Opinion
C.A. No. 03C-05-005 RBY.
Submitted: May 19, 2006.
Decided: July 20, 2006.
William D. Fletcher, Jr., Esq., Schmittinger Rodriguez, P.A., Dover, Delaware for Plaintiffs.
Glenn E. Hitchens, Esq., Morris, James, Hitchens Williams, LLP, Dover, Delaware for Defendants Merkel and Bright.
Frederick H. Schranck, Esq., Department of Transportation, Dover, Delaware for State of Delaware, Department of Transportation.
OPINION UPON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENIED
Presently before the Court are two Motions for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendants, the State of Delaware Department of Transportation ("DelDot") and Charles Bright and Mark Merkel. For the following reasons, the motions of DelDot and Bright and Merkel are DENIED. This decision has no impact on a motion for Directed Verdict.
FACTS
The present matter is a property boundary dispute. Plaintiff, Steven Rhinehardt, filed a complaint on May 2, 2003 against Defendants, Charles Bright, Mark Merkle, and the Department of Transportation ("DelDot"). Rhinehardt owns property located at 359 Grygo Road, Marydel, Delaware. In 2001, Rhinehardt's neighbors to the west were James and John Given, who owned a 9.25 acre parcel that had frontage on Grygo Road, which was less than 100 feet. The Givens' neighbor to the west of their property was Defendant Bright, who owned property that had frontage on Westville Road.
Rhinehardt alleges that, in 2000, he was approached by Bright, who intended to buy the Givens property. Bright advised Rhinehardt that he planned to subdivide the Givens property. Because the Givens property did not have the requisite 100-foot frontage on Grygo Road that was required for a highway entrance onto Grygo Road, Bright asked Rhinehardt for a right-of-way onto his property to facilitate such an entrance. No agreement was reached at that time. Subsequently, Bright approached Rhinehardt, and told him that he no longer needed Rhinehardt's permission for the right-of-way onto his property, because Bright could use Rhinehardt's property without paying for it.
In April 2001, Bright entered a contract to purchase the Givens property. Prior to settlement, the Givens authorized Bright to apply to DelDot for an access permit to build a driveway onto Grygo Road. For whatever relevance it might have, Rhinehardt claims that Bright purposely obtained the access permit before purchasing the Givens property, because Bright's property had access to Westville Road. Once Bright owned the Givens property, his adjacent property would merge with the Givens property, defeating any claim that Bright had a need for an access onto Grygo Road.
After receiving the access permit from DelDot, Bright purchased culverts for the driveway, which were installed by DelDot. Rhinehardt argues that the culverts were installed on his property. However, DelDot maintains that the culverts were installed on a parcel of land for which DelDot has a right-of-way.
Bright purchased the Givens property on April 27, 2001. Thereafter, Rhinehardt and Bright engaged in a series of disputes about the boundary that led Rhinehardt to place "no trespassing" signs and fences along the disputed boundary. Rhinehardt also approached DelDot, advising them to stop the installation of the culverts, which Rhinehardt ultimately removed himself. The parties' dispute culminated with a complaint to the police, and Rhinehardt's arrest for trespassing and criminal mischief. The charges against Rhinehardt were dropped subsequently.
Following Rhinehardt's arrest, Bright continued his improvements to the land without interruption from Rhinehardt, who feared further police involvement. Rhinehardt met with DelDot officials in July 2001, who advised him that Bright's driveway was on a public right-of-way, DelDot's 25-foot easement.
In July 2001, Bright subdivided a 2.4179-acre parcel of the Givens property, which was sold to Defendant Mark Merkle and Cathy Merkle. The Merkle property contained the disputed driveway. Following the Merkles' possession of the land, Merkle and Rhinehardt began disputing the boundary. Again, events escalated, and Delaware State Police arrested Rhinehardt for harassment. Merkle obtained a "no contact" order against Rhinehardt. The criminal matter against Rhinehardt was scheduled for trial; however, because Merkle did not appear as a witness on the day of trial, the charges against Rhinehardt were dropped.
Rhinehardt now brings claims against Defendants for personal injuries caused by his arrests, including emotional distress, interference with his right to possess his land, wrongful ejectment from his land, nuisance, and trespassing. The complaint was amended in June 2004 to add Frances Rhinehardt as a plaintiff in this matter. Frances Rhinehardt is the mother of Stephen Rhinehardt, and the legal owner of the property at issue.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
On August 3, 2005, this Court denied DelDot's Motion to Dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. DelDot argued that it was entitled to sovereign immunity with respect to Plaintiffs' claims. This Court held that the Delaware Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8 provides a self-executing waiver of immunity on the part of the State, when claims are made against the State regarding an unconstitutional taking of property. The Court also found that any claims against the State related to the ejectment action were closely tied to the takings claim; therefore, the State's sovereign immunity was waived for that issue as well.
DISCUSSION
Viewing the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court may grant summary judgment if it determines that there are no genuine issues of material fact. The burden of proof is initially borne by the moving party. However, if a movant can make such a showing, "the burden shifts to a non-moving party to demonstrate that there are material issues of fact."
Pullman, Inc. v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 304 A.2d 334, 335 (Del.Super. 1973) ( citing Matas v. Green, 171 A.2d 916 (Del.Super. 1961); Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c)).
Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979) ( citing Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467 (Del. 1962)).
A. DelDot's Motion For Summary Judgment.
DelDot argues that it is entitled to summary judgment, because the dispute at issue involves private land owned by the individual parties. DelDot argues that there are no genuine issues of material fact that DelDot was liable for Plaintiffs' claims that DelDot trespassed, violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, or otherwise interfered with Plaintiffs' possession, use, enjoyment, or title to the property at issue. DelDot maintains that it has an easement for Gyrgo Road that extends 25 feet from the midline of the road onto the Rhinehardt property. DelDot argues that it is authorized to issue entrance permits for parties seeking access to the State Highway system by virtue of 17 Del. C. § 146. In addition, DelDot is authorized to install drainage pipes for residents from whom they receive entrance permits. Finally, DelDot argues that, at no time, did DelDot encroach on any of the Rhinehardts' private property, but installed drainage pipes on the portion of the land that was burdened by the easement.
In support of its motion, DelDot provides the Easement Agreement that was executed on July 7, 1962, and filed with the Kent County Recorder of Deeds. DelDot also includes the Affidavit of Vasuki R. Hiraesave, the Central District Engineer for DelDot, who averred that the drainage pipes were installed on the property within the easement. DelDot also provides the Affidavit of James Jensen, a licensed surveyor, who conducted a survey on the disputed parcel. Jensen concurs that the drainage pipe was installed within the easement. In addition, a copy of Jensen's survey, dated June 26, 2001, is attached. The survey illustrates the location of the easement in relation to the drainage pipe and the disputed driveway.
Plaintiffs take issue with the manner in which the DelDot surveyor ascertained the property lines for purposes of granting the access permit and determining the location of the easement. Plaintiffs argue that there are discrepancies in the metes and bounds identified in the various deeds, and DelDot failed to use the metes and bounds provided in the Givens' deed. In support of their position, Plaintiffs purport to intend to identify a title expert who will explain the discrepancies in the 2001 deed from Givens to Bright and the 1954 deed and 1958 Givens deed. Plaintiffs' expert evidently will also opine as to why a surveyor cannot change the deed description in support of his position.
Plaintiffs go on to argue that DelDot's easement is limited in scope, and does not give DelDot the authority to grant an access permit to Bright. Further, Plaintiffs claim that the easement does not authorize DelDot to install culverts on Plaintiffs' property. In fact, the affidavit submitted by DelDot in support of its motion acknowledges the boundary dispute. Viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, and for purposes of these motions, there may be genuine issues of material fact as to whether DelDot accurately determined the property lines for purposes of granting Bright an access permit. In addition, there are disputed issues of material of fact as to the scope of DelDot's easement. Therefore, DelDot's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
B. Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Bright and Merkel
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges the following claims against Defendants Bright and Merkel (collectively referred to hereinafter as "Defendants"): (1) willful and malicious use of the criminal process; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (4) trespass; (5) action for ejectment; (6) nuisance; and (7) punitive damages. Defendants dispute all of these claims as not supported by genuine issues of material fact.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claim of willful and malicious use of the criminal process cannot be maintained, because they reported Steven Rhinehardt to the police for a proper purpose. Defendants rely on Stevens v. Independent Newspaper, Inc. for the proposition that they cannot be liable for abusing the criminal process, regardless of claims of bad intentions, if they "carr[ied] out the process to its authorized conclusion." Stevens also lays out the elements for a claim of abuse of process as being "1) an ulterior purpose; and 2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings." By means of example, Stevens cites an improper purpose as taking "the form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the surrender of property or the payment of money, by the use of the process as a threat or a club." Further, Stevens cites "attachment, execution, garnishment, sequestration proceedings, arrest of the person and criminal prosecution" as examples of processes that lend themselves to coercion.
1988 WL 25377, at *8 (Del.Super.).
Id. ( citing Unit, Inc. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 304 A.2d 320, 331 (Del.Super. 1973)).
Id. ( citing W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 121 p. 898 (5th ed. 1984)).
Id.
In the present case, Defendants claim they were justified in calling the police, because Steven Rhinehardt and his brother appeared on Bright's porch and threatened him. On the second occasion, Merkel claims he called the police, because Steven Rhinehardt put nails on his driveway.
Steven Rhinehardt disputes these allegations, and argues that Defendants' course of conduct illustrates their bad faith motive to intimidate Plaintiffs into surrendering their property. Plaintiffs also cite the fact that Steven Rhinehardt was never prosecuted for either incident, as additional evidence that Defendants called police for an improper purpose. Superficially, there appears to be a conceivable genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to whether Defendants intended to gain a tactical advantage by involving the police in this dispute. Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count I, willful and malicious use of the criminal process, is DENIED.
Defendants also request summary judgment on Count II, which alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress. Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires that "(1) [o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm." To be found liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress, "[i]t is not enough that a defendant acted with tortious or criminal intent, intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by malice or a degree of aggravation that would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages under another tort." Rather, the culpable conduct must be such that it is so "extreme in degree that it exceeds the bounds of decency and is regarded as intolerable in a civilized community." Whether a party's conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous is generally an issue for the trier of fact, or at least for the Court at the conclusion of Plaintiffs' case.
Beckett v. Trice, 1994 WL 710874, *4 (Del.Super.) ( citing Farmer v. Wilson, 1992 WL 331450, at *4 (Del.Super.)).
Id.
Thomas v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 WL 1102362, at *3 (Del.Super. 2004) ( citing Farmer, 1992 WL 331450, at *4).
Collins v. African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, 2006 WL 1579718, at *2 (Del.Super.) ( citing Thomas, 2004 WL 1102362, at *3).
Defendants argue that their alleged entry onto Plaintiffs' land cannot be depicted as outrageous. The facts, though, of this case are not straightforward. There are facts in dispute as to whether Bright lied to DelDot when he applied for the access permit. Moreover, the claims related to the abuse of process also support Plaintiffs' argument that Defendants' conduct was outrageous. Therefore, Defendants' motion as to Count II, intentional infliction of emotional distress, is, for the purpose of decision on this motion only, DENIED.
Defendants also argue that there is no evidence to support Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages. Punitive damages may be awarded if "defendant's conduct is `outrageous,' because of `evil motive' or `reckless indifference to the rights of others.'" "Mere inadvertence, mistake or errors of judgment which constitute mere negligence will not suffice." As discussed above, there are facts in dispute as to Defendants' conduct in this matter. Morever, in a posture similar to Count II, because punitive damages are normally a question of fact for the jury, or, as previously noted, for directed verdict motion. Defendants' motion as to Count VII, punitive damages, is DENIED.
Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 529 (Del. 1987) ( citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908, cmt. b (1979)).
Id.
Id. ( citing Eustice v. Rupert, 460 A.2d 507, 509 (Del. 1983).
Similarly, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot support a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, which requires a showing of a present physical injury. The elements required for a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress include "(1) negligence causing fright to someone; (2) in the zone of danger; (3) producing physical consequences to that person as a result of the contemporaneous shock." For purposes of summary judgment, negligence must be assumed.
Lupo v. Medical Center of Delaware, Inc., 1996 WL 111132, at *2 ( citing Garrison v. Medical Center of Delaware, Inc., 581 A.2d 288, 293 (Del. 1989); McKnight v. Voshell, 1986 WL 17360 (Del.Supr.); Merganthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647, 651 (Del. 1984); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 210 A.2d 709 (Del. 1965); Cooke v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 1994 WL 680051 (Del.Super.)).
Snavely ex rel. Snavely v. Wilmington Medical Center, 1985 WL 552277, at *3 (Del.Super.) ( citing Robb v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 210 A.2d 709 (Del. 1965)).
Id. ( citing Oliver B. Cannon Sons, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 312 A.2d 322 (Del.Super. 1973)).
Physical manifestations of emotional distress that are recoverable include "all forms of emotional disturbance, including temporary fright, nervous shock, nausea, grief, rage, and humiliation." However, those physical complaints cannot be transitory, non-recurring phenomena to be a legally recognized physical injuries caused by emotional distress. A plaintiff's injuries must rise to the level in which they become "a medical or psychiatric problem, rather than one of law."
Id., at *3 ( citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 436A(c)).
Id.
Id.
In Lupo, the Court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment on the issue of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Similar to the case at bar, defendants argued that plaintiffs had not suffered physical injuries that met the standard for recovering for a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. However, the Court held that plaintiffs' alleged physical injuries, including "clinically diagnosed depression, eating disorders and recurring severe headaches" were sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of defeating a summary judgment motion.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs have not suffered any physical injuries. However, Steven Rhinehardt testified at his deposition that he has seen his family doctor for gastrointestinal and sleep disorders. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not provided any medical records or identified any medical experts to testify about Plaintiffs' alleged physical injuries. Steven Rhinehardt's physical injuries are sufficiently factual that, at this juncture, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count III, negligent infliction of emotional distress, is DENIED.
Defendants also argue that there is no evidence to support Plaintiffs' claims for trespass or ejectment. Defendants maintain that both claims require a prima facie showing that Plaintiffs owned the disputed property. Defendants argue that the survey establishes that the property in dispute belongs to Bright. The basis of the action is a property dispute. In addition to allegations regarding the location of the property line, there does exist the Affidavit of Vasukir Hiraesave, the Central District Engineer for DelDot, confirming that there are deeds in conflict. Material facts do exist as to the ownership of the disputed property. Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count IV, trespass, and Count V, action for ejectment, is DENIED.
Finally, Count VI of Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges nuisance. A private nuisance is "defined to be anything that results in harm, inconvenience or damage, or which materially interferes with the enjoyment of rights or property of a particular entity." Defendants' request for summary judgment on the claim of nuisance is based on the same argument made for the claim of trespass or ejectment. Defendants argue that the surveys prove that Bright is the owner of the disputed property. For the reasons stated above, there are facts that remain in dispute about the ownership of the property. Therefore, Defendants' motion as to Count VI, nuisance, is DENIED.
Beckrich Holdings, LLC v. Bishop, 2005 WL 1413305, at *9 (Del.Ch.).