Opinion
21-55940
10-25-2022
ROGELIO REYES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF SANTA ANA; KAMERON HENDERSON; MATTHEW D. WHARTON; DAVID GUZMAN; JUSTIN L. COLLINS; JONATHON PEREZ; ANH TU S. PHAN; KENNETH GRAY; DANIEL CARRILLO, Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Argued and Submitted October 3, 2022 Pasadena, California
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, DC No. 8:18-cv-01537-DOC, David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Before: TASHIMA and LEE, Circuit Judges, and FREUDENTHAL,[**] District Judge.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Rogelio Reyes was mistakenly arrested in his home and detained by police officers of the City of Santa Ana. He appeals from the district court's dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) of his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed his claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The district court did not violate the rule of mandate in dismissing Reyes' claim. In his prior appeal, we held that Reyes should have been allowed leave to amend his Monell claim. Reyes v. City of Santa Ana, 832 Fed.Appx. 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2020). We did not hold that the amended complaint should survive a motion to dismiss.
Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural background, we do not include it here except as necessary to understand this disposition.
Although "[a] district court that has received the mandate of an appellate court cannot vary or examine that mandate for any purpose other than executing it," "the rule of mandate allows a lower court to decide anything not foreclosed by the mandate." Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, the mandate required the district court to allow Reyes leave to amend his Monell claim, but it did not foreclose the district court from concluding that Reyes' amended complaint did not survive a motion to dismiss.
2. The allegations in the amended complaint do not plausibly suggest that the City "had 'actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their training program' will 'cause[] [City] employees to violate citizens' constitutional rights.'" Kirkpatrick v. County of Washoe, 843 F.3d 784, 794 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)); see Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that "the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief"). Nor do the allegations "support a reasonable inference . . . of a municipal training policy that amounts to a deliberate indifference to constitutional rights." Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153 (9th Cir. 2021).
The amended complaint alleged the following:
(1) Henderson stated that the City's practice of investigating crimes by surrounding homes without warrants or exigent circumstances and ordering everyone out at gunpoint was done on "a normal basis" by the City.
(2) Henderson stated that he had engaged in this practice more than five times and that it had "been going on as long as [he has] been a Santa Ana police officer."
(3) The City failed to train its officers that "both exigent circumstances and individualized probable cause are necessary prerequisites to encroaching upon the curtilage of a home late at night and ordering all occupants at gunpoint to exit the home."
"[D]eliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action." Kirkpatrick, 843 F.3d at 794 (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 61). "The custom or policy must be a 'deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.'" Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1075 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (plurality opinion)). Even construing the allegations in the amended complaint in the light most favorable to Reyes, they do not support a reasonable inference that the City's training policy amounted to deliberate indifference. See Mudpie, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 15 F.4th 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2021) (explaining that in reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, factual allegations of the complaint are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff).
AFFIRMED.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The Honorable Nancy D. Freudenthal, United States District Judge for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.