Opinion
04-22-00440-CR
05-29-2024
Correy REYES-BROWN, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Do Not Publish
From the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas Trial Court No. 20-1498-CR-C Honorable William D. Old III, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice, Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice, Irene Rios, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
IRENE RIOS, JUSTICE
Appellant Correy Reyes-Brown pled guilty to his February 2019 possession of a controlled substance in an amount of four grams but less than two hundred grams, a second-degree felony. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(a), (d). The trial court deferred the adjudication of his guilt and placed Reyes-Brown on community supervision for six years and assessed a $250 fine. Subsequently, the State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt. The trial court held a hearing, at which Reyes-Brown pled "true" to violating conditions of his community supervision. After accepting his plea, the trial court found Reyes-Brown violated conditions of his community supervision, revoked his community supervision, and found him guilty of the underlying offense. The trial court orally assessed Reyes-Brown's sentence at four years in prison. The trial court's written judgment reflects the four-year sentence but also imposes a $250 fine and court costs in the amount of $484, neither of which were orally pronounced at the revocation proceeding.
Reyes-Brown appeals the imposition of the $250 fine and the $484 in court costs in the written judgment because the trial court did not orally pronounce the fine or the court costs when pronouncing his sentence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.03, § 1(a) (requiring sentence to be orally pronounced in defendant's presence). The State concedes error with respect to the fine and suggests we modify the judgment and delete the fine. With respect to the judgment's assessment of court costs, however, the State contends we should affirm the court costs because they are not considered part of a defendant's sentence.
Assessed Fine
In Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3.d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that when a defendant is placed on deferred adjudication and later adjudicated guilty, "the order adjudicating guilt sets aside the order deferring adjudication, including the previously imposed fine." Therefore, if the trial court does not orally pronounce a fine at the time it adjudicates the defendant's guilt but includes the fine in its written judgment, a conflict exists between the two and the oral pronouncement controls, requiring the fine to be deleted from the judgment. Id.
Here, Reyes-Brown's deferred adjudication order includes a $250 fine, as does his final judgment signed after the revocation of his community supervision and adjudication of his guilt. However, because the trial court did not orally pronounce the fine at the time of Reyes-Brown's adjudication of guilt, the fine must be deleted from the judgment. See Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 502 (noting unique circumstances of deferred adjudication, in contrast to regular probation in which sentence is imposed and then suspended); see also Burt v. State, 445 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ("A trial judge has neither the statutory authority nor the discretion to orally pronounce one sentence in front of the defendant[ ] but then enter a different written judgment outside the defendant's presence.").
The trial court erred in assessing the $250 fine in the written judgment, and therefore the judgment should be modified to delete it.
Court Costs
All court costs assessed by a trial court against a defendant can be separated into two categories: (1) mandatory costs and (2) discretionary costs. Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). A mandatory court cost is "a predetermined, legislatively mandated obligation imposed upon conviction" and includes the consolidation of fees such as the victims' compensation fund fee and crime stoppers fee. Id.; see Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 133.102(a)(e). Mandatory court costs do "not have to be included in the oral pronouncement of sentence . . . as a precondition to their inclusion in the trial court's written judgment." Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). This is because mandatory court costs, unlike fines, are intended as a nonpunitive recoupment of the costs of judicial resources expended in the process of adjudicating a defendant. Johnson, 423 S.W.3d at 389; Weir, 278 S.W.3d at 366; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 42.15, 42.16 (requiring that a judgment order a defendant to pay court costs). Therefore, the trial court did not err in its imposition of mandatory court costs in Reyes-Brown's written judgment. See Weir, 278 S.W.3d at 367.
However, the costs assessed to Reyes-Brown in the final judgment are not all permissible according to the bill of costs included in the appellate record and considering the offense occurred in February 2019. First, the bill of costs lists a cost of $185 for "State Consolidated Court Cost." However, for offenses committed prior to January 2020, such as Reyes-Brown's offense, the statutory amount for this court cost is $133. See Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 209, § 162, sec. 133.102(a)(1), 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 209 (amended 2011, 2017, 2019, 2023) (current version at Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 133.102(a)(1)); Rhodes v. State, 676 S.W.3d 228, 232-33 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.). Thus, the judgment should be modified to reflect the correct amount of $133 in costs for "State Consolidated Court Cost."
Second, the bill of costs lists a cost of $105 for "Local Consolidated Court Cost." However, this cost was added by legislative amendment in 2019 and is only applicable to offenses committed on or after January 1, 2020. See Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1352, § 1.05, sec. 134.101(a), §§ 5.01, 5.04, 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1352 (amended 2023) (current version at Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 134.101(a)) (applying to offenses committed on or after January 1, 2020); Rhodes, 676 S.W.3d at 232-33. The judgment should be modified to delete the assessment of $105 for "Local Consolidated Court Cost."
Next, the $25 separate "Crime Stoppers Fees" cannot be additionally assessed given that the fees are already statutorily mandated and accounted for as part of the assessed mandatory state consolidated court costs in each cause. See Philmon v. State, 580 S.W.3d 377, 383 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2019) (concluding that a crime victims' compensation fee could not be assessed separately from the court costs charged for a felony conviction and affirming the judgment as modified), aff'd, 609 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); see also Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 133.102; Taylor v. State, No. 13-20-00034-CR, 2021 WL 3196519, at *2 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg July 29, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding the same where the trial court assessed a separate crime stoppers fee). The judgment should be modified to delete the separate assessment of $25 for "Crime Stoppers Fees."
Reformation of Judgment
An intermediate appellate court may reform a trial court's judgment to make the record speak the truth when it has the necessary data and information to do so. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b) (authorizing appellate courts to modify the judgment and affirm as modified); French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) ("[A]n appellate court has authority to reform a judgment to include an affirmative finding to make the record speak the truth.").
While this court can reform a judgment, we remand this cause to the trial court to recalculate the proper assessment of costs. Because the fine was not orally pronounced at the time of Reyes-Brown's sentencing, the judgment should not include the $250 fine. When recalculating all costs, the trial court should only assess those amounts permitted by statute at the time of the February 2019 offense.
See Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 209, § 162, sec. 133.102(a)(1), 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 209 (amended 2011, 2017, 2019, 2023) (current version at Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 133.102(a)(1)); Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1352, § 1.05, sec. 134.101(a), §§ 5.01, 5.04, 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1352 (amended 2023) (current version at Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 134.101(a)); Act of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 770, § 2.29, sec. 102.020(a)(3), 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 770, repealed by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1352, § 1.19(7); Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 915 (repealing section 102.020(a)(3) proving for the collection of costs related to DNA testing for offenses occurring after January 1, 2020); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 102.011, 102.012.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction. We reverse the portion of the trial court's judgment imposing the $250 fine and the costs in the amount of $484 and remand the cause to the trial court to delete the $250 fine and to reassess costs permitted by statute at the time of the February 2019 offense.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.