Opinion
March 30, 1987
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Cerrato, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
We find that Special Term properly held that the agreements in question were in the nature of a lease, rather than a license. Although the agreements referred to themselves as licensing agreements, it is well settled that the courts, in construing the true nature of an instrument, are not bound by the name that the parties gave to it (see, City of New York v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 298, 300; see also, Goldsmith v. General Outdoor Adv. Co., 147 Misc. 536, 538-539, affd 240 App. Div. 943). The instruments at bar contained elements found in a lease and thus conferred "rights well beyond those of a licensee or holder of a mere temporary privilege" (Miller v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d 34, 37). As such, Special Term did not err in stating that the agreements were an "incidental contract within the meaning of [the defendant's] policy such that [the defendant] is obligated to defend and indemnify within the limits of its policy". Mangano, J.P., Thompson, Niehoff and Spatt, JJ., concur.