Opinion
Case Number: 02-71201
September 23, 2003
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
I. Introduction
Petitioner Robert L. Reynolds, Jr., a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Mound Correctional Facility in Detroit, Michigan, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1999 convictions in Jackson County Circuit Court for first-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the petition.
II. Facts
Petitioner's convictions arise out of the shooting death of Corey Hackworth on June 2, 1998, in Jackson, Michigan.
Melissa Pickrell testified that, on June 2, 1998, at approximately 8:50 p.m., she was cleaning an office in the City of Jackson, when she heard at least five gunshots. She looked out the window and saw two vehicles, a black and grey Chevrolet Blazer and a Ford Fiesta, parked side-by-side in the parking lot. She testified that she saw a man carrying a handgun walking around a white male, later identified as Corey Hackworth, who was lying on the ground, Ms. Pickrell called 911. She testified that the man who was carrying the gun knelt by the victim and began beating him in the chest with his fists. He then jumped into the Blazer and fled the scene. Mr. Pickrell could not identify the man with the gun, but told police that the man had long hair, and wore a cap.
Police Officer Nathan Gross testified that he responded to the 911 call. When he arrived at the scene, he found a white male lying on the ground next to a red car. The window of the driver's side door was shattered. Officer Gross determined that the individual who was lying on the ground, Mr. Hackworth, had been shot and was dead. Officer Gross testified that he found .380 caliber shell casings at the scene.
Dr. Bernadino Pacris of the Oakland County Medical Examiner's Office, testified that he conducted an autopsy of Mr. Hackworth and determined that Mr. Hackworth had been shot eight times.
Mona Wilson testified that she had been friends with Mr. Hackworth for approximately twenty years. He telephoned her on the afternoon of June 2, 1998. She told him to come to the restaurant where she worked that evening for dinner. He agreed. However, he did not come to the restaurant that evening. When Ms. Wilson learned the following day that Mr. Hackworth had been shot, she contacted police and informed them that during their telephone conversation the previous day, Mr. Hackworth said that he had just received a call from "his man." Mr. Hackworth told her that he was going to meet this man for a drug transaction. Ms. Wilson advised police that Mr. Hackworth had caller ID on his home telephone and they should check the ID to determine who Mr. Hackworth met that day.
Police Detective Gail Rogers testified that he retrieved the caller ID from Mr. he had given Rodney those jeans. Petitioner admitted that he had sold drugs to Mr. Hackworth, and that Mr. Hackworth was a great source of income for him. Petitioner testified that, on the day Mr. Hackworth was shot, Petitioner had asked Rodney to deliver marijuana to Mr. Hackworth.
Edward Rodriguez, a defense witness, testified that he had seen both Petitioner and Rodney drive the Blazer. He testified that at approximately 8:00 p.m. on the night of the shooting, he stopped by Petitioner's house and Petitioner was home. The two men left the house approximately fifteen to twenty minutes later, in separate cars. Mr. Rodriguez testified that Petitioner was driving a Pontiac 6000. Mr. Rodriguez did not see Petitioner again that evening. Mr. Rodriguez testified that Petitioner always wore his hair in a ponytail.
III. Procedural History
Following a jury trial in Jackson County Circuit Court, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On March 11, 1999, Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for the first-degree murder conviction and two years imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction.
Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals, presenting the following claims, through counsel, and in a pro per supplemental brief:
I. Defendant was denied a fair trial when he was presented to the jury in leg irons, despite the fact that he posed no threat of violence, flight or disruption to the court in violation of the United States Constitution, Amendments V and XIV.
II. The trial court committed reversible error and denied defendant due process by allowing into evidence irrelevant testimony that was more prejudicial than probative in nature and denying defendant's request to introduce relevant evidence thereby denying defendant a fair trial.
III. The trial court abused its discretion and denied defendant a fair trial in denying defendant's request for a brief continuance to locate a key alibi witness for the defense.
IV. There was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of first degree murder.
V. Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an illegal search and seizure.
VI. Defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to due process and to a fair trial, under the IV and XIV amendments to the United States [Constitution] when the decisive evidence used to convict him was illegally seized with an invalid search warrant, and seized outside the scope of an invalid warrant.
VII. Before, and during trial, defense attorney's assistance as counsel for the defendant was so defective, deficient and ineffective, that defendant was denied his right to competent counsel guaranteed defendant by the Sixth Amendment and defendant's right to a fair trial.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions.People v. Reynolds. No. 218214 (Mich.Ct.App. March 9, 2001).
Petitioner filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, presenting the same claims presented to the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Reynolds, No. 117005 (Mich. Sept. 12, 2000).
Petitioner then filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus, presenting the following claims:
I. Petitioner was denied his rights to effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial guaranteed by the VI Amendment and Petitioner was further denied his IV Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure and his right to due process of law and equal protection guaranteed by the XIV Amendment to the United States Constitution, when the outcome determinative evidence used to convict Petitioner was illegally seized with an invalid, defective search warrant/affidavit, and seized outside the scope of said warrant, where trial counsel failed to move to suppress illegally seized evidence before or during trial; and Petitioner was denied a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate his IV Amendment claims and his ineffective assistance of counsel claims where both levels of the appellate courts repeatedly frustrated Petitioner's attempt to present his claims by systematically or routinely denying his many requests for remand for an evidentiary hearing and motion for a new trial on the issues solely made by an inmate proceeding in pro per, thereby warranting a writ of habeas corpus to issue.
II. Other instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel before and during trial that also denied and deprived Petitioner of his rights to a fundamentally fair trial by an impartial jury and due process under the VI and XIV Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution.
A. Trial counsel's assistance was ineffective when he allowed himself to be put in a situation that forced him to put Petitioner on the witness stand where there was no prior preparation or plan to do so, and where counsel knew that Petitioner would make for a bad witness in his own defense.
B. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the introduction of irrelevant, highly prejudicial testimonial evidence at trial; and the state court's opinion is an unreasonable application of U.S. Supreme Court law and contrary to such.
C. Defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting or requesting a mistrial on the manner in which the prosecutor improperly questioned both Petitioner and his alibi witness Edward Rodriguez about their alleged involvement in dealing drugs together, where there was no evidence to support such an allegation; and where the prosecutor improperly questioned both Petitioner and Mr. Rodriguez about where they met; and improperly questioned Petitioner and defense witness Norma Mitchell about alleged illegal acts together.
D. Trial counsel offered ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to secure the in-court testimony of a reluctant, crucial defense witness name[d] Ronnie Webb by simply subpoenaing him.
E. Trial counsel was ineffective as Petitioner's advocate when he failed to object to the shackling of a defense witness during testimony at trial.
III. The trial court violated Petitioner's constitutional rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States [Constitution] in denying him a fair trial by allowing into evidence irrelevant testimony that was more prejudicial than probative in nature.
IV. Petitioner was denied a fair and impartial jury trial when he was presented to the jury in leg irons during the entire course of trial, where there were no substantial and compelling reasons to shackle him, in violation of the V, VI, and XIV Amendments to the United States Constitution, justifying habeas corpus relief for Petitioner.
V. The trial court abused its discretion and denied Petitioner the right to call witnesses in his defense and due process and equal protection of law and a fair trial in violation of VI and XIV Amendments to the United States Constitution when it denied Petitioner's request for a brief continuance to locate a key defense witness, and when it refused to let the witness testify after the defense had rested — where there was no prejudice to the prosecutor.
VI. Petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief because there was (and now is) insufficient evidence to convict him of the charged offenses.
IV. Petitioner's Motion to Expand Reviewing Record to Include Affidavits
Petitioner has filed a Motion to Expand Reviewing Record to Include Affidavits (Dkt. #44). Rule 7, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, allows for expansion of the record in habeas corpus proceedings as follows:
(a) If the petition is not dismissed summarily the judge may direct that the record be expanded by the parties by the inclusion of additional materials relevant to the determination of the merits of the petition.
(b) The expanded record may include, without limitation, letters predating the filing of the petition in the district court, documents, exhibits, . . . Affidavits may be submitted and considered as part of the record.
Rule 7, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
The decision whether to allow expansion of the record is within the sound discretion of the district judge. Ford v. Seabold 841 F.2d 677, 691 (6th Cir. 1988). The Court shall permit Petitioner to expand the record to include the affidavits attached to his motion.
V. Analysis A. Standard of Review
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the following standard of review that a federal court must utilize when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, federal courts are bound by a state court's adjudication of a petitioner's claims unless the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 1998). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Cremeans v. Chapleau. 62 F.3d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1995) ("We give complete deference to state court findings unless they are clearly erroneous").
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides, in pertinent part:
In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.
The United States Supreme Court has explained the proper application of the "contrary to" clause as follows:
A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to [the Supreme Court's] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases. . . .
A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court's clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent.Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1519-20 (2000).
With respect to the "unreasonable application" clause of § 3842254(d)(1), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court should analyze a claim for habeas corpus relief under the "unreasonable application" clause when "a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of this Court to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 1521. The Court defined "unreasonable application" as follows:
[A] federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable . . .
[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.Id. at 1521-22.
B. Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
Petitioner claims that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel in several respects. Specifically, Petitioner claims that his attorney was ineffective in: (i) failing to move to suppress allegedly illegally obtained evidence; (ii) permitting Petitioner to testify without prior preparation; (iii) failing to object to allegedly irrelevant, prejudicial testimony; (iv) failing to object to the prosecutor's cross-examination of Petitioner and other defense witnesses; (v) failing to subpoena defense witness Ronnie Webb; and (vi) failing to object to shackling of a defense witness during trial testimony.
In Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court established a two-pronged test for determining whether a petitioner has received ineffective assistance of counsel. First, a petitioner must prove that counsel's performance was deficient, which "requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. Second, a petitioner must show that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced petitioner. A petitioner may establish prejudice by "showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial." Id.
The Supreme Court emphasized that, when considering an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the reviewing court should afford counsel a great deal of deference:
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. . . . A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.Id. at 689 (internal citations omitted).
The Court further explained that, to establish deficient performance, a petitioner must identify acts that were "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id. To satisfy the prejudice prong, a petitioner must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. The Sixth Circuit, applying theStrickland standard, has held that a reviewing court therefore must focus on whether counsel's alleged errors "have undermined the reliability of and confidence in the result." McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1311 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1257 (1997).
1.
First, Petitioner claims his attorney was ineffective in failing to move to suppress illegally obtained evidence. Petitioner claims that his attorney erred in failing to move to suppress the blood-stained pants seized from his home where, Petitioner alleges, the search warrant was invalid and the search exceeded the scope of the search warrant.
The Michigan Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's claims that the warrant was improper and that the search exceeded the scope of the warrant, stating, in pertinent part:
When reviewing a magistrate's conclusion that probable cause to search existed, a reviewing court must read the search warrant and the underlying affidavit in a common-sense and realistic manner. . . .Reviewing courts must afford deference to a magistrate's determination that probable cause existed. This deference "requires the reviewing court to ask only whether a reasonably cautious person could have concluded that there was a `substantial basis' for the finding or probable cause." Russcx supra at 603, quoting Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 236; 103 S.Ct. 2317; 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). This Court must focus on facts and circumstances that support the magistrate's probable cause determination and may consider only those facts that were presented to the magistrate. The magistrate's decision must be based on actual fact, not merely conclusions of the affiant. . . . A sufficient affidavit must present facts and circumstances on which a magistrate can rely to make an independent probable cause determination. . . .
In People v. Sellars. 153 Mich. App. 22, 27; 394 N.W.2d 133 (1986), this Court observed:
[A] warrant may issue on probable cause if the police have conducted an independent investigation to confirm the accuracy and reliability of the information regardless of the knowledge and reliability of the source. This rule is clearly set forth in both federal and state Supreme Court decisions. . . .
In this case, defendant has not demonstrated any plain error with the search warrant affidavit. The record clearly establishes that the facts stated in the affidavit were confirmed by independent police investigation. Sellars. supra at 27. Moreover, viewing the affidavit in a common-sense and realistic manner, a reasonably cautious person could have concluded that there was a substantial basis for the finding of probable cause to issue a search warrant. . . .
Further, our review of the record reveals that the police did not impermissibly exceed the scope of the search warrant during their search of defendant's home by seizing two pairs of pants worn by defendant . . .
The search warrant, attached to defendant's supplemental brief, provided in pertinent part:
The property to be searched for and seized, if found, is specifically described as:
The items to be seized are hand guns, ammunition, controlled substances, phone bills, pagers, cellular phones, answering machines, address books, caller ID boxes shoes, clothing with blood type coloring on it, Gatzby hat. [emphasis in Michigan Court of Appeals' decision]
The police were lawfully on the premises to execute a lawful search, and searching through the clothes hamper did not exceed the scope of the search. Moreover, even if blood spots on the pants were not obvious to the naked eye, the incriminating character of the pants seized by police, which were confirmed to have been the most recently worn by defendant, was "immediately apparent." Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128; 110 S.Ct. 2301; 110 L.Ed.2d 112, 123-123 (1990), citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire. 403 U.S. 443, 446; 91 S.Ct. 2022; 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). Considering "what the executing officers knew [at the time of the search] concerning the nature of the crime, its elements and possible means of proving those elements," we conclude that the officers did not exceed the scope of the search warrant. Andresen v. Maryland 427 U.S. 463; 96 S.Ct. 2737; 49 L.Ed.2d 627, 644 (1976).People v. Reynolds, slip op. at 4-5.
Thus, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that the search warrant was proper and the search conducted did not exceed the scope of the search warrant. Petitioner, therefore, cannot establish that his attorney was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress on those grounds, and habeas relief shall be denied with respect to this claim.
2.
Petitioner argues that his attorney was ineffective in permitting Petitioner to testify without proper preparation. Petitioner presented this claim to the Michigan Court of Appeals, however, the Michigan Court of Appeals, although denying Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, did not separately address this claim. Where a state court, although deciding a claim, does not offer some explanation of its decision, a federal court must conduct an independent review of the state court's decision. Harris v. Stovall 212 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 2000). This independent review requires the federal court to "review the record and applicable law to determine whether the state court decision is contrary to federal law, unreasonably applies clearly established law, or is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." Id. However, the independent review "is not a full, de novo review of the claims, but remains deferential because the court cannot grant relief unless the state court's result is not in keeping with the strictures of the AEDPA." Id.
Petitioner claims that his attorney forced him to testify without adequate preparation. Petitioner states that he and his attorney decided Petitioner would not testify, but were forced to adjust their strategy when the judge would not grant a continuance to await the appearance of missing defense witnesses and stated that if the defense had no more witnesses, the defense had to rest. Petitioner argues his attorney forced him to testify at that point to avoid having to rest.
The Court has reviewed Petitioner's trial testimony in its entirety. Petitioner took the stand outside the presence of the jury so that his leg irons would not be visible to the jury. The transcript evidences no hesitation on his part or any disagreement between Petitioner and his attorney before he took the stand. Petitioner's testimony supported his defense that his brother was the shooter. He testified that his brother delivered marijuana to Mr. Hackworth on the day of the murder. He testified that his brother often wore his clothes and had access to the clothes hamper where the blood-stained jeans were found. In addition, according to Petitioner, his brother had access to the Blazer and was driving it the day of the murder. His testimony does not support his contention that he was ill-prepared to testify. Petitioner argues that his testimony placed before the jury evidence of his bad character, that is, that he was a drug dealer, unfaithful to his wife, lied to an insurance company, and had excessive credit card debts. The bulk of this information, however, already had been placed before the jury through other witnesses.
Therefore, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to establish that his attorney's assistance in preparing him for testifying was outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Further, Petitioner has failed to show that he was prejudiced by his attorney's performance in this regard.
3.
Petitioner next argues that his attorney was ineffective in failing to object to admission of highly prejudicial testimony. Specifically, Petitioner objects to the testimony of Detective Gail Rogers that, when she searched Petitioner's apartment pursuant to a search warrant, she found a knit hat, a .38 revolver, and black gloves. Petitioner argues that admission of this testimony was error because it was highly prejudicial and irrelevant.
The last state court to issue a reasoned opinion regarding this claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals, held that defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to admission of this testimony. People v. Reynolds, slip op. at 6. The state court reasoned that defense counsel elicited from the police officer on cross-examination testimony that the .38 revolver was unconnected to the charged crime, and that the evidence substantiating Petitioner's guilt was so overwhelming that Petitioner was not prejudiced by his attorney's failure to object to admission of this evidence. Id.
Petitioner has failed to show that the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. Habeas corpus relief will therefore be denied.
4.
Petitioner claims that his attorney was also ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutor's cross-examination of him and defense witness Edward Rodriguez regarding their involvement with drug trafficking, and how they met, and improperly questioned Petitioner and defense witness Norma Mitchell about alleged illegal acts.
The last state court to issue a reasoned opinion regarding the alleged improper questions of Edward Rodriguez, the Michigan Court of Appeals, stated in pertinent part:
[D]efendant complains that defense counsel was ineffective for not requesting a mistrial when the prosecutor questioned defendant and Edward Rodriguez, another alibi witness, about their involvement with drugs and where they met. A review of the record reveals that defense counsel objected to the question posed by the prosecution to defendant concerning his relationship with Rodriguez and their involvement with drugs, a sidebar discussion was held, and the objection was sustained. Defense counsel again objected to the prosecutor's inquiry on this subject posed to Rodriguez, a bench discussion was held, and the trial court stated, "the question is not allowed." Thus, because the trial court sustained defense counsel's objections to the prosecutor's inquiries, thereby foreclosing any further questioning on the subject, we find no basis for concluding that a mistrial was warranted.People v. Reynolds, slip op. at 6.
Thus, the state court concluded that Petitioner's attorney objected to the questions, and that those objections were sustained. On this basis, the state court found that Petitioner's attorney was not ineffective. The Court finds that this holding was a reasonable application ofStrickland.
Petitioner also claims that his attorney was ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutor's questions of him and Ms. Mitchell regarding ownership of the Blazer. Although this issue was presented to the state courts, the state courts did not specifically address it. Therefore, this court will conduct an independent review of the state court's decision. See Harris, 212 F.3d at 943.
Ms. Mitchell testified that she permitted Petitioner to put the title of the Chevrolet Blazer that he purchased in her name. Petitioner made this request because he had been in several previous accidents and his insurance premiums would be lower if the vehicle was in Ms. Mitchell's name. Ms. Mitchell testified that although the vehicle's title was in her name, she did not consider herself the owner of the vehicle. Petitioner argues that this testimony was improper, and that his attorney, therefore, should have objected. The Blazer was identified as the vehicle in which the shooter drove away after shooting Mr. Hackworth.
At trial, Petitioner contended that he was not the shooter, and that he was not the individual who drove the Blazer away from the scene of the crime. The ownership of the vehicle therefore was relevant to the case. The prosecutor was entitled to establish Petitioner's relationship to the vehicle. Therefore, Petitioner's attorney was not ineffective in failing to object to this line of questioning.
5.
Petitioner asserts that his attorney also was ineffective in failing to subpoena defense witness Ronnie Webb. As discussed in more detail below, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that Ronny Webb could not have supplied Petitioner with an alibi at the time of the charged crime.People v. Reynolds, slip op. at 6. Thus, the state court held, Petitioner's attorney was not ineffective in failing to subpoena Mr. Webb, when Petitioner failed to show that his testimony would have been exculpatory. Petitioner fails to show that the state court's conclusion that even if he testified as Petitioner contended he would Mr. Webb would not have provided an alibi for Petitioner was clearly erroneous; nor has he shown that the state court's conclusion that counsel was not ineffective in failing to subpoena Mr. Webb was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, the Court will not grant habeas corpus relief with respect to this claim.6.
Finally, Petitioner argues that his attorney was ineffective in failing to object to the shackling of defense witness Edward Robinson during his testimony.
The Michigan Court of Appeals held that Petitioner failed to establish any prejudice resulted from the shackling of defense witness Robinson:
[D]efense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to having defense witness Edward Robinson brought into court in shackles and leg irons in full view of the jury. . . .Although the record suggests that this issue was discussed at a sidebar conference, the reasons for requiring Robinson to be shackled are not apparent from the record; thus, we are unable to further review this claim of error. In any event, Robinson's testimony was merely cumulative to other testimony and supplied no exculpatory value. Accordingly, any prejudice that inured to defendant was minimal and would not have affected the outcome of the trial.People v. Reynolds, slip op. at 6.
Petitioner has failed to show that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.
C. Fourth Amendment Claim
Petitioner next claims that his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure was violated because the search warrant was invalid and the police improperly exceeded the scope of the search warrant.
The Supreme Court has held that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at trial." Stone v. Powell 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals utilizes a two-step analysis to determine whether a defendant was given a foil and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim in state court:
First, the court must determine whether the state procedural mechanism, in the abstract, presents the opportunity to raise a fourth amendment claim. Second, the court must determine whether presentation of the claim was in fact frustrated because of a failure of that mechanism.Machacek v. Hofbauer. 213 F.3d 947, 952 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted).
Petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim was presented to the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's claim, holding that the evidence was seized pursuant to a properly issued and executed warrant. People v. Reynolds, slip op. at 4-5. Petitioner presented this claim to the Michigan Supreme Court in his motion for leave to appeal, which the state court denied. People v. Reynolds, No. 119056 (Mich. Oct. 29, 2001).
Based upon the foregoing, this Court concludes that Petitioner was provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his Fourth Amendment claim in the Michigan courts. Consequently, this claim is not cognizable on habeas review.
D. Evidentiary Decisions
Petitioner claims that certain of the trial court's evidentiary decisions deprived him of his right to a fair trial. He argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that, after an arrest warrant was issued, Petitioner fled to Louisiana, and erred in admitting evidence that Petitioner purchased a handgun at a gun show in September 1997.
It is well-established that "`federal habeas corpus review does not lie for errors of state law.'" Estelle v. McGuire. 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991), quoting Louis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). The Sixth Circuit has held that "[i]n a federal habeas corpus proceeding, it is not the province of a federal appellate court to review the decision of the state's highest court on purely state law." Long v. Smith, 663 F.2d 22, 23 (6th Cir. 1981). Further, "[h]abeas review does not encompass state court rulings on the admission of evidence unless there is a constitutional violation." Clemmons v. Sowders. 34 F.3d 352, 357 (6th Cir. 1994), citing Fuson v. Jago, 773 F.2d 55, 59 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 478 U.S. 1020 (1986). See also Estelle. 502 U.S. at 72 (holding that a federal court may not grant habeas corpus relief simply on the basis that a trial court incorrectly interpreted state evidence rules to allow admission of prior bad acts evidence).
The Michigan Court of Appeals, the last state court to issue a reasoned opinion regarding this claim, held:
First, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant's flight to Louisiana after an arrest warrant was issued. We disagree. It is well settled that evidence of flight may properly be considered as evidence of guilt. People v. Cipriano. 238 Mich. 332, 336; 213 N.W. 104 (1927); . . . In this case, evidence of defendant's flight was relevant and material to the issue of defendant's consciousness of guilt, and its probative value sufficient to withstand a challenge under M.R.E. 403. . . . Further, the risk of any undue prejudice arising from evidence of defendant's flight was eliminated by the trial court's cautionary instruction to the jury advising of the limited purpose of the evidence. Accordingly, we find no error.
Second, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing testimony that defendant had purchased a .380 semiautomatic handgun, similar to the weapon used in the shooting, at a gun and knife show approximately one year earlier. We disagree. In People v. Hall 433 Mich. 573, 580-81; 447 N.W.2d 580 (1989), this Court observed that "[e]vidence of a defendant's possession of a weapon of the kind used in the offense with which he is charged is routinely determined by the courts to be direct, relevant evidence of his commission of that offense." Here, police testimony revealed that the shooting was committed with a .380 caliber automatic handgun. Testimonial evidence that defendant had purchased a similar weapon prior to the shooting was directly relevant to make "defendant's identity as the gunman in the charged [crime] `more probable . . . than it would be without the evidence.'" Hall supra at 582-583. That defendant's ex-wife testified that defendant sold the gun shortly after he purchased it was a credibility issue for the jury to resolve Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.People v. Reynolds, slip op. at 2.
Petitioner has failed to show that the trial court's decision to admit evidence of his flight or his purchase of the handgun deprived him of his fundamental right to a fair trial or resulted in any other violation of his constitutional rights, or that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief with respect to this claim.
E. Leg Irons
Petitioner next argues that he was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury when he was forced to wear leg irons throughout the entire trial.
The last state court to issue a reasoned opinion regarding this claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals, stated, in pertinent part:
Defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because he was forced to wear leg irons during trial. We disagree. This Court reviews a decision to restrain a defendant during trial for an abuse of discretion under the totality of the circumstances. People v. Dixon, 217 Mich. App. 400, 404-405; 552 N.W.2d 663 (1996). Shackling of a defendant during trial is permitted only in extraordinary circumstances to prevent the escape of the defendant, to prevent the defendant from injuring others in the courtroom, or to maintain an orderly trial. Id.
In this case, the record indicates that defendant was a flight risk and had a history of violent crimes. The trial court determined that leg restraints were necessary for security purposes, particularly in light of the configuration of the court room and the lack of security personnel to cover all exits. Further, the trial court took precautions to see that the leg irons could not be viewed by the jury, and there is no evidence that any juror ever observed any leg irons on defendant. People v. Johnson. 160 Mich. App. 490, 493; 408 N.W.2d 485 (1987). Under the circumstances, the trial court's decision to restrain defendant with leg irons during trial was not an abuse of discretion.People v. Reynolds, slip op. at 1-2.
Defendant fled to Louisiana after a warrant was issued for his arrest.
The trial court made sure that defendant was seated comfortably in the witness box before the jury was brought in and, at the completion of his testimony, the trial court dismissed the jury before defendant left the stand to return to his seat.
"A principal ingredient of due process is that every criminal defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial trial." Kennedy v. Cardwell 487 F.2d 101, 104 (6th Cir. 1973), citing Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954). A fair and impartial trial requires that defendant be afforded a presumption of innocence. Id. It follows then that "a criminal defendant is generally entitled to the physical indicia of innocence."Id. The "garb of innocence," Id. at 105, entitles a prisoner brought into court for trial "to appear free from all bonds or shackles" unless shackles are required "to prevent the escape of the accused, to protect everyone in the courtroom, and to maintain order during trial." Woodards v. Cardwell, 430 F.2d 978, 982 (6th Cir. 1970). The decision whether to shackle a defendant rests within the trial court's discretion. Kennedy. 487 F.2d at 107.
The Court concludes that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was consistent with federal law and a reasonable application of that law. The trial court judge found that the leg irons were necessary for security purposes and provided that Petitioner did not have to walk before the jury in leg irons. Petitioner, thus, is not entitled to habeas corpus relief with respect to this claim.
F. Trial Court's Denial of Motion for Continuance
Petitioner claims that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the trial court erred in denying his request for a continuance to locate a missing witness and, when the witness appeared after the defense rested, in denying his request to permit the witness to testify. Petitioner argues that this denial deprived him of his ability to present witnesses in his own defense.
The last state court to issue a reasoned opinion regarding Petitioner's claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals, held, in pertinent part:
Defendant next claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a brief continuance to locate a missing witness, Ronny Webb, who defendant claims was a principal alibi witness. We disagree. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Lansing v. Hartsuff 213 Mich. App. 338, 350; 539 N.W.2d 781 (1995). Melissa Pickrell, an eyewitness to the crime, testified that the shooting occurred around 8:50 p.m., and the perpetrator quickly left the scene in a Chevy Blazer. Kena Wilson, with whom defendant had an "open relationship," testified that defendant visited her apartment between 8:45 and 8:50 p.m. on the evening of the murder and stayed about fifteen or twenty minutes. Defendant testified that after he returned to his apartment from visiting Wilson, he noticed that his Blazer had a flat tire. Defendant's telephone records introduced at trial showed that the called Ronny Webb to help him fix the flat tire at approximately 9:45 p.m. that evening. Detective Rogers testified that the driving distance from the parking lot in Jackson where the murder occurred to the intersection closest to defendant's residence in Lansing was thirty-eight miles, about a forty minute drive at the posted speed limit. Based on this evidence, defendant could have committed the murder at 8:50 p.m. in Jackson and arrived home in Lansing in time to make the telephone call to Webb at 9:45 p.m. Accordingly, we reject defendant's contention that Webb was a principal alibi witness. Because there was no reasonable probability that Webb's testimony could have affected the outcome of the trial, . . . we conclude that the trial court's decision to deny defendant a brief continuance in order to locate Webb, or to allow defendant to reopen proofs after the defense rested, was not an abused of discretion.People v. Reynolds, slip op. at 3.
The decision whether to grant a continuance is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Morris v. Slappy. 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983). Refusal to grant a continuance warrants habeas corpus relief only when the refusal was so arbitrary as to constitute a due process violation. Bennett v. Scroggy, 793 F.2d 112, 774 (6th Cir. 1986).
Petitioner has failed to show that the Michigan Court of Appeals decision that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant a continuance was an abuse of discretion or contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. The trial court's denial of a continuance did not prevent Petitioner from presenting an alibi defense. Mr. Webb's testimony would not have provided Petitioner with an alibi given that it was possible for him to have committed the crime and to have contacted Mr. Webb at 9:45 p.m. Thus, the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance or to reopen proofs did not deprive Petitioner of his right to due process.
Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief with respect to this claim.
G. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Finally, Petitioner argues that insufficient evidence was presented to convict him because the prosecutor failed to establish that he was the shooter.
In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the Supreme Court established that the standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence challenge must focus on whether "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319 (emphasis in original). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), this Court must determine whether the state court's application of the Jackson standard was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. In making this determination, this Court must afford the state court's findings of fact a presumption of correctness unless it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the factual determination in the state court was erroneous. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1);West v. Seabold. 73 F.3d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2569 (1996).
The last state court to issue a reasoned opinion regarding this claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals, held:
[D]efendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first-degree murder. Specifically, defendant argues that the evidence failed to establish his identity as the shooter. . . . We disagree. To determine whether sufficient evidence has been presented, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
To prove first-degree, premeditated murder, the prosecution must establish that the defendant intentionally killed the victim and that the act of killing was premeditated and deliberate. People v. Graves, 224 Mich. App. 676, 678; 569 N.W.2d 911 (1997), modified on other grounds 458 Mich. 476 (1998). Premeditation and deliberation require sufficient time to allow the defendant to take a "second look." Id. . . .
In this case, the eyewitness's description of the shooter, particularly his hair style, "conformed to defendant's appearance at the time of the murder as described by friends, family and coworkers. Other evidence identifying defendant as the shooter included: (1) eyewitness testimony that the perpetrator's vehicle matched the vehicle driven by defendant; (2) undisputed testimony that defendant had purchased a handgun similar to that used in the crime; (3) bloodstains on
defendant's pants matching the victim's blood, and (4) evidence that defendant fled to Louisiana after a warrant was issued for his arrest. Viewed most favorably to the prosecution, the foregoing evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's identity as the shooter beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
Accordingly, we reject defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. People v. Reynolds, slip op. at 3-4.
Petitioner has not presented any evidence that the state court's findings of fact were erroneous. Therefore, according the state court's findings of fact a presumption of correctness, this Court concludes that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision did not "result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief with respect to this claim.
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion to Expand Reviewing Record is GRANTED and the affidavits attached to the Motion to Expand Reviewing Record are to be included as part of the record before this Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED and the matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.