Opinion
NO. 2012 CA 0159
11-02-2012
GERALD M. RICH v. GAYLE M. JURASIN
James E. Moorman, III Kasi Brannan Covington, Louisiana Attorneys for Appellee, Gerald M. Rich Michael D. Conroy Covington, Louisiana Attorneys for Appellant, Gayle M. Jurasin G. Edward Merritt New Orleans, Louisiana
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the
22nd Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of St. Tammany
State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2007-16065
The Honorable William J. Burris, Judge Presiding
James E. Moorman, III
Kasi Brannan
Covington, Louisiana
Attorneys for Appellee,
Gerald M. Rich
Michael D. Conroy
Covington, Louisiana
Attorneys for Appellant,
Gayle M. Jurasin
G. Edward Merritt
New Orleans, Louisiana
BEFORE: CARTER, C.J., GUIDRY AND GAIDRY, JJ.
CARTER, C .J.
Gayle M. Jurasin appeals an adverse judgment following a trial on the merits wherein the trial judge awarded damages to the plaintiff, Gerald M. Rich, in the principal amount of $18,856.00 after a determination that Ms. Jurasin acknowledged the debt owed plaintiff for the amount of mortgage payments he made on her home. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. Rich and Ms. Jurasin began dating in late 2004 and eventually became engaged to be married. Mr. Rich spent approximately three nights a week at Ms. Jurasin's house and lived there the last four months of the relationship. The relationship was tumultuous, and the parties ended the engagement in March, 2007. While engaged, Mr. Rich learned that Ms. Jurasin's home was going to be foreclosed on due to her financial difficulty and loss of her job. Mr. Rich negotiated with the lenders on behalf of Ms. Jurasin to prohibit the foreclosure proceedings. Because Ms. Jurasin was unable to make the payments, Mr. Rich began paying the mortgage and arrears. Mr. Rich testified that he and Ms. Jurasin entered into an agreement where he would make the payments on her home. In exchange, upon marriage, Ms. Jurasin would give Mr. Rich one-half interest in her home. Mr. Rich further testified that should the parties not get married, Ms. Jurasin agreed to repay the money as a loan.
Ms. Jurasin denied that she ever agreed to repay Mr. Rich for the money he spent on her mortgage. She described the arrangement as one in which Mr. Rich paid the mortgage so she would not have to sell the house or move to Baton Rouge for a new job. Ms. Jurasin denied that the agreement was ever a loan from Mr. Rich. After their relationship ended, Ms. Jurasin testified that Mr. Rich began demanding the money back, claiming that the payments he made on her behalf were loans. He threatened to sue her for repayment of those monies. Therefore, she made several payments to Mr. Rich in the hope of halting any litigation against her. Ms. Jurasin admitted that she did agree to sign over one-half of the house if she and Mr. Rich married, but claimed that the payments were made as part of the relationship, never as a loan.
The trial court found that because Ms. Jurasin made some payments to Mr. Rich, she acknowledged the debt she owed of the total mortgage payments of $40,806.00. Therefore, the trial court found Ms. Jurasin owed the remainder of that amount, $18,856.00. As to the other claims by Mr. Rich that Ms. Jurasin owed him for numerous payments he made for household items and expenses, the trial court found that Mr. Rich failed to carry his burden that he owned the household items used by both parties or expected to be reimbursed for the expenses paid. The trial court also found that Ms. Jurasin failed to carry the burden of proof on any of her reconventional demands. Ms. Jurasin now appeals from the trial court's October 5, 2011, judgment in favor of Mr. Rich and assigns as errors that she acknowledged the debt to Mr. Rich or that there was a debt under either contract law or Louisiana Civil Code article 1967 pertaining to detrimental reliance.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
It is well-settled that a court of appeal may not set aside a trial court's or a jury's finding of fact in the absence of "manifest error" or unless it is "clearly wrong," and where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840, 844 (La. 1989). Where two permissible views of the evidence exist, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous. Stobart v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So. 2d 880, 883 (La. 1993). "[T]he issue to be resolved by a reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the factfinder's conclusion was a reasonable one." Id. at 882. Accordingly, we review the record before us in accordance with these standards.
APPLICATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES
In his original petition, Mr. Rich sought recovery of loans made to the plaintiff under the theory of detrimental reliance set forth in Louisiana Civil Code article 1967. Mr. Rich amended his petition, setting forth the amount of the loans he claimed he was owed and alleging that Ms. Jurasin agreed to repay him for the loans he made. The trial court ruled that Mr. Rich did not carry his burden of proof regarding ownership of the disputed personal property or the expectation of reimbursement for the expenses he sought, but that he was entitled to be reimbursed for the mortgage payments he paid on behalf of Ms. Jurasin. The trial court did not expressly set forth whether its decision was based on breach of contract or detrimental reliance.
While the parties have extensively briefed the issue of detrimental reliance, because this court finds a breach of contract, we pretermit discussion of the alternative claim of detrimental reliance.
In its reasons for judgment, the trial court stated, "[t]he Court finds the defendant's payments to plaintiff reflect her acknowledgment of the debt and she owes plaintiff $18,856.00." After considering all the evidence and testimony, the trial court must have found that an oral contract to repay the money loaned existed. Louisiana Civil Code article 1846 provides:
When a writing is not required by law, a contract not reduced to writing, for a price or, in the absence of a price, for a value not in excess of five hundred dollars may be proved by competent evidence.
If the price or value is in excess of five hundred dollars, the contract must be proved by at least one witness and other corroborating circumstances.
To meet the burden of proving an oral contract by a witness and other corroborating circumstances, a party may serve as his own witness and the "other corroborating circumstances" may be general and need not prove every detail of the plaintiffs case. However, the corroborating circumstances that are required must come from a source other than the plaintiff. Pennington Construction, Inc., 652 So.2d at 639.
Furthermore, the existence or non-existence of a contract is a question of fact, and the trial court's determination of this issue will not be disturbed unless manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Townsend v. Urie, 00-0730, p. 6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/11/01), 800 So.2d 11, 15, writ denied, 01-1678 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So.2d 674. Similarly, the issue of whether there were corroborating circumstances sufficient to establish an oral contract is a question of fact. Pennington Construction, Inc. v. R A Eagle Corp., 94-0575 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/3/95), 652 So.2d 637, 639. Moreover, when evaluating the evidence needed to establish the existence or non-existence of a contract, the trial court is allowed to make credibility determinations. Imperial Chemicals Limited v. PKB Scania (USA), Inc., 04-2742 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/22/06), 929 So.2d 84, 93, writ denied, 06-0665 (La. 5/26/06), 930 So.2d 31.
We conclude that this factual finding is reasonably supported by the evidence. The existence or non-existence of a contract is a question of fact, and the trial court's determination of this issue will not be disturbed unless manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Townsend v. Urie, 00-0730 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/11/01), 800 So. 2d 11, 15, writ denied, 01-1678 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So. 2d 674. Similarly, the issue of whether there were corroborating circumstances sufficient to establish an oral contract is a question of fact. Pennington Const, Inc. v. R A Eagle Corp., 94-0575 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/3/95), 652 So. 2d 637, 639. When evaluating the evidence needed to establish the existence or non-existence of a contract, the trial court is allowed to make credibility determinations. See Imperial Chemicals Ltd. v. PKB Scania (USA), Inc., 929 So. 2d 84, 93, writ denied, 06-0665 (La. 5/26/06), 930 So. 2d 31.
The evidence showed that Ms. Jurasin wrote several checks totaling $21,500.00 to Mr. Rich. After the relationship ended, Mr. Rich began demanding to be reimbursed for the balance of the money he paid on her behalf. At one point in Ms. Jurasin's testimony, she denied agreeing to pay Mr. Rich back any of the money he gave her, but later admitted to agreeing to pay him back in the amount of the checks she sent to him when the relationship ended, but claimed she only did so because he threatened litigation. Ms. Jurasin claims that she believed the monies paid by Mr. Rich were gifts, not loans, and that she never agreed to repay him the monies given.
The issue of whether the monies advanced was a donation or a loan is a factual one. Baker v. Baker, 09-507 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/4/09), 27 So. 3d 958, 966, writ denied, 09-2640 (La. 2/12/10), 27 So. 3d 850. A gift may be made to another person "by delivery of the thing to the donee without any other formality." La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1543. The donee bears the burden of proving, by strong and convincing evidence, that he was the recipient of a gift rather than a loan. Baker, 27 So. 3d at 966. "It is the task of the trial judge to determine the credibility of the witnesses and this determination will not be disturbed absent manifest error." Sevier v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 497 So. 2d 1380, 1382-83 (La. 1986).
In the instant matter, the trial court heard conflicting testimony and made a decision based on its consideration of all the evidence presented. Mr. Rich testified that he made a loan to Ms. Jurasin to make mortgage payments to her home since she lost her job, always with the intention of being repaid. Ms. Jurasin testified that the payments Mr. Rich made for her home were a gift as part of the relationship. However, Ms. Jurasin also made some payments to Mr. Rich and even admitted that the first payment she made of $8,500.00 was "to get me back up on the payments." Clearly, the trial court found Mr. Rich to be more credible than Ms. Jurasin as to whether the money paid by Mr. Rich for the mortgage of Ms. Jurasin was a loan or a gift. The record also shows five payments made by Ms. Jurasin totaling $21,500.00 to Mr. Rich. The trial court considered all the evidence and testimony and chose to believe Mr. Rich over Ms. Jurasin that the money spent by Mr. Rich on Ms. Jurasin's mortgage payments was a loan and not a gift to her. Ms. Jurasin did not carry her burden of proving by strong and convincing evidence that the money given to her by Mr. Rich was a gift. In light of the evidence in the record, the decision by the trial court is not clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous.
Given the great deference owed to the trial court's findings, and the record herein, we find no error by the trial court in its conclusion that a loan was made by Mr. Rich and is owed by Ms. Jurasin.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Gayle M. Jurasin.
AFFIRMED.