Opinion
# 2013-049-035 Claim No. 115186 Motion No. M-83062
06-28-2013
RETAMOZZO v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
Synopsis
Case information
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ ¦UID: ¦2013-049-035 ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Claimant(s): ¦ARMAND RETAMOZZO ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Claimant short ¦RETAMOZZO ¦ ¦name: ¦ ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Footnote (claimant¦ ¦ ¦name) : ¦ ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Defendant(s): ¦THE STATE OF NEW YORK ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Footnote ¦ ¦ ¦(defendant name) :¦ ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Third-party ¦ ¦ ¦claimant(s): ¦ ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Third-party ¦ ¦ ¦defendant(s): ¦ ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Claim number(s): ¦115186 ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Motion number(s): ¦M-83062 ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Cross-motion ¦ ¦ ¦number(s): ¦ ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Judge: ¦DAVID A. WEINSTEIN ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Claimant's ¦Armand Retamozzo, Pro Se ¦ ¦attorney: ¦ ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Defendant's ¦Eric T. Schneiderman, New York State Attorney General ¦ ¦attorney: ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦By: Janet L. Polstein, Assistant Attorney General ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Third-party ¦For Nonparties Meggan Dodd and Frederick Hartwell: Office ¦ ¦defendant's ¦of the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York ¦ ¦attorney: ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦By: Karl J. Ashanti, Esq. ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Signature date: ¦June 28, 2013 ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦City: ¦Albany ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Comments: ¦ ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Official citation:¦ ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦Appellate results:¦ ¦ +------------------+----------------------------------------------------------¦ ¦See also ¦ ¦ ¦(multicaptioned ¦ ¦ ¦case) ¦ ¦ +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Decision
Claimant Armand Retamozzo filed the instant claim on April 29, 2008, seeking to hold defendant State of New York liable for damages pursuant to the Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act of 1984, codified as section 8-b of the Court of Claims Act. He alleges that on April 28, 2004, he was convicted of and served time in prison for criminal possession of a controlled substance (ecstasy pills or MDMA) in the second and third degrees. The conviction was reversed by the Appellate Division, First Department on October 18, 2005 (see People v Retamozzo, 25 AD3d 73 [1st Dept 2005]), and Retamozzo was acquitted of all charges on May 5, 2006, following retrial. Retamozzo maintains that he did not commit the offense for which he was incarcerated.
At issue in the present motion are two subpoenas ad testificandum Retamozzo has served on employees of nonparty Office of the New York City Special Narcotics Prosecutor ("SNP"). Those subpoenas, which were signed by the Court on January 11, 2013 pursuant to CPLR 2302, seek the testimony of Meggan Dodd and Frederick Hartwell (collectively "movants"). Dodd provided claimant, via a letter dated September 25, 2012 (the "September 25 letter"), with documents responsive to a subpoena duces tecum claimant had served on the New York County District Attorney (NYCDA), and which was referred by it to SNP. Hartwell was the prosecutor in Retamozzo's two criminal trials.
CPLR 2302(a) and (b) require Court approval before an unrepresented party can serve a subpoena. The order approving claimant's request to serve subpoenas stated that nothing in such approval "is intended to indicate any view regarding any issue that the NYCDA . . . may raise in regard to the propriety of these subpoenas, or any privilege they may assert, should [it] move to quash the subpoenas in whole or in part in accordance with the CPLR" (Retamozzo v State of New York, UID No. 2012-049-009 [Ct Cl, Weinstein, J., Feb. 9, 2012]).
The subpoenas were accompanied by a notice of circumstances or reasons disclosure is sought or required. In addition to certain general statements regarding the importance of the information sought, the document listed the following as the specific reasons, among others, as to claimant's need for Dodd's testimony:
"(1) that this action involves questions concerning the authenticity of the non-original items you mailed to Armand Retamozzo on 25 September 2012 . . . ; (2) that this action involves questions concerning the date and time of the locations depicted in the photographs you mailed to Retamozzo on 25 September 2012 purportedly responding to the aforementioned subpoena; (3) that this action involves questions concerning the identity of the photographer(s) of the photographs you mailed to Retamozzo. . . purportedly responding to the aforementioned subpoena; (4) that this action involves questions concerning whether you were required to produce the items identified in the aforementioned subpoena; (5) that this action involves questions concerning whether you produced all of the items identified in the aforementioned subpoena; (6) that this action involves questions concerning the identity of the items called for in the aforementioned subpoena which you have not yet produced; (7) that this action involves questions concerning the identity of the custodian or other qualified witness charged with the responsibility of maintaining the items identified in the aforementioned subpoena which you have not yet produced; (8) that this action involves questions concerning the specific factual basis of your objections to producing some of the items identified in the aforementioned subpoena; (9) that this action involves questions concerning whether your office has already waived the objections you have asserted in response to the aforementioned subpoena; (10) that this action involves questions concerning whether non-privileged portions of the items identified in the aforementioned subpoena can be produced without revealing the portions which you believe are privileged; [and] (11) that this action involves questions concerning whether your office has in its possession, custody or control, items showing, or tending to show, that Retamozzo did not commit the crimes he stood accused of under, or in connection with, New York County Indictment No. 1605/03 . . . ."Claimant's statement of reasons also set forth certain legal propositions stated in the CPLR and (in item 15) various questions about the alleged underlying offenses at issue in this action, such as whether "Retamozzo constructively possessed a certain controlled substance in or near the vicinity of Washington Square Park on 8 January 2003, . . . whether Retamozzo was approached by a confidential informant in or near the vicinity of Washington Square Park on 8 January 2003, [and] how much money Retamozzo physically possessed in or near the vicinity of Washington Square Park on 8 January 2003."
In regard to Retamozzo's reasons for seeking the testimony of Mr. Hartwell, claimant listed items (1), (11) and (15) as set forth above, and further added a question concerning "the identity, reliability and credibility of the confidential informant involved in the 8 January 2003 RIP operation."
Hartwell and Dodd moved by Order to Show Cause to quash the subpoenas pursuant to CPLR 2304, which order was signed by the Court on February 14, 2013. In a memorandum of law accompanying that motion, movants argue that they have "no relevant knowledge" of the information sought in the subpoenas. In addition, Hartwell and Dodd contend that Retamozzo failed to show that he "is unable to obtain the information from alternative sources" or "through other channels of discovery" (Mem. in Support at 2).
In support of those contentions, the motion papers include Dodd's and Hartwell's affirmations. In the former, Dodd states that she had no involvement with this matter except that she prepared and served the SNP's document production in response to Retamozzo's subpoena duces tecum, in her capacity as SNP's "civil litigation liaison" (Dodd. Aff. ¶ 7). As to Hartwell, he acknowledges that he was the Assistant Special Narcotics Prosecutor who prosecuted both of claimant's criminal trials (Hartwell Aff. ¶ 5). Nonetheless, he attests that he never met the confidential informant, nor is he aware of his identity (id.). He further denies any knowledge regarding many of the questions raised in Retamozzo's Notice of Circumstances.
According to Dodd's letter accompanying the document production, although the subpoena was initially served on the NYCDA, it was forwarded to SNP, which held the relevant records.
A hearing was conducted via teleconference on the record on February 14, 2013. I indicated at the hearing that I would sign the Order to Show Cause, and that the testimony would be adjourned to allow the parties to brief the motion to quash. A signed copy of the Order was mailed and faxed to counsel for Hartwell and Dodd, and the order directed that it be served on claimant that day. Under circumstances discussed in more detail below, while the unsigned order was served on claimant via e-mail that day, the signed version was not sent to him until February 20.
Claimant responded to the motion to quash with his own affidavit in opposition. In that submission, he raises a series of procedural objections to the motion, arguing that it was untimely served, and procedurally defective in failing to attach the subpoenas or an affirmation showing the parties had conferred in good faith before the motion was filed. In addition, he argues that various discovery rulings have prevented him from obtaining the information he now seeks from Dodd and Hartwell. Finally, he contends that various representations by Dodd in the September 25 letter regarding her role in collecting the documents and certain facts regarding the evidence used against Retamozzo, demonstrate her personal knowledge of the facts of his case. He makes no rebuttal regarding Hartwell's denial of such knowledge.
Defendant also filed a response to the motion to quash, in which it took no position thereon. Movants filed papers in reply to claimant, and he responded with a sur-reply with the Court's leave.
Discussion
A. Procedural Challenges
As an initial matter, I address the various procedural challenges claimant makes to the motion before me.
First, claimant contends that the motion is defective for failing to append an affirmation stating that movants had conferred with claimant in good faith in an effort to resolve the issues set forth in the motion before it was filed, in violation of 22 NYCRR § 202.7. That rule, however, applies to Supreme Court and County Courts, and is not set forth in the rules governing the Court of Claims (see Johnson v State of New York, UID No. 2011-038-504 [Ct Cl, DeBow, J., Feb. 10, 2011] ["In the Court of Claims, an affirmation of good faith effort to resolve a discovery dispute is not required as a predicate to filing a motion addressed to disclosure"]) . While the rules of this Court do require a conference with the judge before a discovery motion may be "placed on the calendar" (NYCRR § 206.8[b]), that occurred in this case, as the motion schedule was established only after a conference before the Court on February 14, 2013. Thus claimant cannot rebut the motion to quash on this ground.
Court of Claims decisions are available at http://www.nyscourtofclaims.state.ny.us.
Second, claimant asserts that the motion is "defective" because movants failed to attach the subpoenas signed by the Court to the motion. He does not cite any authority for this proposition, and none is apparent. The Court has a copy of the subpoenas before it, and Retamozzo, who prepared and served them, has them as well. Thus, their absence from the moving papers neither prejudiced claimant, nor bars the Court from ruling on this motion.
Third, claimant argues that the movants' failure to serve the motion to quash until after the return date (and after the February 14 date set forth in the executed Order to Show Cause) compels denial of this motion.
The relevant chronology of events was as follows: The subpoenas ultimately signed by the Court were served some time in January 2013, and they scheduled depositions for February 15 (Dodd) and February 22 (Hartwell). On February 11, movants sent a proposed order to show cause by facsimile to the Court. I conducted a conference on the record at 3 PM on February 14, the date before the subpoena on Dodd was returnable. As noted above, I indicated at the conference that I would sign the order to show cause, and that the depositions would be adjourned without date pending briefing on this motion.
Following the call, by letter sent on February 14, the Court sent counsel for movants a signed version of the Order to Show Cause by fax and regular mail, stating that it should be served on claimant. Copies of the letter were also provided (without attachments), to defendant and claimant.
In a reply brief submitted with the present motion, movants state that they served an executed copy of the Order to Show Cause by counsel "the same day they received it from the Court" (Movants' Br. at 7 [emphasis in original]). In support of this assertion, movants append an email by Assistant Corporation Counsel Karl Ashanti dated February 21, 2013, which states that a signed copy of the Order to Show Cause is attached (Movants' Reply Br. Ex. D). Elsewhere in movants' reply submission, their counsel states that they "did not come into possession of an executed copy of the Order to Show Cause until February 21, 2103" (Reply Br. at 8 [emphasis in original]).
CPLR 2304 requires that a motion to quash a subpoena be made "promptly," which has been construed to mean "generally" that the motion must be made before the return date of the subpoena (Matter of Brunswick Hosp. Ctr. v Hynes, 52 NY2d 333, 339 [1981]). The untimely service of such a motion is grounds for its denial (see Securities Settlement Corp. v Johnpoll, 128 AD2d 429 [1st Dept 1987] [denying motion to quash because, inter alia, motion was commenced on the return date of the subpoena]). Claimant argues that because a motion brought on order to show cause is "made" when the order is served (see CPLR 2211), and movants failed to serve the signed order until after the return date of the subpoena (and the date provided in the Court's order), the motion must be denied.
For their part, movants do not make clear in their submission what exactly transpired in regard to their receipt of the Order to Show Cause. Their brief does not state whether their counsel received the Court's fax on February 14 (although the implication of counsel's representations is that he did not), nor does it present any evidence (such as a date-stamped copy of the Order) regarding when and how they ultimately received the signed Order. But even assuming that a signed order was received by movants' counsel on February 14, and for reasons undisclosed was not served at that time, it would not preclude consideration of the merits of this motion.
As noted above, a conference call was held on the Order to Show Cause on February 14, the day before the Dodd deposition was initially scheduled. During that call, I stated that the deposition would be postponed without date pending consideration of the motion, and that I would sign the proposed Order. The return date of the subpoena had, in short, already been adjourned by the time the Order was served. Moreover, claimant received a copy of the Order, albeit unsigned, prior to February 15. He does not assert that he suffered any prejudice from the delay in service of the executed order. Rather, claimant has had ample opportunity to oppose the motion to quash in the same manner as if he had received a signed, rather than unsigned, copy of the Order on February 14 (see People v Duran, 32 Misc 3d 225, 227 [Crim Ct Kings County, 2011] [movant's challenge to timeframe in which subpoena was served "rendered moot" by the fact that it "has taken advantage of a full and fair opportunity" to oppose the subpoena]).
In other words, it would elevate form over substance - without any apparent, constructive purpose - to deny the application on the ground that movants initially provided only an unsigned version of an order that claimant knew was to be signed, on the day directed by the Court. In any case, the Court of Appeals makes clear in Brunswick that the principle that a motion to quash be made prior to the return date set forth on the subpoena is a "general" rule (52 NY2d at 339), not an iron principle that is to be obeyed in all circumstances, regardless of prejudice or the materiality of any defect. For these reasons, I will not reject this motion on the technical ground that only the unsigned version was served prior to the (already adjourned) date set forth on Dodd's subpoena.
I proceed, then, to consider the merits of the motion before me.
B. The Merits
As with all discovery demands, a party seeking to subpoena testimony from a third party must show that the information sought is material and necessary to the action (CPLR 3101[a]; Conte v County of Nassau, 87 AD3d 558, 559 [2d Dept 2011]). Where disclosure is sought from a nonparty, the requirements imposed on the party seeking disclosure are "more stringent" (Velez v Hunts Point Multi-Serv. Ctr., Inc., 29 AD3d 104, 108 [1st Dept 2006]). In such cases, movants must also show that the information is "not obtainable from other sources" (Reich v Reich, 36 AD3d 506 [1st Dept 2007]; Tannebaum v City of New York, 30 AD3d at 358-59 [1st Dept 2006]; see also Menkes v Beth Abraham Servs., 89 AD3d 647, 648 [1st Dept 2011] [upholding quashal of subpoena ad testificandum on non-party where plaintiff "failed to demonstrate that the information sought . . . could not be obtained from other sources"]).
Various New York State cases contain the proposition that relevance is generally not a ground for quashing a subpoena, or that the burden of showing relevance is nominal (see infra n 6). While the First Department still sets a minimal threshold for relevance in regard to document subpoenas (e.g. Ledonne v Orsid Realty Corp., 83 AD3d 598, 599 [1st Dept 2011] [party seeking to quash subpoena on materiality grounds must show matters sought are "utterly irrelevant"]; Velez v Hunts Point Multi-Serv. Ctr., Inc., 29 AD3d 104 [1st Dept 2006][same]), First Department cases have quashed subpoenas for failure to showing the materiality of non-party testimony (see e.g. Tannenbaum, 30 AD3d 357, 358 [1st Dept 2006] [upholding decision quashing third-party testimonial subpoena for failure to show testimony was relevant and could not be obtained from other sources]; see also MHA Inc. v Consulting for Architects, 244 AD2d 169, 169-70 [1st Dept 1997] [upholding quashal of subpoena on relevance grounds])
In BAII Banking Corp. v Northville Indust. Corp., (204 AD2d 223 [1st Dept 1994]), the First Department appeared to dispense with the requirement that a party seeking disclosure from non parties demonstrate that it is not available from other sources, and found the showing of materiality provided for by CPLR 3101(a)(4) (governing non party discovery) to be "a nominal one." As discussed in BAII, CPLR 3101 required a showing of "special circumstances" to permit the subpoena on a non-party, but that language was removed in a 1984 amendment. Prior to that amendment, the First Department set a very low threshold for meeting the standards of 3101(a)(4), and according to BAII, the amendment meant the section should be construed in an "even more generous" manner (204 AD2d at 225). As cited above, however, more recent cases - albeit without discussing BAII - have found that a higher burden is still applicable to those seeking discovery from third parties (see Matter of Troy Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v Town of Nassau, 80 AD3d 199, 202 n* [3d Dept 2010] [discussing evolution of First Department caselaw; while Court once applied same standard to non parties as to parties, it has recently recognized that "more stringent requirements" are applicable to the latter] [citations omitted]).
The showing of relevance must be based on something "better than conjecture," and a subpoena cannot be used to conduct a "fishing expedition" (Matter of County of Nassau v Sullivan, 194 AD2d 236, 239 [2d Dept 1993]). The determination of whether a subpoena should be quashed is within the Court's discretion (Conte v County of Nassau, 87 AD3d 558, 559 [2d Dept 2011] [citations omitted]).
While Retamozzo sets forth numerous areas of information he seeks to explore with the two SNP witnesses (see supra pp 2-3), they boil down to several general categories: First, he seeks to question the witnesses of the specifics facts and circumstances of the events that led to his initial arrest and conviction (i.e., item 15 of the Dodd subpoena, and item 4 of the Hartwell subpoena). Second, he seeks information regarding the manner in which the documents provided to him were located and produced (i.e., item 5 of the Dodd subpoena and item 3 of the Hartwell subpoena). Third, he seeks responses to various legal questions (i.e., item 12 of Ms. Dodd's subpoena).
Movants aver that they lack any personal knowledge of the facts underlying the events at issue in claimant's criminal trials. Dodd's affirmation states that her only involvement in this matter was her collection of documents responsive to Retamozzo's subpoena. While Hartwell was the prosecutor in Retamozzo's criminal case, he states that he was not present at the scene of claimant's arrest, does not know the identity of the confidential informant, and therefore has no relevant testimony concerning the facts underlying the conduct for which he was tried. For his part, claimant has not explained why Hartwell has any information that could not be obtained from the record of the two trial proceedings or the documents produced by the SNP in this proceeding, or in response to claimant's subpoena duces tecum (see Menkes, 89 AD3d at 648 [granting motion to quash testimonial subpoena against nonparty witness, where evidence could be obtained from that party's "own records"]).
Moreover, nothing in claimant's submissions demonstrates that the proposed witnesses have any personal knowledge relating to the questions at the heart of this matter, i.e. whether Retamozzo is innocent of the offense for which he was incarcerated, and did not by his acts bring about his own conviction (see Court of Claims Act § 8-b[5][c]-[d]). While Hartwell is clearly familiar with Retamozzo's case, the record before me is barren as to any evidence that he has personal knowledge of any fact relevant to claimant's guilt or innocence. Nor is there anything in the submissions before me showing that Dodd has personal knowledge relevant to this case except as to her conduct of a search for documents. Under these circumstances, Retamozzo cannot subpoena these witnesses to question them about the events at issue at Retamozzo's criminal trials (see Matter of Concerned Tenants of 823 Park Ave. v Salberg, 284 AD2d 276, 277 [1st Dept 2001] [proposed witness's testimony on accuracy of data not relevant, "since she merely analyzed the data and has no first-hand knowledge of their accuracy"]; see also MHA Inc., 244 AD2d at 169 ["Defendant's subpoenas were properly quashed on the ground that plaintiff's customers do not have any information relevant to the quality of the services performed"]).
This holding is consistent with other decisions addressing testimonial subpoenas served upon prosecutors or other law enforcement officials. As a general rule, courts have upheld such subpoenas when the prosecutor's own conduct, or matters of which he or she has direct personal knowledge, are at issue in the cause of action (see Brown v City of Syracuse, 648 F Supp 2d 461, 467 [ND NY 2009] [assistant district attorney could give "probative" testimony on circumstances that led to guilty plea, when those circumstances were relevant to plaintiff's subsequent firing at issue in the case]; People v Slochowsky, 116 Misc 2d 1069, 1074 [Sup Ct, Kings County 1982] [claimant can subpoena testimony from District Attorney to question on allegation of prosecutorial misconduct: "[t]his is not an ordinary case where this court can conclude as a matter of fact that the District Attorney has no personal knowledge"]). When, on the other hand, the prosecutor's conduct is not relevant to the underlying issues, quashal is appropriate (see Smith v City of New York, 49 AD3d 400 [1st Dept 2008] [quashing subpoena on District Attorney because allegations of prosecutor's motives are not "material and necessary" to malicious prosecution claim]). In this claim, where claimant must demonstrate his innocence, the conduct of the prosecutors is not generally at issue, and claimant does not show otherwise in the papers he has filed on this motion.
Claimant has, however, presented one area of questioning that is material to this action, and of which a witness appears to have personal knowledge. He seeks to question Dodd as to the nature of the records the SNP maintained in regard to his case; how it gathered records for production in response to his subpoena; and whether all relevant records have been produced.
The "material and necessary" standard encompasses any information "bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity" (Andon v 302-304 Mott St. Assoc., 94 NY2d 740, 746 [2000][internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Under this standard, the information sought during discovery need not itself be admissible, provided it "may lead to discovery of admissible evidence" (Prink v Rockefeller Ctr., 48 NY2d 309, 314 n 1 [1979], quoting Baxter v Orans, 63 AD2d 875 [1st Dept 1978] [allowing discovery of "testimony or documents which, while themselves inadmissible, may lead to the disclosure of admissible proof"]). The exploration of the completeness and authenticity of a nonparty's production of documents, how such documents were maintained and whether there may be other materials available is, by these criteria, material to this action.
Indeed, movants do not argue that such testimony is not relevant, but rather that it can be obtained "through the normal mechanisms available to a claimant" such as "interrogatories, document requests and document subpoenas" (Dodd Aff. ¶ 9). Interrogatories are, however, generally not available against nonparties (see Price v State of New York, UID No. 2004-032-030 [Ct Cl, Hard, J., May 12, 2004]. Moreover, the SNP has already produced documents, and it is not clear how claimant could determine the sufficiency or method of such production by asking for a further document production.
Price notes that some judges have allowed interrogatories to be served on non parties by Court order. I can find no authority, however, for the proposition that a testimonial subpoena may be denied on the ground that the party should obtain such information via interrogatories instead.
For these reasons, I find that the subpoena seeks material and necessary information in to the manner in which the SNP produced documents relevant to the subpoena. Claimant has made no showing, however, as to why two witnesses must be made available for such purpose. Indeed, as noted above, his brief only addresses Dodd's knowledge of this issue. Further, the questioning of Dodd may demonstrate that the testimony of Hartwell on this question is merely duplicative (see Reich, 36 AD3d at 507 [quashing subpoena where proponent of subpoena "has not shown that the information sought . . . is not obtainable from other sources," such as other deponent]). For that reason, the motion is held in abeyance as to Hartwell until after claimant has had the opportunity to question Dodd, at which time the Court will allow parties to make such additional arguments on this issue as it deems appropriate.
In making this ruling, I do not find that all areas listed on claimant's subpoenas are appropriate areas for exploration. Indeed, several topics appear to concern matters of law that are clearly inappropriate for deposition. Moreover, as noted above, claimant cannot properly question Dodd on the underlying facts of claimant's criminal case. Any such objections, however, as well any assertion of privilege, are appropriately raised during the deposition, not in advance thereof in a motion to quash (see New York State Commn. on Govt. Integrity v Congel, 156 AD2d 274 [1st Dept 1989]).
In light of the foregoing, the motion to quash the subpoenas is denied in part (as to Dodd subject to the limitations set forth above), and held in abeyance as to Hartwell. The parties, and counsel for movants, shall appear for a conference at 26 Broadway, 10th Floor, New York, New York 10004, on August 15, 2013 at 3:30 p.m. to discuss the conduct of the deposition, including any judicial supervision that may be sought thereof (see CPLR 3104). In the event any party is unavailable on that date, they shall advise the Court in writing at least seven days in advance, so that an alternative time may be scheduled.
June 28, 2013
Albany, New York
DAVID A. WEINSTEIN
Judge of the Court of Claims
Papers Considered
1. Nonparties' Order to Show Cause to Quash Subpoenas, and supporting documents.
2. Defendant's Response to Third-Party's Order to Show Cause to Quash Subpoenas.
3. Claimant's Affidavit in Opposition to Motion to Quash Subpoenas, and supporting documents.
4. Nonparties' Letter dated April 2, 2013.
5. Claimant's Letter dated April 15, 2013.
6. Non-Parties Meggan Dodd and Frederick Hartwell's Memorandum of Law In Further Support of their Order to Show Cause Motion to Quash Judicial Subpoenas Ad Testificandum, and supporting documents.
7. Claimant's Rebuttal Affidavit in Further Opposition to Motion to Quash Subpoenas, and supporting documents.