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stating "even if prisoners do retain some Fourth Amendment rights after incarceration, the right to privacy is, at best, very minimal"
Summary of this case from Evans v. TiffinOpinion
No. 04-03-00747-CV.
Delivered and Filed: April 14, 2004.
Appeal from the 81st Judicial District Court, Karnes County, Texas, Trial Court No. 02-11-209-Cvk, Honorable Ron Carr, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Sitting: Catherine STONE, Justice, Paul W. GREEN, Justice, Sarah B. DUNCAN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Juan A. Reyna, a prison inmate, sued Irene Castillo, a correctional officer, alleging invasion of privacy. Reyna also requested an injunction to prevent Castillo from making false discipline claims by refusing to acknowledge Reyna's "bodily privacy" and failing to correctly apply the policies regarding Reyna's "bodily privacy." Reyna appeals the order of the trial court, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the dismissal of his suit pursuant to Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. We affirm the trial court's order.
Background
Reyna is a prisoner at the correctional facility where Castillo is employed. Castillo filed a disciplinary report against Reyna for masturbating in her presence when she entered Reyna's cell to deliver his razor. After being disciplined, Reyna filed suit against Castillo alleging that Castillo invaded his right to privacy. Reyna also sought an injunction to prevent what he argues are false disciplinary actions from occurring. Castillo moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the grounds that Reyna's case was frivolous. The trial court granted Castillo's motion to dismiss, finding that Reyna's claims were without merit. Specifically, the trial judge dismissed Reyna's invasion of privacy claim as frivolous under Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and denied Reyna's request for injunctive relief due to lack of merit.
Standard of Review
We review the trial court's dismissal of Reyna's claims under an abuse of discretion standard. Hickman v. Adams, 35 S.W.3d 120, 123 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.); Samuels v. Strain, 11 S.W.3d 404, 406 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion only if it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Hickman, 35 S.W.3d at 123.
The trial court has broad discretion under Chapter 14 to dismiss an inmate's suit if it determines that the suit is frivolous. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003 (Vernon 2000). In determining whether a claim is frivolous or malicious, the trial court may consider whether "the claim's realistic chance of ultimate success is slight, the claim has no arguable basis in law or in fact, it is clear the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim, or the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts." Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(b) (Vernon 2000). A trial court's dismissal of a claim without conducting a fact hearing can be affirmed on appeal only if the claim has no arguable basis in law, which we review de novo. Retzlaff v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 94 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); Lentworth v. Trahan, 981 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
Invasion of Privacy Claim and Declaratory Relief
Reyna asserts that Castillo violated his constitutional right to privacy when she walked into his cell and observed him masturbating. Reyna argues that because he was on his bed and Castillo entered the cell without knocking, Castillo invaded Reyna's right to privacy.
Generally, Texas law recognizes a common law right to privacy. Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Tex. 1973). To establish a claim for invasion of privacy, the complaining party must prove (1) an intentional intrusion, physically or otherwise, upon his solitude, seclusion, or private affairs or concerns, which (2) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. 1993). However, the United States Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration . . ." Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984). Additionally, the Court stressed the important and difficult task of prison administration and how this administration would be weakened if prisoners retained a privacy right in their cells. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526. Furthermore, even if prisoners do retain some Fourth Amendment rights after incarceration, the right to privacy is, at best, very minimal. Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2002).
Reyna's argument that Castillo violated his constitutional right to privacy has no arguable basis in law because there is no fundamental right to privacy in prison. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed Reyna's claim that Castillo invaded his privacy and Reyna's request that the trial court declare that Castillo's actions invaded his privacy.
Injunction
Reyna argues that the trial court improperly denied his request for injunctive relief. Reyna sought an injunction that would prevent Castillo from taking future disciplinary action against him that would invade his "bodily privacy." Injunctive relief may only be granted on a showing of (1) the existence of a wrongful act; (2) the existence of imminent harm; (3) the existence of irreparable injury; and (4) the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Beathard Joint Venture v. West Houston Airport Corp., 72 S.W.3d 426, 432 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.); Jim Rutherford Invs., Inc. v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Ass'n, 25 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). Reyna's injunction request is premised on his contention that Castillo engaged in a wrongful act by invading his privacy. Because the trial court correctly found that Reyna's invasion of privacy claim was frivolous, any disciplinary action taken against Reyna for engaging in similar activities in the future would not be a wrongful act. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Reyna's request for injunctive relief was without merit.
Conclusion
The trial court's order dismissing Reyna's suit is affirmed.