Opinion
23A-PL-2212
08-06-2024
L.P. Richardson, Scott Richardson, and L&H Development, Appellants-Plaintiffs v. Eric Armstrong, Tyrone Postell, Lambert Barnes, and Jonathon Postell, Appellees-Defendants
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS SCOTT RICHARDSON AND L&H DEVELOPMENT Scott Richardson Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE ERIC ARMSTRONG Jason D. May Edward D. Thomas Melanie A. Ryder Jason May Law Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Circuit Court The Honorable Lena Pratt Sanders, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49C01-1205-PL-21783
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS SCOTT RICHARDSON AND L&H DEVELOPMENT
Scott Richardson
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE ERIC ARMSTRONG
Jason D. May
Edward D. Thomas
Melanie A. Ryder
Jason May Law
Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Foley, Judge.
[¶1] Scott Richardson ("Richardson") and L&H Development ("L&H") (collectively, "the Judgment-Debtors") appeal the denial of their motion to set aside a judgment under Trial Rule 60(B). We address the dispositive issue of whether the trial court should have set aside the judgment under Trial Rule 60(B)(6) because the judgment was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Applying Appellate Rule 8 and recent guidance from our Supreme Court, we conclude that the challenged judgment is void because it interfered with the subject matter of an appeal that was pending at that time. We therefore reverse the order denying relief to the Judgment-Debtors under Trial Rule 60(B), and we remand with instructions to set aside the judgment. We also deny Appellee Eric Armstrong's ("Armstrong") request for an award of appellate damages.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] This matter arose in 2011 when L.P. Richardson ("L.P.") initiated eviction proceedings in the Marion County Small Claims Court as to four residential tenants: Armstrong, Tyrone Postell, Lambert Barnes, and Jonathon Postell (collectively, "the Tenants"). L.P. obtained a judgment against the Tenants. The Tenants appealed to the Marion County Superior Court in May 2012, and the case was transferred to the Marion County Circuit Court, which held a bench trial in 2013. At trial, the Tenants moved for judgment on the evidence. They also sought a return of their security deposit and an award of attorney's fees. On August 30, 2013, the trial court granted the motion for judgment on the evidence. Initially, the court declined to order L.P. to return the security deposit, and it did not award attorney's fees. However, upon the Tenants' motion to reconsider, the trial court issued a September 2013 order requiring L.P. to return the security deposit. The trial court also awarded the Tenants "reasonable attorney's fees and court costs." Appellants' App. Vol. 2 p. 6.
Only Armstrong participates on appeal.
[¶3] On September 28, 2013, Richardson-an attorney-filed a Notice of Appeal on behalf of L.P. Meanwhile, on October 2, 2013, the Tenants moved to clarify the judgment. The trial court granted the motion on October 9, 2013, entering what it labeled as a final judgment of $12,670.00 in favor of the Tenants. See id. at 7. As for the appeal, the trial court's Chronological Case Summary contains an October 29, 2013, entry regarding the "Notice of Completion of Clerk's Record." See id. at 8. The entry indicates that the "transcript [was] not yet completed." Id. There is a subsequent docket entry indicating that the Notice of Completion of Transcript was generated on February 5, 2014. See id. at 9.
[¶4] In that prior appeal, L.P. challenged the trial court's order to return the security deposit. See Richardson v. Armstrong, 14 N.E.3d 138 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014) (mem. decision), trans. denied. L.P. also argued that he was entitled to "recover[] damages for certain non-physical damages to the [rental] property," including alleged damages related to "failing to cut the grass." Id. at 138 (emphasis removed). We affirmed the trial court on June 26, 2014. See id. L.P. then petitioned to transfer, and our Supreme Court denied the petition on February 27, 2015. See Richardson v. Armstrong, 26 N.E.3d 613 (Ind. 2015). The opinion of the Court of Appeals was certified on March 17, 2015. See Appellants' App. Vol. 2 p. 13.
[¶5] During the pendency of the prior appeal, the trial court conducted proceedings supplemental. Amid those proceedings, the trial court found L.P. in contempt and imposed monetary sanctions on August 4, 2014. See id. at 12. On August 7, 2014-which was after this Court issued its decision, but before the Indiana Supreme Court denied the petition to transfer-the Tenants filed with the trial court a "Motion to Establish Proper Plaintiff Identification and Order L&H . . . as Necessary Responsible Party." Id. at 71. Therein, the Tenants asserted that Richardson "held himself out to be the landlord and property owner of the real property at issue in th[e] case," and that "[p]laintiff L.P. . . [was] in fact attorney . . . Richardson." Id. at 71-72. They also asserted that L&H owned "the rental property at issue" and was "a necessary party [that] should pay damages[.]" Id. at 72. On October 1, 2014-while the petition to transfer remained pending-the trial court issued a judgment in which it (1) joined the Judgment-Debtors as parties and (2) ordered them jointly and severally liable "for all damages." Id. at 78. The court specified that the Judgment-Debtors were liable for $30,855.66, which consisted of the security deposit of $1,525.00, filing fees of $170.00, sanctions totaling $6,933.50, and an attorney fee award of $22,227.16. See id. at 79-80. It is undisputed that L.P. died a few days later.
[¶6] On May 19, 2023, the Judgment-Debtors filed a Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside the 2014 judgment. See id. at 32, 41-50. In their amended motion, they cited Trial Rule 60(B)(6) and argued the judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction because they were not properly served. They also referred to Trial Rule 60(B)(8), a catchall provision for relief requiring, among other things, that the motion be filed within a reasonable time. As to Trial Rule 60(B)(8), the Judgment-Debtors argued that ordering them liable "after trial and appeal[,] and without summons[,] violates Trial Rule 19 as well as every concept of Due Process under both Indiana State and U.S. Federal Law." Id. at 49.
[¶7] The trial court held a hearing on June 15, 2023, and took the matter under advisement. On August 21, 2023, the court issued a written order denying the Judgment-Debtors' Trial Rule 60(B) motion. Therein, the court concluded it had personal jurisdiction over the Judgment-Debtors because Richardson had received some degree of notice as counsel for L.P., and he had been appointed Power of Attorney as to L&H at pertinent times in the action. As to other asserted grounds for relief, the court determined the motion failed because it was not filed within a reasonable time. The Judgment-Debtors now appeal.
Discussion and Decision
I. Voidness
[¶8] In their Appellants' Brief, the Judgment-Debtors exclusively focus on whether they were entitled to relief because the judgment is void. See, e.g., Appellants' Br. pp. 4-5, 11-13, 23. Thus, to the extent the Judgment-Debtors rely upon other grounds for relief in their Reply Brief, they have waived those arguments. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 593 N.E.2d 1188, 1191 (Ind. 1992) (noting that an "[a]ppellant cannot raise an argument for the first time in [the] reply brief").
[¶9] Trial Rule 60(B) provides that, "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just[,] the court may relieve a party . . . from a judgment" for several enumerated reasons. Under Trial Rule 60(B)(6), one such reason is if "the judgment is void[.]" Moreover, a motion seeking relief for a void judgment "shall be filed within a reasonable time[.]" Ind. Trial Rule 60(B). In applying Trial Rule 60(B), the Indiana Supreme Court has explained that, "[w]hen a judgment is void," the trial court "has no discretion to enforce it, and thus, we review the [trial] court's decision de novo." T.D. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 719, 724 (Ind. 2023).
[¶10] Here, the Judgment-Debtors contend the October 2014 judgment is void under Indiana Appellate Rule 8, which limits the subject matter jurisdiction of a trial court when there is an appeal pending in the case. We begin by observing that the Judgment-Debtors filed their Trial Rule 60(B)(6) motion in May 2023, by which point the judgment was nearly a decade old. Trial Rule 60(B) required filing that motion within a "reasonable time[.]" As for this time limitation, our Supreme Court has held that a void judgment "may be collaterally attacked at any time" and "the 'reasonable time' limitation under [Trial] Rule 60(B)(6) means no time limit." Stidham v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152, 1156 (Ind. 1998) (setting aside a seventeen-year-old judgment that was void for lack of personal jurisdiction). Thus, the Judgment-Debtors' motion was timely. We next observe that, in the proceedings below, the Judgment-Debtors discussed the timeline of the judgment but did not focus on Appellate Rule 8. In most cases, we do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. Cf. Wilkes v. Celadon Grp., Inc., 177 N.E.3d 786, 794 (Ind. 2021) (explaining that issues are generally appealable only if first raised below). Here, however, the Judgment-Debtors claim the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction, and this is a claim that "may be raised by the parties or the court at any time, including on appeal." Weldon v. Universal Reagents, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 1104, 1107 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999). Thus, regardless of the scope of arguments below, we address the issue presented.
Finding this issue dispositive, we do not address other challenges to the October 2014 judgment.
[¶11] Indiana Appellate Rule 8 governs the jurisdiction of cases on appeal. Under this rule, "[t]he Court on Appeal acquires jurisdiction on the date the Notice of Completion of Clerk's Record is noted in the Chronological Case Summary." Ind. Appellate Rule 8. The Indiana Supreme Court recently explained that Appellate Rule 8 "erects a jurisdictional fence between the trial court and the appellate court[.]" Conroad Assocs., L.P. v. Castleton Corner Owners Assoc., Inc., 205 N.E.3d 1001, 1003 (Ind. 2023). Under this rule, "once a final judgment is appealed and the clerk certifies completion of the record, the trial court has no authority to interfere with the subject matter of that appeal until it is terminated." Id. Put differently, while an appeal is pending, trial courts retain authority only "'over matters [that] are independent of and do not interfere with the subject matter of the appeal.'" Id. at 1005 (quoting Crider v. Crider, 15 N.E.3d 1042, 1064-65 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014), trans. denied). "Such independent matters include 'reassessing costs, correcting the record, or enforcing the judgment.'" Id. (quoting Bradley v. State, 649 N.E.2d 100, 106 (Ind. 1995)). Furthermore, "a trial court can continue with trial during an interlocutory appeal of an order transferring or refusing to transfer venue of a case." Id. (citing Indiana Trial Rule 75(E)). Aside from these circumstances, the only way for a trial court to "regain jurisdiction while an appeal is pending" is through a stay of the appeal pursuant to Appellate Rule 37(A). Id. (citing Ind. Appellate Rule 37(A)).
[¶12] Here, the challenged judgment was issued in October 2014. At that point, L.P.'s petition to transfer was pending, and the appeal was not stayed. Thus, when the trial court entered the judgment at issue, its subject matter jurisdiction was limited to those matters that did not interfere with the subject matter of the appeal. In the October 2014 judgment, the trial court increased the monetary judgment against L.P. and joined the Judgment-Debtors as liable parties. On appeal, Armstrong defends the trial court's actions, asserting that the judgment fell within the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court because "the [Tenants] were seeking to collect on the August 2013 [j]udgment[.]" Appellee's Br. p. 26. Armstrong characterizes the judgment as involving permissible proceedings supplemental. However, the Judgment-Debtors contend that the court went too far because any "collection [action] against" L.P. "d[id] not apply to adding the additional parties of [the Judgment Debtors]." Appellants' Reply Br. p. 15.
[¶13] We agree with the Judgment-Debtors that the October 2014 judgment went beyond the permissible scope of proceedings supplemental. That is, by increasing the monetary judgment involved in the pending appeal and joining parties to be liable thereon, the October 2014 judgment "directly interfered with the subject matter pending on appeal." Conroad, 205 N.E.3d at 1003. We accordingly conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the October 2014 judgment, and therefore, that judgment is void. Having concluded that the challenged judgment is void, we reverse the denial of the Trial Rule 60(B) motion and remand for the trial court to grant all proper relief.
B. Appellate Damages
[¶14] Armstrong seeks appellate damages, arguing there were deficiencies in the Appellants' Brief that are indicative of procedural bad faith. In pertinent part, Appellate Rule 66(E) states: "The Court may assess damages if an appeal, petition, or motion, or response, is frivolous or in bad faith. Damages shall be in the Court's discretion and may include attorneys' fees." We use "extreme restraint" in awarding appellate damages "because of the potential chilling effect upon the exercise of the right to appeal." Alexin, LLC v. Olympic Metals, LLC, 53 N.E.3d 1184, 1197 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016). Having considered the instant request, we exercise restraint and decline to award appellate damages.
Conclusion
[¶15] Because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the October 2014 judgment, we reverse the denial of the Trial Rule 60(B)(6) motion and remand with instructions to grant the Judgment-Debtors all proper relief. We also decline Armstrong's request for damages under Appellate Rule 66(E).
[¶16] Reversed and remanded.
Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.