Opinion
No. 61031-7-I.
October 6, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 07-2-08530-1, Brian D. Gain, J., entered November 28, 2007.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Bruce Kumbera, his mother, and his stepfather owned a piece of real property together. Kumbera quitclaimed his interest in the property to his mother and stepfather, both of whom have since died. The personal representative of his stepfather's estate, Mary Jo Rice, brought an action to quiet title to the property in the estate, and the trial court granted her motion for summary judgment. Kumbera appeals, arguing that he has an equitable interest in the property because of various payments he allegedly made. Because there is insufficient evidence in the record to support Kumbera's payment claims, we affirm the trial court.
FACTS
On August 5, 1993, Bruce Kumbera, his mother, Patricia Maletic, and his stepfather, Steven Maletic, acquired ownership of a residential property in Renton, Washington. Title to the property was conveyed via a statutory warranty deed to "Steven S. Maletic and Patricia D. Maletic, husband and wife; and Bruce W. Kumbera, a single person." Kumbera alleges that he paid the initial down payment and part or all of the mortgage payments from August 1993 forward.
On July 26, 2004, Kumbera signed a quitclaim deed conveying his interest and title in the property to "Stephen (sic) and Patricia Maletic, husband and wife." He contends that he never intended to give up his interest in the property and that his signing the quitclaim deed was simply part of a "financing scheme" to obtain a better interest rate for refinancing because the lender did not want Kumbera's name on the title due to his poor credit. According to Kumbera, "[i]t was the understanding of the parties that the home would be deeded back to [him] after the loan was perfected." Appellant's Br. at 3.
Patricia Maletic died intestate shortly after the refinancing. On August 21, 2006, Steven Maletic executed his last will and testament, which directed that "Bruce Kumbera receive nothing from my estate, directly or indirectly." Steven Maletic died in September of 2006, and Mary Jo Rice was appointed the personal representative of his estate on September 25, 2006. Rice brought an action to quiet title in Steven Maletic's estate and to eject Kumbera and his belongings from the property. Kumbera filed a counterclaim requesting "a decree quieting title in the subject property for the Defendant Bruce W. Kumbera." Kumbera also requested an accounting and partition. The trial court granted summary judgment to Rice and Kumbera now appeals.
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
When reviewing an order of summary judgment, the court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court. Momah v. Bharti, 144 Wn. App. 731, 739, 182 P.3d 455 (2008). Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Briggs v. Nova Servs., 135 Wn. App. 955, 962, 147 P.3d 616 (2006), review granted in part, 161 Wn.2d 1022 (2007). All facts and reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Schaaf v. Highfield, 127 Wn.2d 17, 21, 896 P.2d 665 (1995). However, the nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations, opinions, or conclusory statements, but must put forward specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Allen v. Asbestos Corp., 138 Wn. App. 564, 569-70, 157 P.3d 406 (2007). When reviewing a civil case in which the standard of proof is clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, the court determines whether a rational trier of fact could find from the evidence in the record that the nonmoving party satisfied this evidentiary burden. Woody v. Stapp, ___ Wn. App. ___,189 P.3d 807, 810 (2008). Summary judgment is appropriate if reasonable persons could reach but one conclusion. Venwest Yachts, Inc. v. Schweickert, 142 Wn. App. 886, 893, 176 P.3d 577 (2008).
Constructive Trust
Kumbera initially contends that a constructive trust on the property should be imposed in his favor. A constructive trust is an equitable remedy that arises when a person who holds legal title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another who justly deserves it. City of Lakewood v. Pierce County, 144 Wn.2d 118, 126, 30 P.3d 446 (2001); Baker v. Leonard, 120 Wn.2d 538, 547, 843 P.2d 1050 (1993). "[F]raud, misrepresentation, bad faith, or overreaching usually forms the base upon which a constructive trust is erected." Bland v. Mentor, 63 Wn.2d 150, 155, 385 P.2d 727 (1963). However, while constructive trusts often arise in the context of fraud, misrepresentation, or bad faith, they may also arise in the absence of misconduct if retention of the property would result in unjust enrichment. Consulting Overseas Mgmt. Ltd. v. Shtikel, 105 Wn. App. 80, 87, 18 P.3d 1144 (2001).
Unjust enrichment occurs when a person retains money, property, or benefits that in justice and equity belong to someone else. Bailie Commc'ns, Ltd. v. Trend Bus. Sys., Inc., 61 Wn. App. 151, 160, 810 P.2d 12, 814 P.2d 699 (1991). A constructive trust may be proven by parol evidence, but the evidence must be clear, cogent, and convincing. In re Marriage of Lutz, 74 Wn. App. 356, 366, 873 P.2d 566 (1994).
Kumbera argues that there is an issue of fact regarding the existence of a constructive trust because he "paid for the down payment, and contributed to or paid in full all mortgage payments and expenses." Appellant's Br. at 9. But other than conclusory statements in his declaration and that of his wife, there is no evidence in the record to support this statement. Kumbera points to a partial photocopy of an annual escrow review sent to he and his stepfather, but this document does nothing to show how much Kumbera paid, if anything, toward the mortgage.
Kumbera also argues that Steven Maletic began participating in a state Medicaid program in June 2003 that prevented him from paying the mortgage for the last two years of his life. But even assuming this is true, it does not prove how much Kumbera paid, if anything. Virtually all of the cancelled checks in the record were signed by Patricia Maletic and drawn from a joint account of Kumbera, his mother, and his stepfather. Nothing in the record shows where the funds in the account originated. Kumbera conveyed his interest in the house via quitclaim deed in 2004, and in the process, he was relieved of his legal obligation to pay the underlying mortgage. Giving full effect to the deed Kumbera executed does not result in unjust enrichment under these circumstances. See Stocker v. Stocker, 74 Wn. App. 1, 7, 871 P.2d 1095 (1994) (where son deeded father property in exchange for being relieved of mortgage obligation, father's retention of property did not constitute unjust enrichment justifying imposition of constructive trust).
Rice presents approximately 30 evidentiary objections to this and other evidence in an appendix to her brief. But even assuming all of Kumbera's evidence is admissible, no rational trier of fact could find that the evidence constitutes the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence necessary to impose a constructive trust on the property in his favor. Other than bare assertions, there is no evidence in the record to show that he paid anything toward the property.
Kumbera further asserts "this Court could also find that the decedent, Steven S. Maletic[,] intentionally changed his Will in an effort to defraud Kumbera." Appellant's Br. at 14. But to establish fraud, a party must present clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of all the elements of fraud. In re Estate of Mumby, 97 Wn. App. 385, 391, 982 P.2d 1219 (1999). Here, beyond this cursory statement in his brief, Kumbera fails to support his argument with any citations to authority or the record in his case. The court need not consider an argument not supported by references to the record or citation to authority. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992). Consequently, Kumbera's suggestion that he was defrauded also does not support imposition of a constructive trust.
Resulting Trust
Kumbera next argues that a resulting trust arose in his favor when he signed the quitclaim deed. A resulting trust arises when a person conveys a property's legal title to another under circumstances that reasonably show the person did not intend for the grantee to have a beneficial interest in the property. Thor v. McDearmid, 63 Wn. App. 193, 205, 817 P.2d 1380 (1991). Thus, where property is purchased by one person but placed in the name of another, the person with legal title is presumed to hold it subject to the equitable ownership of the purchaser, absent evidence of contrary intent. In re Estate of Spadoni, 71 Wn.2d 820, 822, 430 P.2d 965 (1967). But no presumption arises if the payor advances only part of the consideration for the property. Engel v. Breske, 37 Wn. App. 526, 529, 681 P.2d 263 (1984). And where there is a close family relationship between the parties, a transfer without consideration may be deemed a gift. See In re Estate of Cunningham, 19 Wn.2d 589, 592, 143 P.2d 852 (1943) (a gift, rather than a resulting trust, will be presumed when the person taking legal title is a natural object of the purchaser's bounty). While a resulting trust may be proven with parol evidence, the evidence must be clear, cogent, and convincing. Spadoni, 71 Wn.2d at 823. This standard is not met if the evidence supports some other hypothesis or "does not unmistakably point to the existence of the claimed trust." Engel, 37 Wn. App. at 530-31.
Kumbera argues that a resulting trust was created because he intended to convey legal title to his mother only on a temporary basis to obtain a better loan rate, after which she was to deed the property back to him. He asserts that he continued to live in the house and pay all expenses, thereby showing the intent of the parties that the property would ultimately be transferred back to him. But there is no evidence demonstrating that Kumbera actually paid anything, and even assuming some payments occurred, that would not "unmistakably point to the existence of the claimed trust." Id. Such payments could just as easily be explained as rent given in exchange for his continued residence and use of the house or as a gift given out of familial affection.
Rice objects that Kumbera cannot testify regarding any conversations, understandings, or arrangements he made with his deceased mother because such evidence is barred by RCW 5.60.030, the so-called dead man's statute. However, even assuming Kumbera's declaration about the parties' intentions is considered, it does not show that a resulting trust was created in his favor at the time he signed the 2004 quitclaim deed. Kumbera must show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the circumstances of the conveyance require the law to imply a trust in his favor. He could potentially show this with evidence that he paid for the property even though he placed title in another's name, but there is no clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in the record that he paid for the property.
Kumbera also contends that his case is analogous to Spadoni, "in that both provided the down payment, made the subsequent payments, and possessed the property for a long duration." Appellant's Br. at 10. But here, other than conclusory statements and allegations, there is no evidence in the record to prove how much, if at all, Kumbera contributed to the property. In contrast, the Spadoni court found "clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence for a resulting trust: "The fact that Mr. Spadoni supplied all the consideration, occupied the property for a quarter of a century to the time of his death, erected improvements, negotiated sales of portions of the property, negotiated a reconveyance of a portion, paid taxes and acted in every respect as owner, leads irresistibly to the conclusion that equitable title rested in Mr. Spadoni." Spadoni, 71 Wn.2d at 823 (emphasis added). Here, Kumbera does not contend that he supplied all the consideration for the property or that he acted as its sole owner. This case is distinguishable from Spadoni. Accounting
Kumbera also asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing his counterclaim for an accounting and reimbursement of the money he spent on the property. He contends that Rice never requested this relief in her motion for summary judgment. But this contention is inaccurate because the motion specifically requested that "the Court dismiss the counterclaims alleged by Defendant Kumbera, and each of them, with prejudice." Kumbera also contends that there is a "question of fact as to where the fund originated." Appellant's Reply Br. at 16. Presumably, the fund Kumbera refers to is the joint account he held with his mother and stepfather from which the mortgage payments were made. But Kumbera makes no argument and cites no cases to show why he is entitled to an accounting under these circumstances. He produced no evidence to prove that he ever contributed to the joint account. The trial court did not err in dismissing this claim.
Partition
Kumbera also suggests that "[i]f the Court finds that the parties' intent was to remain as tenants-in-common and/or joint tenants with rights of survivorship, then the Court can impose a partition and thus order that the property be sold, and the proceeds split." Appellant's Br. at 11. But the trial court did not find that the parties intended to remain joint owners of the property, and such a finding would have been contradicted by the quitclaim deed Kumbera signed conveying his interest to his mother and stepfather. Moreover, Kumbera failed to put forward any evidence regarding the feasibility of partition or the prejudice that might result to the owners. The trial court did not err in dismissing this claim.
Affirmed.