Summary
In Richardson, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision to prospectively increase alimony upon the termination of child support.
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Case No. 20060575-CA.
Filed June 21, 2007. NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, 034905249 The Honorable Stephen L. Roth.
J. Bruce Reading and William G. Wilson, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Scott L. Wiggins, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and McHugh.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Respondent Kenneth Andrew Richardson appeals the trial court's alimony award, arguing that the trial court erred when it ordered him to pay incremental increases in alimony to his ex-wife, Petitioner Kynda Kay Richardson, upon the termination of child support. Mr. Richardson further asserts that the trial court erred when it awarded Ms. Richardson retroactive alimony, even though she failed to include a request for interim alimony in her petition for divorce. "We review a trial court's award of alimony for abuse of discretion. `We will not disturb the trial court's alimony award so long as the trial court exercises its discretion within the standards set by the appellate courts.'" Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 7, 80 P.3d 153 (citation omitted) (quoting Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). We affirm.
First, Mr. Richardson contends that the trial court erred by ordering that, as each of the parties' children turns eighteen years old and the amount of child support decreases, the amount of alimony Mr. Richardson pays Ms. Richardson increases. Specifically, Mr. Richardson argues that it was improper for the trial court to mandate future changes to Ms. Richardson's alimony award based on a speculative change in her circumstances. We believe, however, that Mr. Richardson mischaracterizes the considerations upon which the trial court based the increases in alimony.
Under Utah law, "[t]he trial court has broad latitude" in determining alimony awards. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985). In making such awards, "the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(c) (Supp. 2006). Moreover, "[t]he court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of living." Id. § 30-3-5(8)(d). As the supreme court stated, "the purpose of alimony . . . `is to provide support for the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge.'"Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075 (quoting English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)).
Based on the underlying purpose of alimony, the supreme court "articulated three factors that must be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony award: `[1] the financial conditions and needs of the wife; [2] the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself; and [3] the ability of the husband to provide support.'"Id. (quoting English, 565 P.2d at 411-12). After reviewing the record, we conclude that upon Mr. Richardson's motion to reconsider, the trial court properly "analyzed the circumstances of the parties in light of these three factors." Id.
It is clear that the trial court considered Ms. Richardson's financial needs as well as her ability to support herself. The trial court noted that
[t]he parties were married for over twenty years and had six children. [Ms. Richardson] gave up her ability to acquire significant work skills and earning capacity to care for a large family, and continued to care for the remaining four minor children at the time of trial. She is in her forties or fifties and is not likely to significantly increase her earning capacity to a point where she can support herself at a standard the parties enjoyed during the marriage.
This court has discussed the appropriateness of such alimony considerations "after a long-term marriage, where the wife (usually) has worked primarily in the home, has limited job skills, and is in her late forties or fifties." Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1213 (Utah Ct.App. 1991).
The trial court determined that Ms. Richardson's initial alimony award of $420 per month was appropriate to address her needs, but only because that amount was "based on [Ms. Richardson's] present sources of income, including about $1375 in child support, which will decrease incrementally as each of the four minor children turns eighteen." Thus, as child support payments decrease, so does that source of Ms. Richardson's income. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court order incrementally increasing Ms. Richardson's alimony award properly considered her financial needs as well as her ability to support herself.
The trial court also properly considered Mr. Richardson's "ability . . . to provide support." Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075. The trial court determined that while Mr. Richardson pays his child support obligations, the parties' respective incomes are equalized. However, as his child support obligations terminate over time, his ability to pay support to Ms. Richardson increases while her ability to meet her own needs decreases. Without the addition of incremental increases in alimony payments to Ms. Richardson upon termination of child support, the parties' gross monthly incomes would be significantly disproportionate, and she would not be able to enjoy the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage.
After considering Mr. Richardson's ability to pay alimony once his child support obligations decrease, the trial court determined that upon the termination of his child support payments, Mr. Richardson has an increased ability to provide Ms. Richardson the support she needs to maintain the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage. These incremental increases in alimony meet the goal of "better equaliz[ing] the parties' abilities to go forward with their respective lives" after their long-term marriage, Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213, and provide Ms. Richardson with "the [approximate] standard of living she enjoyed during marriage," Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Ms. Richardson incremental increases in alimony as her child support payments terminate.
Second, Mr. Richardson argues that the trial court erred when it awarded Ms. Richardson retroactive alimony, even though she never petitioned the court for interim alimony during the divorce proceedings. Utah Code section 30-3-3 provides that the trial court "may order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other party." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(3) (Supp. 2006). Section 30-3-3 further indicates that interim alimony may be ordered "prior to the entry of the final order or judgment [and] may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order or judgment." Id. § 30-3-3(4). This section allows a trial court to award interim alimony and does not specifically state that a party must request that the trial court order interim alimony prior to entry of the final order. See id. § 30-3-3.
Here, Ms. Richardson did not separately request interim alimony in her petition for divorce, but instead simply requested alimony. However, she testified at trial that she was seeking interim alimony. Section 30-3-5(1) gives the trial court power to include "equitable orders" in divorce decrees, id. § 30-3-3(5), and the trial court has broad discretion in using this power. See Curry v. Curry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 321 P.2d 939, 942 (Utah 1958) (recognizing that "the trial court is vested with broad equitable powers in divorce matters and that its judgment will not be disturbed lightly, nor at all unless the evidence clearly preponderates against [its] findings, or there has been a plain abuse of discretion, or a manifest injustice or inequity is wrought"). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised its broad equitable powers in awarding retroactive alimony to Ms. Richardson.
Accordingly, we affirm.
WE CONCUR: Pamela T. Greenwood, Associate Presiding Judge
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge