Opinion
CA 10-995
Opinion Delivered January 19, 2011
Appeal from the Pulaski County Circuit Court, Eighth Division, [No. JJN-09-915], Honorable Wiley A. Branton, Jr., Judge, Affirmed; Motion to Withdraw Granted.
The Pulaski County Circuit Court terminated appellant's parental rights in K.A.1, K.A.2, K.A.3, and K.A.4, who were ages six, five, four, and two. Appellant's counsel has filed a no-merit brief and a motion to withdraw, stating that there is no meritorious basis for an appeal. In compliance with Linker-Flores v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004), and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(i) (2010), counsel has listed all adverse rulings made by the circuit court at the termination hearing and explained why each ruling is not a meritorious ground for reversal. In this case, the only adverse ruling is the court's decision to terminate appellant's parental rights. Appellant was provided with a copy of counsel's motion and brief and has filed a pro se statement seeking reversal of the termination order. The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) and the children's attorney chose not to file briefs. We affirm and grant the motion to withdraw.
The following events gave rise to the termination order. On April 29, 2009, DHS petitioned the circuit court for emergency custody of appellant's four children after receiving a report that K.A.1, then age five, was consistently tardy for school and had missed thirty-seven of ninety-four days. An investigation revealed that the children were living, at least part of the time, with appellant's mother so that appellant and the children's father, Matthew Alexander, could acquire better housing and greater financial stability. Mr. Alexander told a DHS worker that he smoked marijuana daily, and appellant, after initially denying drug usage, tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine. The circuit court granted emergency custody to DHS.
In the ensuing months, the court entered a probable-cause order, an adjudication order, and a review order, all of which directed appellant and Mr. Alexander to accomplish various goals in hopes of reuniting the family. Appellant was ordered to undergo a psychological evaluation, a drug-and-alcohol assessment, and random drug and alcohol screens; to attend parenting classes; to undergo drug treatment; and to obtain and maintain stable, independent housing. By the time of the December 7, 2009 review order, however, appellant and Mr. Alexander had been discharged from parenting classes for non-attendance. Appellant had also refused a drug screen, and both parents continued to be unstable in their living arrangements. Subsequently, the court entered a permanency-planning order that changed the goal of the case to termination of parental rights. The order recited that appellant had not participated in counseling, had not attended drug treatment, and had not diligently pursued reunification. The court warned appellant to address her drug problem and "step up to the plate and start complying."
On April 16, 2010, DHS filed a petition to terminate appellant's parental rights, and the court held a termination hearing on June 15, 2010. By that point, the children had been in DHS custody for almost fourteen months. During the hearing, the court heard testimony from DHS family service worker LaSonya Morehead that all four children were in foster care together and were adoptable. The court also viewed appellant's psychological evaluation, conducted by Dr. Paul Deyoub in September and October 2009, in which Dr. Deyoub recommended that appellant attend outpatient drug-treatment and N/A meetings, take parenting classes, and attend counseling. The evidence revealed, however, that appellant waited until March 2010 to begin counseling, then missed several appointments without reasonable explanation; that appellant did not submit to a drug-and-alcohol assessment, despite DHS referrals; that appellant did not complete parenting classes; that appellant attended only half of one AA/NA meeting, which she admitted was not in compliance with court orders; and that appellant had no independent housing, vehicle, or income at the time of the hearing.
On July 7, 2010, the court entered an order terminating appellant's parental rights. The court found that DHS had an appropriate permanent-placement plan of adoption; that termination was in the children's best interest; and that grounds for termination existed, in particular that the children were adjudicated dependent-neglected and remained out of their parents' custody for twelve months, during which the parents did not remedy the conditions that caused the children's removal, despite DHS's meaningful effort. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)( a) (Repl. 2009). Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
The court also terminated Matthew Alexander's parental rights. He is not a party to this appeal.
Upon a careful review of the record, we conclude that an appeal in this case would be wholly without merit. DHS had an appropriate permanency-placement plan of adoption, which is a prerequisite to the circuit court's consideration of a petition to terminate parental rights. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(1)(A) (Repl. 2009). Further, we cannot say that the circuit court's finding that termination was in the children's best interest, considering the likelihood of their adoption and the potential harm in returning them to appellant, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A) (Repl. 2009), was clearly erroneous. The DHS family service worker testified that the children had been in foster care together and were adoptable. Additionally, the proof showed that appellant steadfastly refused to address her drug problem, attend counseling, or complete parenting classes, in direct defiance of court orders and in contravention of Dr. Deyoub's recommendations. Appellant also had no income or independent housing at the time of the termination hearing. A parent's lack of serious effort to attend counseling or address a drug problem and the failure to obtain appropriate income and housing are factors that demonstrate potential harm in returning the children to a parent, warranting termination. See Long v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 369 Ark. 74, 250 S.W.3d 560 (2007); Pacheco v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 411.
We also see no clear error in the circuit court's finding that at least one ground for termination existed as required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B) (Repl. 2009). The children were adjudicated dependent-neglected and continued out of appellant's custody for twelve months, during which time appellant took no steps to remedy her drug problem or obtain stable housing. These issues precipitated the children's removal from the home, and appellant failed to address them during the case despite DHS's meaningful effort in providing services. Accordingly, the ground for termination set forth in Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)( a) (Repl. 2009), was met.
All that remains is consideration of appellant's pro se points. Appellant has submitted a narrative discussing several alleged errors that occurred in circuit court. Her assertions include that the affidavit attached to the original dependency-neglect petition contained inaccuracies; that her attorney refused her request to submit certain unspecified evidence; that she wanted a different caseworker because hers was biased and dishonest; that a judge who formerly sat on the case violated a court order; that background checks and home studies on relatives were ignored; and that she was unaware of her rights during the case. We see no merit in these assertions. The record reveals that appellant stipulated to the contents of the original DHS petition; that she did not seek removal of her counsel at the termination hearing due to ineffectiveness; and that her other assignments of error were either not raised in circuit court or are wholly unsupported by the proof. These points therefore do not warrant the filing of a merit brief.
Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.
GRUBER and BROWN, JJ., agree.