Opinion
No. 4-036 / 03-0817
Filed February 27, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Gregory A. Hulse, Judge.
The plaintiffs appeal from the district court summary judgment ruling that dismissed their personal injury petition. AFFIRMED.
John Hearn, Des Moines, for appellants.
Kevin Reynolds and Gretchen Kraemer of Whitfield Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
Heard by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
This case presents a purely legal question concerning the applicability of the relation-back doctrine of Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.402(5). The district court granted the summary judgment motion of Walgreen Co., and dismissed the petition of Rose and Ralph Richardson, because the Richardsons had brought suit, but failed to name the proper defendant, within the applicable limitations period. The Richardsons appeal, contending that if they were to amend their petition to name the correct defendant, the amendment would relate back to the time the petition was filed.
No motion to amend was ever filed.
We review the district court's summary judgment ruling for the correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. When, as here, there are no material facts in dispute, "[o]ur role is simply to decide whether we agree with the district court's application of the law to the undisputed facts before us." Iowa Tel. Ass'n v. City of Hawarden, 589 N.W.2d 245, 250 (Iowa 1999) (citation omitted).
On December 3, 2002, Rose and Ralph Richardson filed a petition against Walgreens, Inc. and Walgreens Properties, Inc., alleging that on December 4, 2000, Rose had been injured in a particular "Walgreens" store. The petition was filed with one day remaining in the two-year statute of limitations period for personal injury claims. See Iowa Code § 614.1(2) (2002). However, the store in question was not operated by either Walgreens, Inc. or Walgreens Properties, Inc., two apparently nonexistent entitles, but by Walgreen Co. Walgreen Co. was not served with notice of the action until December 12, 2002, after the expiration of the limitations period. Walgreen Co. provided an uncontroverted affidavit stating that, prior to December 4, 2002, it was unaware the Richardsons had filed suit.
Walgreen Co.'s answer asserted that Walgreens, Inc. and Walgreens Properties, Inc. "are entities that do not exist to the undersigned's knowledge and belief." The Richardsons do not dispute this assertion.
Under the foregoing undisputed facts, it is clear the Richardsons failed to bring suit against the properly-named party within the two-year statute of limitations. The Richardsons argue this fact does not bar their claims, as an amendment to name Walgreen Co. as the correct defendant would relate back to the time their petition was filed. Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.402(5) governs when such amendments will be allowed:
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if . . ., within the period provided by law for commencing the action against the party, the party to be brought in by amendment has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.
The Richardsons contend rule 1.402(5) is inapplicable as they do not seek to change the party defendant, but merely correct the defendant's name. However, our supreme court has interpreted rule 1.402(5) as applying to misnomers as well as to wholly new parties. See Grant v. Cedar Falls Oil Co., 480 N.W.2d 863, 866 (Iowa 1992) ("we reject plaintiffs' contention that rule [1.402(5)] only applies to amendments changing parties and not to amendments correcting names"). We conclude the rule is applicable to this case.
The Richardsons attempt to distinguish Grant because, in that case, the true party name bore little if any relationship to the name listed in the petition. However, the supreme court's focus in Grant was upon, not the dissimilarity of the names, but the fact a petition that misnames a defendant "does not serve to effectively bring the claim against the proper party." Grant, 480 N.W.2d at 866. That concern remains even when the two names are similar.
Accordingly, the Richardsons were required to establish that the relation-back requirements of rule 1.402(5) had been satisfied. See Alvarez v. Meadow Lane Mall Ltd. P'ship, 560 N.W.2d 588, 592 (Iowa 1997). This they did not and could not do. Under the undisputed facts, Walgreen Co. did not receive notice of the Richardsons' suit until after expiration of the limitations period. Cf. Gutierrez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 638 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Iowa 2002) (concluding amendment from "WALMART" to "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." related back to time of filing as an agent of the corporation had received notice of the suit within the limitations period).
Having fully considered the Richardsons' claims on appeal, we conclude the district court correctly granted Walgreen Co.'s summary judgment motion.
The Richardsons make two other arguments on appeal: 1) their claims are not barred as they sued Walgreen Co. under its trade name of "Walgreens," and 2) Walgreen Co. is estopped from claiming it may not be sued as "Walgreens" because it does business as, and thus represents to the public that its actual name is, "Walgreens." However, the suit did not name "Walgreens" as the party defendant; it named two non-existent corporate entities. Moreover, even if the Richardsons had sued Walgreen Co. in its trade name, it appears rule 1.402(5) would still apply. See Guiterrez, 638 N.W.2d at 706. We find these arguments to be without merit.