no remedy that an administrative tribunal could provide. Under those circumstances, we found that exhaustion was excused. Id.
Defendants counter that unlike Matula and Ronald D., the Plaintiff's requested relief in the original Complaint is not limited to monetary damages, but also seeks injunctive relief whereby the Defendants would be compelled to place her in a different school. Defendants argue that because emotional support services are not provided at Strong Vincent High School, the Plaintiff essentially seeks to compel the Defendant District to provide such services at Strong Vincent. This request, the Defendants claim, is clearly prospective in nature and is a matter squarely within the authority of the state administrative agency. Defendants contend that the recent case of Falzett v. Pocono Mountain School Dist., 150 F. Supp.2d 699 (M.D.Pa. 2001), which analyzed the exhaustion requirement, is factually analogous to the present case.
After unsuccessfully negotiating with the school district over their child's IEP, the plaintiffs in Falzett placed their son in private school and subsequently filed an action for tuition reimbursement and compensatory damages. Falzett, 150 F. Supp.2d at 700. The plaintiffs based their claims on IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA and § 1983. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The plaintiffs did not dispute that they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to bringing suit; rather they argued that exhaustion was excused on the basis of futility since they were dissatisfied with the school district's conduct during the parties' settlement negotiations. The court rejected the plaintiffs' futility argument, and then focused on whether exhaustion under IDEA was required where a plaintiff seeks relief that is partially available through the administrative process. Falzett, 150 F. Supp.2d at 703-04.
The court in Falzett stressed the fact that two additional considerations were "central" to the Matula court holding beyond the fact that the plaintiffs were seeking compensatory damages:
First, the parties in W.B. had participated in an extended series of administrative proceedings including four IDEA due process hearings which resulted in the development of an extensive factual record. Thus one of the principal reasons for the exhaustion requirement — to allow the administrative body with the relevant expertise to create an evidentiary record prior to judicial review — did not apply in W.B. Id. Second, all issues in W.B. other than the damages issue had been resolved by prior administrative proceedings. With only a monetary damages claim remaining, the plaintiffs in W.B. could gain nothing from an IDEA administrative proceeding in which damages could not be awarded. Id. Given the presence of a robust administrative record and the fact that the plaintiffs could gain nothing from recourse to yet another due process hearing, the W.B. court had little difficulty in dispensing with the exhaustion requirement.Falzett, 150 F. Supp.2d at 704. The court's holding in Falzett was limited to the conclusion that "recourse to IDEA administrative procedures is required prior to the filing of an action seeking to vindicate the educational rights of a handicapped child where the complaint seeks relief that is available through the administrative process." Falzett, 150 F. Supp.2d at 706 (footnote omitted). With respect to the Plaintiff's original Complaint here, she seeks, as did the plaintiff in Falzett, remedies that are both available in the administrative process, i.e., injunctive relief, and unavailable in the administrative process, i.e., monetary damages. However, theFalzett court also expressed a temptation, which it resisted, to delineate an exhaustion requirement of broader application. The court noted:
As will be discussed more fully in connection with the Motion to Amend, the Plaintiff's request to amend her Complaint by deleting the injunctive relief request is an apparent attempt to avoid the exhaustion requirement under Matula and Falzett.
The court is tempted to conclude that recourse to IDEA administrative procedures is required prior to the filing of a civil action seeking to vindicate the educational rights of a handicapped child whenever those administrative procedures are capable of providing relief to the plaintiff. Such a reading of § 1415(l) comports with the plain meaning of the statutory language as well as with the purposes of the exhaustion doctrine. It is also consistent with W.B., which excused exhaustion where the plaintiffs could receive no relief whatsoever through the available administrative processes. 67 F.3d at 496. It is likewise supported by the Supreme Court's recent Booth decision holding that a prisoner seeking only monetary damages must exhaust the administrative process even where damages are unavailable, so long as that process is capable of providing the prisoner some relief Booth, 121 S.Ct. at 1824.Falzett, 150 F. Supp.2d at 706 (footnote omitted).
In the present case, as in Falzett, but unlike Matula and Ronald D., the Plaintiff's present education situation is very much at issue. Her legal guardian has known since June of 2000 that pursuant to the NORA she would be placed at Central High School. To the extent that the Plaintiff disagreed and continues to disagree with her placement, a procedural mechanism existed through which meaningful relief could have been and could be sought. Matters relating to a child's placement are specifically included within the regulations concerning procedural safeguards found at 22 Pa. Code §§ 14.161 and 14.162. Specifically, these regulations provide that parents may request a prehearing conference in instances where they disapprove of the school district's proposed action. 22 Pa. Code § 14.161(l). Additionally, if the parents disagree with the school district's "identification, evaluation or placement of" their child, the parent may request an impartial due process hearing. 22 Pa. Code § 14.162(b). We find therefore that the Plaintiff's causes of action set forth in her original Complaint suffers from the jurisdictional infirmity of the Plaintiff's failure to have exhausted her administrative remedies.
B. Motion to Amend
We now turn to the issue of whether to permit the Plaintiff to amend her Complaint to delete her request for injunctive and declaratory relief. A court may justify the denial of a motion to amend if the amendment is found to be futile. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. An amendment is considered futile "if the amendment will not cure [any] deficiency in the original complaint or if the amended complaint cannot withstand a motion to dismiss." Jablonski v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3rd Cir. 1988). In determining futility, the court "applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6)." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3rd Cir. 1997). Therefore, a court must take all well pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.
For the reasons discussed more fully above, we are of the opinion that the requested amendment would be futile. We do not believe that a request for relief which is limited to money damages talismanically excuses a failure to exhaust. Such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the other factors which the Falzett court found "central" to the Matula holding, namely the development of a robust administrative record and the inability of the plaintiff to have obtained meaningful relief through the administrative process.
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted, and the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend is denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 25th day of March, 2002, and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint [Doc No. 5] is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint to Delete Requested Forms of Relief [Doc. No. 12] is DENIED.
The clerk is directed to mark the case "closed."