Opinion
3:20-CV-01181-AC
07-13-2022
ANTONINA REUTOV, Plaintiff, v. TATANCA HEALTH CARE PLAN, TATANCA HEALTH CARE PLAN BOARD OF TRUSTEES, dba Omnis Benefit Administrator, Defendant.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
ARMISTEAD, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Antonina Reutov sues Tatanca Health Care Plan and Tatanca Health Care Plan Board of Trustees, dba Omnis Benefit Administrator (collectively, Tatanca), for improper denial of benefits under Reutov's health care plan in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Before the court is Reutov's second motion for an order of default judgment, or in the alternative, for a hearing on damages. Sec. Mot. for Order of Default J., ECF No. 55. For the following reasons, the court recommends Reutov's motion be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Tatanca comprises a self-funded health and welfare plan and an administrator that oversees the processing of claims and payment of group health benefits. Compl. ¶¶ 2-3, ECF No. 1. In February 2019, Reutov purchased an “LBP Gold 4 Prenatal” health insurance plan (the Plan) from Tatanca. Decl. of Antonina Reutov (Reutov Decl.) ¶ 3, Ex. 7. The Plan was effective from March 1, 2019 through December 31, 2019. Id. After enrolling, Reutov visited the online patient portal provided by Tatanca and selected Legacy Silverton Hospital (Legacy), which the Plan represented as an in-network provider of medical benefits. Compl. ¶ 10; Reutov Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 1. From March 2019 through November 2019, Reutov received medical services from Legacy, for which she was billed about $39,000. See generally, Reutov Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 2. Tatanca paid $877.05 of these expenses and denied $4,713.62 as uncovered services and $33,303.99 as “out-of-network” services. Id. at 1, 7, 9, 5-6, 10, 11-15, 16, 17-20. Reutov contends those denials were inconsistent with Tatanca's representations about the Plan. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 26-27.
Tatanca also denied a $326.00 charge as an uncovered service, but Reutov does not dispute that this charge was properly denied. Id. at 9.
Reutov contacted Tatanca to try to resolve these billing and coverage issues directly, but Tatanca did not respond. Reutov Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 4. Tatanca also never responded after Reutov acquired an attorney and issued a demand letter. Reutov commenced this action in July 2020. See generally, Compl.; Reutov Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 5. Reutov asserts ERISA claims under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B) and 1132(a)(3) to recover the unpaid benefits due under the Plan. Compl. ¶¶ 7-18; 24-30. While this action was pending, Reutov applied to Legacy for financial assistance. Reutov Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. 3. Legacy granted her request and forgave all but $8,492 of her unpaid expenses. Reutov Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 6.
Reutov also alleged a statutory-damages claim, but she releases that claim for the purpose of default judgment.
In November 2020, Tatanca appeared and moved to dismiss or transfer venue based on a forum selection clause in the policy. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 15. Magistrate Judge John V. Acosta recommended denial of Tatanca's motions. F&R, ECF No. 25. Following that recommendation, the court granted Tatanca three extensions of time to file objections. Order, ECF Nos. 28, 30, 32. Tatanca did not object. On September 11, 2021, District Judge Michael H. Mosman adopted the F&R in full. O&O, ECF No. 33. Two weeks later, Tatanca's counsel moved to withdraw from representation, which the court granted. Motion to Withdraw, ECF No. 37; Order, ECF No. 42. The court also granted Tatanca an extension of time to file an Answer to the Complaint. Order, ECF No. 36. Tatanca did not file an Answer.
On October 29, 2021, Reutov sought leave to file an amended complaint. Mot. to Amend, ECF No. 40. On November 12, 2021, Judge Acosta held a telephonic status conference to clarify whether Reutov intended to amend her complaint or to pursue a default judgment. Minutes of Proceeding, ECF No. 44. Tatanca failed to appear at the status conference. Subsequently, Reutov moved for entry of default. Mot. for Entry of Default, ECF No. 45.
The court treats Reutov's pending motion to amend (ECF No. 40) as abandoned.
In his declaration accompanying the motion for entry of default, Reutov's attorney, Clinton Tapper, stated:
On or about November 19, 2021, I received a call from Tatanca from a person who referred to [himself] as Dr. Webster. Dr. Webster advised that the policies sold to Ms. Reutov and others like her were “junk,” that Tatanca did not have to provide her with benefits, and that Tatanca was in the process of “shutting down” the arm of the company that sold such policies. I asked if Tatanca was going bankrupt and if so, to be advised of the Bankruptcy court case number. Dr. Webster said the company was not going bankrupt.Decl. of Clinton Tapper in support of Default (Tapper Decl.) ¶ 7, ECF No. 45-1). In December 2021, Mr. Tapper received a certified mailing from Tatanca, in which Tatanca again denied liability and ambiguously represented that its operation was “winding down.” Id. ¶ 9. The Clerk of Court entered default against Tatanca on December 12, 2021. Entry of Default, ECF No. 47.
Tatanca has not appeared since November 2020. On January 14, 2022, Reutov moved for an order of default judgment. First. Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 48. The court denied that motion, with leave to refile. F&R, ECF No. 52; Order, ECF No. 54 (adopting F&R in full). On June 1, 2022, Reutov filed a corrected motion for default judgment.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 55(a), the clerk of court must enter an order of default if a party against whom affirmative relief is sought has failed timely to plead or otherwise defend an action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). Upon the entry of default, the court accepts as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007); Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). “The court, however, does not accept as admitted facts that are not well-pleaded, conclusions of law, or facts relating to the amount of damages.” Fathers & Daughters Nevada, LLC v. Brown, Case No. 3:16-cv-927-SI, 2017 WL 2378358, at *1 (D. Or. June 1, 2017); DIRECTV, 503 F.3d at 854; see also Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” (Quotations omitted)). If the plaintiff's claim is not for a certain sum or a sum that can be made certain by computation, the court may hold a hearing to conduct an accounting, ascertain damages, establish the truth of any allegation by evidence, or investigate any other matter. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2)(A-D).
After default has been entered against a defendant, a court may order default judgment against the defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). “The district court's decision whether to enter a default judgment is a discretionary one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.1980). In exercising this discretion, courts in this circuit consider the factors set out in Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1986). See DIRECTV, 503 F.3d at 852. The Eitel factors are:
(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claims; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. The “starting point” of the court's analysis, however, “is the general rule that default judgments are ordinarily disfavored.” Id. at 1472 (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Reutov asks the court to grant her judgment of $8,492-the remaining balance that she owes to Legacy. She also asks the court to award $39,615.50 in attorney fees. The court recommends partially granting this request by (1) entering judgment for Reutov in the amount of $8,492 and (2) granting attorneys fees in the amount of $32,533.50.
A. Default Judgment and Consideration of the Eitel Factors
Although the court recognizes that default judgments are “ordinarily disfavored” and that cases “should be decided on the merits,“ id. at 1472, as the court explains below, consideration of the Eitel factors readily favor default judgment against Tatanca.
The first Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff would suffer prejudice if default judgment is not entered. PepsiCo, Inc., v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. United Revolver Club of Sacramento, Inc., Case No. 2:18-cv-2960 KJM DB, 2020 WL 773419 *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2020). Because Tatanca has not appeared to defend this action since the court denied its motion to dismiss or transfer venue in November 2020, Reutov will be denied the right to resolution of her claims if default judgment is not entered. Thus, the court finds this factor weighs in favor of granting a default judgment. See Minnesota Life Ins. Co. v. Gomez, Case No. CV-14-00866, 2015 WL 4638351 *4 (D. Ariz. Aug. 4, 2015) (finding that not entering default judgment would prejudice plaintiffs because it would leave them without any other way of resolving claim).
As to the second and third Eitel factors, the court considers the merits of Reutov's substantive claims and the sufficiency of the complaint together because the two inquiries are related. As part of this inquiry, the court must consider whether the allegations in the complaint state a claim that supports the relief sought. PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1175; Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 2020 WL 773419, at *3.
In her first claim for relief, Reutov alleges that Tatanca wrongfully denied her benefits in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Compl. ¶¶ 7-18. That section provides that, under ERISA, a plan participant may bring a civil action in federal court “to recover benefits due to [her] under the terms of [her] plan, to enforce [her] rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify [her] rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Reutov alleges that, on its website and client portal, Tatanca represented that Legacy was an in-network provider under the Plan. Compl. ¶ 10. When Reutov relied on that representation and incurred expenses for medical services provided by Legacy, however, Tatanca stated that Legacy was an out-of-network provider and denied payment of benefits. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Taking these allegations as true, Reutov plausibly has alleged that Tatanca wrongfully denied her benefits under the Plan.
Alternatively, Reutov asserts that Tatanca violated its fiduciary duties by failing to maintain an accurate database of in-network and out-of-network medical providers and should be equitably estopped from denying her benefits. Id. ¶¶ 24-30. Reutov's allegation that Tatanca misrepresented Legacy as an in-network provider supports this claim. Therefore, the merits of Reutov's claims and sufficiency of her pleadings favor entry of default judgment.
Under the fourth factor, the court considers the amount of money at stake in relation to the seriousness of the defendant's conduct. PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1176-77. Reutov asserts that Tatanca wrongfully refused to cover $38,017.61 for medical services owed to Legacy. However, because Reutov applied for and was granted patient forgiveness for most of this sum, she requests only $8,492 in damages-the remaining amount owed to Legacy. The court considers this amount reasonable and finds that the fourth Eitel factor weighs in favor of default judgment.
Likewise, the fifth and sixth Eitel factors favor default judgment. There is little possibility of a dispute over material facts as to Tatanca. Tatanca appeared briefly to litigate its motion to dismiss or transfer this case. However, after the court denied its motion, Tatanca's counsel withdrew and Tatanca failed to appear further in this dispute. There is no evidence that this failure to appear was the result of excusable neglect.
Under the seventh Eitel factor, the court considers the policy that, whenever possible, cases should be tried on the merits. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. The existence of Rule 55(b), however, shows that the preference for resolving cases on the merits is not absolute. PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177. Here, because Tatanca has not appeared since November 2020, deciding the case on the merits is “impractical,” if not impossible. Id. This factor favors default judgment.
Consequently, all of the Eitel factors favor default judgment, and the court recommends entering default judgment against Tatanca.
B. Damages
The court does not accept as true allegations relating to damages. See TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Instead, Reutov must prove the amount of damages. Reutov asks the court to issue a judgment against Tatanca for the remaining balance that she owes to Legacy: $8,492. To support the award, she submits an affidavit explaining how she applied to Legacy for patient forgiveness, as well as exhibits containing a letter from Legacy granting her application and a record of the outstanding $8,492 balance. Reutov Decl. ¶¶ 8-9, Exs. 3, 6. Because this figure is a “sum certain,” the court should grant Reutov judgment against Tatanca for $8,492.
C. Attorney Fees
As the prevailing party in this ERISA action, Reutov may recover attorney fees and costs. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (providing that the court “in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fees and costs of action” if an insurer is found liable under ERISA); Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2) (prevailing party entitled to costs and attorney fees if provided by judgment and statute, rule, or other grounds); LR 54-1 & 54-3 (same).
The Ninth Circuit has adopted the “lodestar” method for calculating attorney fees. Fischer v. SJB-P. D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). That calculation multiplies a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended in the litigation. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The court must then decide whether to enhance or reduce the lodestar figure by evaluating several factors. Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008). There is a “strong presumption” that the lodestar method produces a reasonable figure and should only be enhanced or reduced in exceptional circumstances. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clear Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986); Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013). The court has an independent duty to scrutinize a fee request to determine its reasonableness, even with no objections. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1401 (9th Cir. 1993). The court has “considerable discretion” in determining the reasonableness of a fee award. Webb v. Ada Cnty., Idaho, 195 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1999).
The court may adjust the lodestar to account for factors such as: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the undesirability of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. Kerr v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975); Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1119. The court need only address those factors not already subsumed in its lodestar analysis. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436.
Reutov seeks $39,615.50 in fees for 121.58 hours expended by Clinton Tapper, Brenda Taylor, and Missy Steadman Tapper. To support this request, Reutov submitted statements of time. See Tapper Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, Ex. 10 (June 2020 to Aug 2020), Ex. 11 (Aug. 2020 to Jan. 2022).
Because Reutov's fee request does not separate the hours worked by Mr. Tapper, Ms. Taylor, and Ms. Tapper, the court calculates these hours based on the submitted time statements.
1. Reasonable Hourly Rate
The court looks to prevailing market rates to determine a reasonable hourly rate. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). Prevailing market rates are those that the local legal market would pay for a case of this nature to a lawyer of comparable skill, experience, and reputation to a plaintiff's counsel of record. Id. at 897. In the District of Oregon, the court evaluates fee petitions against the most recent Oregon State Bar Economic Survey. See Local Rule 54-3 Practice Tip (“[T]he Court requests that fee petitions address the Economic Survey and provide justification for requested hourly rates higher than reported by the Survey.”); Roberts v. Interstate Distrib. Co., 242 F.Supp.2d 850, 857 (D. Or. 2002) (in determining the reasonable hourly rate, the District of Oregon uses the OSB Economic Survey “as an initial benchmark” and attorneys should “provide ample justification” for deviating from the Survey rates). Typically, the court limits the hourly rate requested to the 75th percentile of the OSB Economic Survey. See, e.g., Brady Mktg. Co. Inc. v. Kai U.S.A. Ltd., No. 3:16-cv-1878-MO, 2018 WL 3377083, at *3 (D. Or. July 11, 2018) (noting that awarding “the 75th percentile rate . . . is the usual practice of this district”).
The economic survey is available at: https://www.osbar.org/docs/resources/Econsurveys/17EconomicSurvey.pdf.
Mr. Tapper seeks $345 per hour for about 113 hours spent on this action. Tapper Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, Exs. 10-11. Mr. Tapper has been practicing law for thirteen years. Id. ¶ 4. For the past twelve years, he has specialized in first-party insurance disputes, with a particular focus on handling plaintiff ERISA cases in the state of Oregon. Id.
Mr. Tapper's requested rate is reasonable when compared to the average rates in the local legal market. The OSB 2017 Economic Survey provides that the median rate for Portland attorneys with Mr. Tapper's experience is $300 per hour, the 75th percentile is $375, and the 95th percentile is $460. Tapper Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. 8. Mr. Tapper's requested rate of $345 is below the 75th percentile, and the court concludes that, given his total years of practice, his experience, and the demands of the case, compensation at $345 per hour is a reasonable hourly rate.
The billing records submitted by Reutov also reflect work performed by two employees at Tapper Law Firm: Brenda Taylor and Missy Steadman Tapper. Each requests a billing rate of $75 per hour. It is unclear from the record whether Ms. Taylor and Ms. Tapper are employed as paralegals, legal assistant, or other capacity. As explained below, the work performed by Ms. Taylor and Ms. Tapper is clerical and noncompensable. Thus, the court does not address the reasonableness of their requested rate.
2. Reasonable Number of Hours
The party seeking the fee award bears the burden of showing the number of hours spent was reasonably necessary to the litigation and that counsel made “a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. This burden can be satisfied by submitting documentary evidence supporting the hours worked and fees claimed. Id. at 433; United States v. $28,000 in U.S. Currency, 802 F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2015). Fee petitions that include inadequate detail or that fail to separate time for individual tasks may be totally or partially denied, or apportioned accordingly. See Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1121 (noting district court has authority to deny fee requests that are “poorly documented”). Reasonable time spent in preparing a fee petition generally is recoverable. Guerrero v. Cummings, 70 F.3d 1111, 1112 (9th Cir. 1995). Ultimately, a reasonable number of hours is the number of hours that “‘reasonably could have been billed to a private client.'” Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202 (quoting Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1111).
With respect to the requested fees for Ms. Taylor and Ms. Tapper, it is well-settled that the court may reduce an attorney's hours for time spent performing clerical work. Davis v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1543 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (1993); see Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989) (noting the dollar value of non-legal work “is not enhanced” because it is performed by a lawyer); Sterling Sav. Bank v. Sequoia Crossing, LLC, Civ. No. 09-555-AC, 2010 WL 3210855, at *7 (D. Or. Aug. 11, 2010) (“Tasks considered clerical include, but are not limited to, filing motions with the court, filling out and printing documents, preparing affidavits and drafting certificates of service, organizing files, calendaring dates, rescheduling depositions, and sending documents.”). Costs associated with clerical tasks are generally considered overhead expenses reflected in an attorney's billing rate. Ash Grove Cement Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 3:09-cv-00239-HZ, 2014 WL 837389, at *8 (D. Or. Mar. 3, 2014); see also Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 921 (9th Cir. 2009) (reducing fees for clerical tasks such as filing and organization).
Brenda Taylor seeks fees for 5.96 hours billed at an hourly rate of $75. After careful review, the court finds these entries are clerical work and should be eliminated:
The descriptions of the tasks performed are summarized for clarity and efficiency.
6/18/2020
B. Taylor
.4 Client File Set Up
6/18/2020
B. Taylor
1.15 Mailing Post Office
7/22/2020
B. Taylor
.18 Download / Print: downloaded docs
7/22/2020
B. Taylor
.14 Update Client Matter
7/22/2020
B. Taylor
.16 Court Docketing
7/22/2020
B. Taylor
.75 Mailing Post Office / printing / scanning
7/22/2020
B. Taylor
.18 Client Accounting: added filing fee, and certified mailing receipts to expenses and financial folder
7/22/2020
B. Taylor
2.0 Service Packet Mailing to THCP & Trustees
Eliminating these time entries results in a 4.96 hour reduction of Ms. Taylor's time, leaving one hour remaining. That hour, however, appears to reflect the $400 filing fee for the complaint. See Tapper Decl. ¶8, Ex. 10 (billing one hour, at an hourly rate of $400, as “Filing Fee for Complaint” on 7/22/20). Filing fees are reasonable as costs, not attorney's fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (taxing docket fees as costs). Thus, the filing fee entry is eliminated.
If Reutov wishes to recover the filing fee for the Complaint, she may submit a Bill of Costs.
Similarly, the time entries for Missy Steadman Tapper describe that she spend 2.62 hours performing tasks such as “Scanning and Document Management” and “Scheduling: Update Attn Calendar.” Tapper Decl. ¶¶ 7, Ex. 11 (8/1/2020 (.1), 9/22/2020 (.1), 9/23/2020 (.3), 9/30/2020 (.1), 10/19/2020 (.1), 11/1/2020 (.12), 11/3/2020 (.1), 11/10/2020 (.1), 11/18/2020 (.1), 12/3/2020 (.15), 12/8/2020 (.15), 1/15/2021 (.5), 1/19/2021 (.2), 1/26/2021 (.1), 1/27/2021 (.1), 1/28/2021 (.1), 2/2/2021 (.1), and 2/19/2021 (.1)). Again, the court finds that these tasks are noncompensable. In short, the court finds all of Ms. Taylor and Ms. Tapper's time clerical and noncompensable.
Mr. Tapper also occasionally billed time for clerical tasks such as filing, calendaring, and sending documents. See Tapper Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, Exs. 10-11. (Mr. Tapper's entries with clerical tasks are dated 6/18/2020 (1), 7/21/2020 (.5), 7/13/2020 (.3), 7/26/2020 (.4), 8/3/2020 (.2), 8/24/2020 (1), 9/23/2020 (.5), 9/7/2020 (.6), 9/30/2020 (.3), 11/2/2020 (.2), 11/20/2020 (.5), 11/20/20 (.2), 12/1/2020 (1.8), 12/2/2020 (.2), 12/4/2020 (.3), 1/15/2021 (.4), 7/6/2021 (.3), 7/30/2021 (.3), 9/14/2021 (.8), 10/20/2021 (.2), 10/25/2021 (.6), 12/13/2021 (.4), 12/20/2021 (.3), 1/14/2022 (1), and 1/10/2022 (.4)). Eliminating these entries results in a 12.7 hour reduction of Mr. Tapper's time, leaving Mr. Tapper with 100.3 remaining hours.
With that said, the court turns to the excessiveness of Mr. Tapper's claimed time spent on this case. During this litigation, Mr. Tapper drafted a demand letter, conducted initial research, prepared a complaint and summons, corresponded with opposing counsel, responded to a motion to dismiss or transfer venue, attended a brief hearing, prepared a motion for entry of default, and prepared motions for default judgment. Mr. Tapper represents that the time spent on these tasks was reasonable and necessary to achieve the results obtained in this action. The court generally agrees with Mr. Tapper but finds that his requested time is excessive in one respect.
Mr. Tapper requests fees for time spent on the First Motion for Default Judgment, but not for time spend on the Second Motion for Default Judgment. The court considers this request reasonable.
Mr. Tapper billed 8 hours for drafting, reviewing, and corresponding with opposing counsel about motions for extensions of time. Tapper Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, Exs. 10-11 (9/30/2020 (.3), 10/5/2020 (.6), 11/17/2020 (2.8), 12/2/2020 (.3), 12/3/2020 (.8), 1/19/2021 (.3), 1/27/2021 (1.4), 6/23/2021 (.4), 7/12/2021 (.4), 7/13/2021 (.2), 7/27/2021 (.5)). Reutov sought one extension, and Tatanca filed nine unopposed motions for extension of time, each no more than a half page long. Given the brevity and simplicity of these unopposed motions, 8 hours is excessive and unreasonable. The court finds that billing 2 hours total for these extension-related tasks is reasonable and deducts 6 hours from Mr. Tapper's time. This deduction leaves Mr. Tapper with 94.3 compensable hours.
3. Calculation of the Lodestar
The court finds $32,533.50 in attorney fees reasonable and calculated as follows: C. Tapper: $345 x 94.30 hours = $32.533.50 (113 less 12.7 hours for clerical work and 6 hours for excessive time).
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, Reutov's second motion for an order of default judgment (ECF No. 55) should be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The court recommends entering judgment for Reutov in the amount of $8,492 and granting attorney fees of $32,533.50.
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to Judge Mosman. Objections, if any, are due within fourteen days. If no objections are filed, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. If objections are filed, a response is due within fourteen days. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.