Opinion
No. 107,586.
2013-02-15
Deborah LUCAS, Attorney–in–Fact for Dorothy Gullick, Appellant, v. SOUTH MERIDIAN PARK, LLC, and Jason Judkins, Appellees.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; Jeff Goering, Judge. Ted E. Knopp, of Ted E. Knopp, Chartered, of Wichita, for appellant. Patrick Turner, of Shultz Law Office, P.A., of Wichita, for appellees.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; Jeff Goering, Judge.
Ted E. Knopp, of Ted E. Knopp, Chartered, of Wichita, for appellant. Patrick Turner, of Shultz Law Office, P.A., of Wichita, for appellees.
Before MALONE, C.J., HILL and BRUNS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Deborah Lucas, attorney-in-fact for her mother Dorothy Gullick, appeals the district court's decision denying her motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of South Meridian Park, LLC, (South Meridian) and its owner, Jason Judkins, on Lucas' claim for conversion of Gullick's mobile home and contents. Lucas argues that South Meridian and Judkins wrongfully converted Gullick's property when they denied her access to the mobile home park and changed the locks on the mobile home after evicting Christina Kerr—Lucas' daughter and Gullick's granddaughter. Lucas also contends that the district court erred in imposing sanctions against her attorney under K.S.A.2010 Supp. 60–211. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court's judgment including the imposition of sanctions.
The events leading to this appeal were set in motion on April 4, 2011, when Mary Lary, mobile home park manager for South Meridian, posted a 3–day notice to vacate on the door of the mobile home located on Lot 213 informing Kerr and all other persons residing in the mobile home that they would be evicted if they did not pay $495 in overdue lot rent and fees within 3 days of the notice. Later that same day, Lary also posted a 14/30–day notice to vacate for violating the mobile home park's rules.
On April 8, 2011, South Meridian filed a petition to evict Kerr and all others residing in the mobile home located on Lot 213 for nonpayment of rent. That same day, Kerr was personally served with a notice to appear in the eviction action. Kerr did not appear at the hearing, and default judgment was entered against her. A writ of restitution was also issued to remove Kerr and all others residing in the mobile home located on Lot 213 from the mobile home space—that is, the lot underlying the mobile home itself—and all common areas, yards, driveways, and property of South Meridian.
On or about April 15, 2011, a notice was posted on the door of the mobile home warning Kerr and all other persons residing in the mobile home that they had been evicted and could be arrested for trespass. South Meridian also had the locks changed on the mobile home. According to Lary, at some point after the eviction petition was filed, she allowed Kerr into the mobile home to get some of her belongings.
On May 6, 2011, Kerr filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The motion was signed by Ted Knopp as Kerr's attorney. Also on May 6, 2011, Lucas filed a motion to intervene in the eviction case. The motion to intervene, which was signed by Knopp as Lucas' attorney, indicated that Lucas was either the record or equitable owner of the mobile home and was the attorney-in-fact for Gullick, the original owner of the mobile home. Lucas claimed an interest in the mobile home not adequately protected by any of the existing parties and stated that South Meridian “has obtained a writ of assistance and, using said writ, has asserted dominion and control of [Lucas'] mobile home without notice or due process to [Lucas].”
On May 16, 2011, the district court held a hearing on the motion to set aside default judgment and the motion to intervene. During the hearing, Knopp indicated that his clients ultimately wanted the mobile home itself but did not want to keep it in the mobile home park. Kurt Holmes, attorney for South Meridian and Judkins, indicated that his client never wanted possession of the mobile home and had asked to have the mobile home removed from the park. Holmes further stated:
“[W]hat Mr. Knopp really wants to do is put Ms. Kerr back in the home until they make arrangements to move this mobile home, if they are going to move it, and that is something our client is adamant that they do not want her back in—living there in the park, and there's—they have—they have told her from day one that she can make any arrangements to move all of her personal property that's in the home out, and to date, she's not done that, and, so far, there's been no arrangements to move the home.
....
“... Again we are more than willing—my clients are here to give [Kerr] every opportunity to move anything that she wants out of the house, and to make any—whoever owns the home to make any steps toward moving that home.”
But after the district court suggested continuing the hearing so that the parties could work out between themselves a time for Kerr to retrieve her personal belongings and to make arrangements to move the mobile home, Knopp indicated that he wanted his clients to be able to stay at the mobile home until the eviction proceedings were properly completed. The district court ultimately denied the motion to set aside default judgment as to Kerr on the basis that it was not timely filed under K.S.A.2010 Supp. 61–3301(c). The district court granted Lucas' motion to intervene but found that Lucas would first have to establish that she and/or Gullick were tenants of South Meridian before allowing unlimited access to the mobile home. The district court set an evidentiary hearing to determine Lucas' and/or Gullick's tenancy.
On May 18, 2011, before the evidentiary hearing was held, Lucas entered the mobile home park on Knopp's advice and had a locksmith change the locks on the mobile home so that she could retrieve documents for court and some of Kerr's personal belongings. According to Kerr, Lucas called Kerr to inform her that some items had been stolen from the mobile home and that she needed to come to the home to identify those items for the police. Lucas also testified that she had called Kerr in order to identify stolen property but that the police had threatened to arrest them based on the posted notice of eviction. Lucas further testified that Judkins refused to tell the police that she was not part of the eviction, but Judkins did allow Lucas to access the inside of the mobile home for a very short period of time. According to Judkins, nobody gave any notice to him or to South Meridian that Kerr would reenter the property, and the police were called by the neighbors when they saw Kerr at the property.
On May 19, 2011, the district court held the evidentiary hearing on Lucas' and/or Gullick's tenancy. Lucas testified that the mobile home was owned by her mother, Gullick, who had been diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease over 3 years previously. At that time, Gullick moved into a care facility and Lucas was appointed her attorney-in-fact. Lucas also began to care for the mobile home, although she never lived there. Lucas paid the lot rent for about 2 1/2 years. Lucas further testified that about 1 1/2 years previously, she allowed her daughter Kerr and Kerr's children to move into the mobile home. Lucas acknowledged that she had no written lease agreement with South Meridian. Lary testified that Lucas had never been an occupant of the mobile home and that Gullick had not been an occupant for some time.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court again upheld the default judgment as to Kerr. The district court also found that neither Lucas nor Gullick were tenants of South Meridian and thus had no tenancy rights, including the right to participate in the eviction proceedings. Finally, the district court asked the parties about their intent with respect to the mobile home. Knopp indicated that his clients wished to remove the mobile home from South Meridian's property. The district court ordered the parties to coordinate a time to allow Kerr to retrieve the remainder of her personal belongings from the mobile home and to remove the mobile home itself from South Meridian's property.
On May 27, 2011, the district court issued an order dismissing Lucas and Gullick from the eviction action because they were not tenants of the mobile home park. The order was signed by counsel for both parties and file-stamped at 9:59 a.m. The district court also issued a second order, signed by counsel for both parties and file-stamped at 10:59 a.m., which stated in part:
“1. That pursuant to K.S.A. 58–25–103(1), the Court FINDS that Deborah Lucas and Dorothy Gullick are not Tenants', and the only tenant is the defendant, Christina Kerr.
....
“3. The Court further FINDS that Ms. Kerr should make arrangements through Plaintiff [South Meridian] or Plaintiff's counsel for purposes of removing any remaining personal property not already taken by Defendant after entering the home on 5/18/2011 or taken earlier with consent of Plaintiff's manager [Lary].
“4. The Court further FINDS that Defendant, Christina Kerr, and Intervener, Deborah Lucas, have requested, and shall be allowed to enter the property between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on May 28, 29, and 30, 2011 for purposes of removing the personal property from the manufactured home on Lot 213.... Said entry will be coordinated by Plaintiff to allow Defendant and Deborah Lucas access during those times.
“5. The Court further FINDS that Defendant, Christina Kerr, has no further tenancy rights and Plaintiff shall proceed with giving appropriate notice to have the mobile home removed.”
Lucas or Kerr made no attempt to appeal the district court's judgment in the eviction action, including the denial of Lucas' motion to intervene. But on May 27, 2011, only a few hours after the order was filed allowing Lucas access to the mobile home, Knopp on behalf of Lucas (as attorney-in-fact for Gullick) filed a petition for conversion against South Meridian and against Judkins individually. The petition, which made no reference to the order permitting Lucas access to the mobile home over a 3–day period to retrieve personal property, alleged in part:
“9. Notwithstanding Plaintiff's ownership of the mobile home, Defendants wrongfully denied Plaintiff entry to the home and have at all times denied Plaintiff access and entry to the mobile home. Plaintiff was denied access on May 18, 2011 and Defendant thereafter once more caused the locks on Plaintiff's mobile home to be changed, thereby re-asserting Defendant's control and dominion over Plaintiff's mobile home and preventing free entry to, and dominion of, the mobile home by Plaintiff. On May 21, 2011, Plaintiff attempted to enter the mobile home, with prior notice to Defendants, and again was turned away by police under color of court order. At all times since April 15, 2011, Defendants have deprived Plaintiff access, control and dominion of her mobile home while obtaining control for Defendants, thereby converting the mobile home and its contents to Defendants' own use.
“10. Plaintiff has been denied the use of the mobile home from April 15, 2011 through the date of judgment at a reasonable value of $250.00 per month.
“11. Defendants denied Plaintiff access to clothing, household items and personal property, thereby converting the same to Defendants' ownership and use. The value of personal property converted is in excess of $5,000.00.
“12. In the event Defendants have not converted Plaintiff's personal property in the mobile home, then Plaintiff asserts that during Defendant's dominion of the mobile home, Defendants negligently failed to secure the mobile home resulting in loss and theft of Plaintiff's property.
“WHEREFORE, Plaintiff seeks judgment jointly and severally against Defendants as follows:
A. Fair market value of the mobile home on the date converted to wit: April 15,2011;
B. Fair market value of personal property in the mobile home on the date converted in an amount in excess of $5,000.00 and to be determined at trial.
C. Cost of changing the locks in the amount of $300.00;
D. Loss of the use of the manufactured home of $500 per month from April 15, 2011 until the date of judgment herein; and
E. A set-off against any lot rent claimed by Defendant South Meridian Park, LLC for the placement of the manufactured home on the lot from and after April 15, 2011, the date of conversion.”
On June 15, 2011, South Meridian and Judkins, both represented by Holmes, filed a motion to dismiss the conversion case. On June 24, 2011, the district court held a hearing on the motion, at which it ordered that South Meridian and Judkins' motion to dismiss be refiled as a motion for summary judgment. The district court also placed Knopp on notice under K.S.A.2010 Supp. 60–211 that there did not appear to be any factual basis for the conversion claim.
On July 1, 2011, Lucas filed a motion for summary judgment, to which South Meridian and Judkins filed a response. The district court held a hearing on Lucas' motion on August 24, 2011. The district court found that there were material facts precluding Lucas' motion for summary judgment, including facts related to the extent that Lucas was actually deprived of ownership or control over the mobile home and its contents, in light of the enforceable court order allowing Lucas to gain access to the mobile home. The district court found that Lucas had failed to establish facts or make legal arguments as to how Judkins could be held personally liable on the conversion claim. Thus, the district court denied Lucas' summary judgment motion. The following exchange then occurred:
“[THE COURT:] I will, again, reiterate that it appears to me that the purpose of this lawsuit is not to recover personal property belonging to Ms. Gullick. It appears to be uncontroverted that property remains on the real estate owned by the defendants, that the defendants do not want that property on their real estate, and it appears to be uncontroverted that the plaintiff apparently doesn't want possession of that stuff, either. What the plaintiff is trying to accomplish by way of this conversion action, apparently, is to force the defendants to buy, through some claim for conversion, the personal property that, for all intents and purposes, appears to be abandoned on their property. And, as I mentioned before, I've not been provided any law that stands for that proposition. And it sure seems to me, in the absence of any law or in the absence of some theory that would allow the plaintiff to get from point A to point B on that issue, that this lawsuit has not been brought for a proper purpose. I referenced that earlier, and I'm referencing it again. It seems to me that this whole thing can be solved today—today if Ms. Gullick would hire somebody to go move that mobile home off of the defendants' property.
“Mr. Holmes, you have Mr. Judkins here; is he—does he have any objections to Ms. Gullick moving that mobile home off his mobile home lot?
“MR. HOLMES: No, Your Honor.
“THE COURT: Is there—so this has been stated today, it's been stated at every prior hearing that the defendants do not want this mobile home on their property. Ms. Gullick refuses to go get it. I don't see how she maintains an action for conversion under those circumstances. And if this is an effort to force ... the defendants to buy this mobile home, there had better be some law on point.
....
“MR. KNOPP: Ms. Gullick, can—may she make arrangements to pick up this mobile home without prejudicing her claims for conversion damages?
“THE COURT: I'll tell you this, Mr. Knopp: If she wants to go get her mobile home, that's fine. If she wants to maintain this action for conversion—well, if she wants to maintain this action for conversion, whether or not she goes and gets that mobile home, she does it at her own risk. I've already told you what I think of the purpose for why this lawsuit was brought. If she wants to charge ahead and take a stab at convincing me that there is some valid legal theory that would allow for the damages that she's requesting, then, fine. So the answer to your question is, sure. If she wants to go get the mobile home and still maintain her action for conversion, I don't think it gets any better or worse for her than it is right now.”
On September 14, 2011, South Meridian and Judkins filed their motion for summary judgment, arguing that the uncontroverted facts showed that they had not converted the mobile home and that Judkins could not be held personally liable. After hearing arguments of counsel, which are not included in the record on appeal, the district court found no genuine issues of material fact and granted South Meridian and Judkins' motion for summary judgment.
On October 26, 2011, South Meridian and Judkins filed a motion seeking sanctions under K.S.A.2010 Supp. 60–211, arguing that Lucas' conversion action was filed for an improper purpose— i.e., to harass or increase the cost of litigation or to force South Meridian and Judkins to pay for the mobile home—and that it had no legal merit. On January 5, 2012, the district court issued a 46–page memorandum decision granting the motion and assessing sanctions against Knopp in the amount of $5,990.25. The district court found that Lucas' conversion claim was not supported by facts or law, that most of the damages claimed by Lucas were not supported by facts or law, and that the conversion action was not brought for any proper purpose. Lucas timely appealed.
Conversion Action
On appeal, Lucas argues that South Meridian and Judkins' denial of access to the mobile home located within the mobile home park and the changing of the locks on the mobile home amounted to conversion of her property. With respect to access to the mobile home, Lucas contends that she was a “non-residential” tenant by virtue of her mobile home being permissibly placed within the mobile home park, that she was never properly evicted from the mobile home park, and thus she had an unlimited right to enter the property in order to access the mobile home. With respect to the changing of the locks on the mobile home, Lucas contends that as owner of the mobile home she had the exclusive right to control access to the interior of the mobile home by maintaining the locks and keys to the mobile home. Further, Lucas asserts that the eviction of Kerr had no bearing on Lucas or her rights to access and control the mobile home and its contents.
South Meridian and Judkins argue that their actions in restricting Lucas' access to the mobile home and in changing the locks on the mobile home did not constitute conversion of Lucas' property. With respect to access to the mobile home, they argue that Lucas was not a tenant and therefore did not have an unlimited right to enter the mobile home park in order to access the mobile home. With respect to the changing of the locks on the mobile home, South Meridian and Judkins contend that it was a reasonable action taken to secure the mobile home space and contents of the mobile home after the lawful eviction of Kerr. South Meridian and Judkins note as a factual matter that they provided multiple opportunities for Kerr and/or Lucas to enter the mobile home park and the mobile home itself—including court-ordered access on May 28, 29, and 30—and that they repeatedly indicated that they were willing to work with Lucas to arrange access to and removal of the mobile home.
The parties agree that the material facts related to Lucas' conversion action are undisputed. Where there is no factual dispute, appellate review of an order regarding summary judgment is de novo. David v. Hett, 293 Kan. 679, 682, 270 P.3d 1102 (2011). To the extent that resolution of this issue requires statutory construction, including interpretation of the Mobile Home Parks Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (MHPRLTA), K.S.A. 58–25,100 et seq. , appellate review is also unlimited. See Unruh v. Purina Mills, 289 Kan. 1185, 1193, 221 P.3d 1130 (2009).
A conversion is an unauthorized assumption or exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another to the exclusion of the other's rights. Bomhoff v. Nelnet Loan Services, Inc., 279 Kan. 415, 421, 109 P.3d 1241 (2005). Thus, to prevail on her conversion claim, Lucas was required to show that South Meridian and/or Judkins: (1) assumed or exercised the right of ownership (2) over Lucas' property (3) without authorization, and (4) to the exclusion of Lucas' rights.
Lucas first contends that South Meridian and Judkins exercised the right of ownership over her mobile home without authorization and to the exclusion of her rights where they restricted her access across the mobile home park to the mobile home. Lucas concedes that the mobile home park is South Meridian's private property but argues that she was a “non-residential” tenant by virtue of her mobile home being located in the park, that she was not properly evicted, and that she had an unlimited right of access for nonresidential purposes that was improperly restricted by South Meridian and Judkins.
In essence, Lucas contends that there are two types of tenancies of mobile home spaces: one related to the person residing within the mobile home located on the mobile home space, governed by the MHPRLTA (“residential”), and the other related to the person or entity that owns the mobile home located on the mobile home space, governed by the general landlord-tenant provisions of K.S.A. 58–2501 et seq. (“non-residential”). Lucas cites no authority for this proposition, which is plainly foreclosed by the MHPRLTA. See K .S.A. 58–25,103(1) (defining “tenant” as person entitled under a rental agreement to occupy the mobile home space); K.S.A. 58–25,121 (treating “tenant” as distinct from the legal owner and known lienholder of the mobile home). Lucas has failed to show that her mere ownership of the mobile home located within the mobile home park, without other indicia of tenancy, created a tenancy giving her an unlimited right to enter the mobile home park in order to access to the mobile home. Thus, Lucas has not shown that she had a right incident to her ownership of the mobile home that was excluded by South Meridian and Judkins' alleged restriction of her access to the mobile home. As a matter of law, their actions in restricting Lucas' right to enter the mobile home park in order to access the mobile home did not constitute a conversion.
Next, Lucas argues that South Meridian and Judkins exercised the right of ownership over her mobile home without authorization and to the exclusion of her rights when they changed the locks to the mobile home, thus restricting her access to the interior and contents of the mobile home. This argument is also without merit because, even assuming factually and legally that the changing of the locks was an action that excluded Lucas' ownership rights to her mobile home, the action was a reasonable means of retaking possession of the mobile home space following the lawful eviction of Kerr.
Changing the locks on a building is generally considered a reasonable means of retaking possession of a building following a lawful eviction. See Statewide Agencies, Inc. v. Diggs, 31 Kan.App.2d 226, 62 P.3d 1105 (2003) (landlord changed locks on dwelling following lawful eviction of tenant); K.S.A.2011 Supp. 61–3808(b) (authorizing person serving writ of restitution issued pursuant to lawful eviction to use such reasonable force as is necessary to execute the writ). But this case presents unusual circumstances because, although South Meridian owned and leased out the mobile home space—that is, the plot of ground on which the mobile home was located—it did not own or lease out the mobile home itself. Thus, the question this court must consider is whether a landlord may change the locks on a mobile home not owned by the landlord (or a third party for whom the landlord acts as an agent) pursuant to a lawful eviction of the tenant from the underlying mobile home space and without exposing the landlord to liability for conversion of the mobile home owner's property.
Lucas cites several cases in support of her proposition that the changing of her locks on her mobile home constituted conversion of her property. But these cases do not apply to the facts herein. See Riley State Bank v. Spillman, 242 Kan. 696, 703–05, 750 P.2d 1024 (1988) (secured creditor breached the peace when it repossessed debtor's collateral by changing the locks to debtor's business premises); Geiger v. Wallace, 233 Kan. 656, 658, 664 P.2d 846 (1983) (landlord liable to tenant for damages after landlord wrongfully evicted tenant by nailing door shut and cutting off utilities without providing required statutory notice); Wingerson v. Tucker, 175 Kan. 538, 539–40, 265 P.2d 842 (1954) (district court did not err in finding that landlord converted tenant's property based on landlord changing locks to building); Farmers State Bank v. FFP Operating Partners, 23 Kan App.2d 712, 712–15, 935 P.2d 233 (owner of building that housed convenience store converted bank's security interest in inventory where it sold inventory despite bank's repeated claims of interest in the inventory) rev. denied 262 Kan. 960 (1997).
As South Meridian and Judkins point out, there appears to be no requirement—within the MHPRLTA or elsewhere—that a landlord notify the legal owner and/or known lienholder of a mobile home of either an action to evict the tenant from the underlying mobile home space or a writ of restitution authorizing removal of the tenant. Further, the lawful eviction of a tenant from a mobile home space presents a challenge to the landlord attempting to retake possession of the mobile home space. Although the situation is not expressly addressed in the MHPRLTA, it appears that the landlord may remove and store the mobile home itself and is required to notify the legal owner and known lienholder of the mobile home only after doing so. Cf. K.S.A. 58–25,121 (landlord may remove and store mobile home that has been abandoned by tenant and legal owner is liable for expenses incurred after owner has been notified by landlord).
Here, South Meridian and Judkins secured a writ of restitution evicting Kerr and all others residing in the mobile home located on Lot 213 from the mobile home space including all common areas, yards, driveways, and property of South Meridian. The writ of restitution stated: “The execution of this writ may involve the use of such force as is reasonably necessary to remove defendant(s) and all other occupants from and restore possession of the premises to plaintiff.” Changing the locks was a reasonable means of securing the property and of preventing Kerr from returning to the property without permission. In fact, South Meridian and Judkins were exposed to potential liability for not properly securing the contents of the mobile home. We note that Lucas' conversion petition stated a claim that South Meridian and Judkins “negligently failed to secure the mobile home resulting in loss and theft of Plaintiff's property.”
Furthermore, the uncontroverted facts show that South Meridian and Judkins repeatedly indicated their willingness to permit Lucas and Kerr to access the mobile home to retrieve personal property and to arrange for the removal of the mobile home from the mobile home space. The record reflects that as early as the hearing to set aside the default judgment on May 16, 2012, South Meridian and Judkins offered to allow Lucas and Kerr access to the mobile home and for the mobile home to be removed from the park. However, Lucas failed to take advantage of those opportunities until the summary judgment motions had been decided against her. Even if Lucas had a potential claim against South Meridian and Judkins for conversion based upon changing the locks, Lucas failed to mitigate her damages for any such claim. See Home Life Ins. Co. v. Clay, 13 Kan.App.2d 435, 445–46, 773 P.2d 666,rev. denied 245 Kan. 783 (1989) (amount of damages for the conversion of chattel may be diminished by the tender of return of property that was converted); see also State v. Kelly, 78 Kan. 42, 44–45, 96 Pac. 40 (1908) (where a demurer to a petition for conversion which states no ground for substantial damages is sustained, an appellate court will not reverse the decision merely because the facts stated would have entitled plaintiff to nominal damages).
In summary, the actions of South Meridian and Judkins did not constitute a conversion of the mobile home. Even if such cause of action may have existed, Lucas completely failed to mitigate her damages by refusing South Meridian and Judkins' repeated offers to allow Lucas to remove the mobile home from the premises. Thus, we conclude the district court did not err in denying Lucas' motion for summary judgment and granting South Meridian and Judkins' motion for summary judgment on the conversion action.
Sanctions Under K.S.A.2010 Supp. 60–211
Lucas argues that the district court erred in imposing sanctions under K.S.A.2010 Supp. 60–211 against her attorney, Knopp, because her conversion claim was supported by the facts and by existing law. However, Lucas makes no attempt to challenge the amount of the sanction imposed by the district court. South Meridian and Judkins argue that the district court correctly found that Lucas' conversion claim had been brought for an improper purpose and was not supported by facts or law and thus it did not err in imposing sanctions against Knopp.
In reviewing an imposition of sanctions on appeal, the appellate court's function is to “determine whether substantial competent evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact that the statutory requirements for sanctions are present.” Evenson Trucking Co. v. Aranda, 280 Kan. 821, 835, 127 P.3d 292 (2006). To the extent that the district court may impose sanctions upon a finding that a violation has occurred, we review the district court's decision for an abuse of discretion. See K.S.A.2010 Supp. 60–211(c); cf. Evensen Trucking, 280 Kan. at 835–36 (current statute discretionary)
Here, the district court did not impose sanctions on Lucas' attorney hastily. We note that at the hearing on June 15, 2011, the district court placed Knopp on notice under K.S.A.2010 Supp. 60–211 that there did not appear to be any factual basis for the conversion claim. Moreover, the district court issued an exhaustive, carefully reasoned 46–page memorandum decision imposing sanctions on Knopp. We note the appellant's brief devotes only two paragraphs of argument attempting to set aside the sanction order.
After thoroughly reviewing the record on appeal, we find no reversible error in the district court's decision to impose sanctions. We find that the district court's findings are supported by substantial competent evidence, the district court's memorandum decision adequately explains the ruling, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering sanctions. Accordingly, the district court's decision imposing sanctions is summarily affirmed under Rule 7.042(b)(3), (5) and (6) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 63).
Affirmed.