Opinion
No. 15–P–1065.
07-19-2016
Jean REVIL v. George COLEMAN & another.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
On October 7, 2010, Bishop George Coleman, acting for the Roman Catholic Diocese of Fall River AIDS Ministry (Diocese), issued a press release announcing that the plaintiff, a member of the faculty at Bishop Stang High School for over thirty years, had been placed on administrative leave pending an investigation of allegations that she had engaged in sexual misconduct with a former student. The matter was referred to the district attorney for investigation and, ultimately, no charges were filed. On October 3, 2013, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the press release was defamatory and that the defendants acted negligently when they issued the release before conducting any investigation. In a thorough written opinion, a Superior Court judge allowed the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). The plaintiff challenges that decision on appeal. We affirm.
The press release was not attached to the complaint. The plaintiff did not object to the motion judge's consideration of the copy of the press release attached to the defendants' motion to dismiss. Because the plaintiff relied upon the release in framing her complaint, no conversion to Mass.R.Civ.P. 56, as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002), was required. See Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 224 (2011).
Discussion. We review the order of dismissal de novo. Harrington v. Costello, 467 Mass. 720, 724 (2014). A complaint is sufficient if the factual allegations plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008). In assessing sufficiency, we accept “the allegations in the complaint as true and draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Harrington v. Costello, supra.
“To prevail on a claim of defamation, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant was at fault for the publication of a false statement regarding the plaintiff, capable of damaging the plaintiff's reputation in the community, which either caused economic loss or is actionable without proof of economic loss” (emphasis added). White v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mass., Inc ., 442 Mass. 64, 66 (2004). The requirement that a defamatory statement be false can be satisfied by a direct statement of fact that is capable of being proved false or by false innuendo. See Reilly v. Associated Press, 59 Mass.App.Ct. 764, 772–774 (2003). In rare cases, individual true statements may be “combined in such a manner as [to] constitute a defamatory falsehood.” Salvo v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 57 Mass.App.Ct. 255, 262 (2003). See Mihalik v. Duprey, 11 Mass.App.Ct. 602, 604 (1981).
In this case, the complaint does not assert that the statements in the release were false. Indeed, the plaintiff has conceded the truth of those statements. Rather, the complaint alleges that the “failure to include pertinent facts within the press release rendered it false.” We have found no Massachusetts authority recognizing a cause of action for defamation by failure to provide factual context to an otherwise truthful statement. Nor are we persuaded by the plaintiff's argument that the contents of the release amounted, in the aggregate, to a half-truth. The release balanced the disclosure of the allegation and the actions taken by the defendants with the plaintiff's denial of the allegation and a description of her significant experience. The dates included in the release alerted readers that (1) the accusation was made sixteen years after the alleged misconduct and (2) the investigation was in its early stages.
In pertinent part, the release reported the following facts. On October 5, 2010, a Catholic Social Services staff member received a report alleging inappropriate sexual conduct by the plaintiff, a teacher at Bishop Stang High School, with a female student. Following the receipt of the report, “[i]n keeping with its policies,” the Diocese reported the allegation to an investigator from the office of the Bristol County district attorney. The Diocese informed the plaintiff of the allegation and placed her on paid administrative leave “pending the outcome of the ongoing investigation.” The plaintiff denied the allegation. The release described the plaintiff as a longtime staff member with over thirty years of experience at the school as a classroom teacher and as the director of the campus ministry program. In response to the “very troubling matter for all involved, including the alleged victim, [the plaintiff], and the entire [school] community,” Catholic Social Services made counselors available to any student or staff member who wished to talk about the “distressing situation.”
In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that “[t]he release was [sic] did not include facts relating to the timing of the complaint, the nature of the complaint as a single allegation and/or the uninvestigated nature of the allegation.” In fact, the release did report that (1) the allegation was received two days earlier; and (2) “the alleged victim—now an adult—“ maintained that the abuse occurred at the school in 1994. Moreover, the release referred to only a single accusation and that the investigation was “ongoing .”
Contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, the release did not suggest that the allegations were credible. Rather, it cautioned that placing the plaintiff on administrative leave was “a matter of policy and should not be construed as an indication of guilt or wrongdoing.” The release also made clear that the report to the district attorney's office was a matter of Diocesan policy. In short, nothing in the release suggested the truth of the allegations . Accordingly, we discern no error in the dismissal of the defamation claim.
For the first time on appeal, the plaintiff claims that the reference in the release to a “very troubling matter for all involved,” can be proved false. This argument is inconsistent with the position taken before the motion judge, and we need not consider it.
“To recover for negligence, a plaintiff must show the existence of an act or omission in violation of a ... duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant [s].” Roe No. 1 v. Children's Hosp. Med. Center, 469 Mass. 710, 713 (2014) (quotations omitted). “Whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of reasonable care is a question of law that is decided ‘by reference to existing social values and customs and appropriate social policy.’ “ Coombes v. Florio, 450 Mass. 182, 187 (2007), quoting from Cremins v. Clancy, 415 Mass. 289, 292 (1993). The complaint in this case does not identify the duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendants. If, as the plaintiff appears to have argued to the motion judge, the defendants owed the plaintiff a duty to report the facts accurately and without “imputing credibility to the accusation,” the complaint does not sufficiently allege a breach of that duty. The issuance of a truthful press release did not breach a duty owed to the plaintiff.
Finally, the plaintiff argues that the defendants owed her a duty to investigate the validity of the accusation before issuing the release. We need not reach the merits of this claim, which is unsupported by reasoned argument and citation to any relevant authority. See Mass.R.A.P. 16(a)(4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975).
Because we conclude the negligence claim fails, the vicarious liability claim was properly dismissed as well.
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Judgment affirmed.