Opinion
Civil Action 22-368
05-11-2022
ERIC L. RENN Plaintiff, v. GATEWAY REHAB of Aliquippa, PA, and JENNIFER DANIELS, LPN Defendants.
Nora Barry Fischer, District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ECF NO. 8
Lisa Pupo Lenihan, United States Magistrate Judge
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 8) be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
II. REPORT
A. Relevant Facts
Plaintiff Eric L. Renn (“Plaintiff”), currently an inmate at Beaver County Jail, has filed a Complaint against Gateway Rehab and its employee Jennifer Daniels for violating his rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for the unauthorized use of medical records under HIPPA. The Complaint alleges that Defendants conducted a warrant check for Plaintiff to receive treatment and Plaintiff was accepted to enter treatment. Then, on the third day, Plaintiff alleges that the local police arrested him at Defendant's facility and that the Defendants gave the police a copy of Plaintiff's rapid drug screen that would be used against Plaintiff at trial.
This Court must review Plaintiff's Complaint in accordance with the amendments promulgated in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). Under the PLRA, courts have an affirmative duty to screen and review prisoner complaints filed by inmates who seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Federal courts are granted the authority to sua sponte dismiss claims in in forma pauperis proceedings if the court determines that a claim is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A, 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). Plaintiff requested and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Thus, his allegations must be reviewed in accordance with the directives provided in the PLRA.
B. Legal Standards
The Court must liberally construe the factual allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint because pro se pleadings, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation omitted); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). In addition, the Court should “‘apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.'” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)).
A complaint that fails to state a claim must be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 556 (2007) (rejecting the traditional 12 (b)(6) standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The court must accept as true all allegations of the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir. 1985).
In reviewing complaints under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e), a federal court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). D'Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, 436 Fed.Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
As the Supreme Court held in Twombly, in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 550 U.S. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To state a claim for relief under this provision, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct in the complaint was committed by a person or entity acting under color of state law and that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Piecknick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). Section 1983 does not create rights; it simply provides a remedy for violations of those rights created by the United States Constitution or federal law. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996).
To determine if a defendant is acting under color of state law depends upon whether there is “such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Concepcion v. Tonya B., et al., Civ. A. No. 21-3434, 2021 WL 4592161, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 2021) (quoting Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005)); see also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). The constitutional standard can only be invoked when the government “is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (emphasis in original).
C. Analysis
Plaintiff's Complaint does not contain any allegations from which the Court could conclude that the Defendants are state actors. As part of the entry process, Plaintiff alleges that a warrant check was conducted. During this warrant check, Defendant Gateway Rehab discovered that there was an outstanding warrant for Plaintiff and contacted the local police. A positive drug test conducted by Defendant Jennifer Daniels was turned over to police. Because Defendant Gateway Rehab is a private rehabilitation facility and Defendant Jennifer Daniels is an employee of Gateway Rehab, they are not state actors under § 1983.
While the Plaintiff was arrested at Defendants' facility, Plaintiff's allegations are not sufficient to establish that the Defendants are state actors under § 1983. See Daniels v. Nw. Hum. Servs, No. 20-1736, 2021 WL 4166285, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 14, 2021) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of lawsuit against residential rehabilitation center and its employees where plaintiff alleged that individuals from state jails were sent to such residential treatment centers); Smith v. Alternative Counseling Servs., Civ. A. No. 21-0076, 2021 WL 492513, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2021) (“a privately run halfway house, its owners, and its employees - are not subject to liability under § 1983.”); Veeder v. TRI-CAP, Civ. A. No. 17-11690, 2020 WL 1867212, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 967481 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2020) (“ ‘drug treatment facilities that treat individuals pursuant to a condition of parole are not performing a public function.' ”) (quoting Porter v. Game, Civ. A. No. 19-1408, 2020 WL 127580, at *2 (E.D. N.Y. Jan. 9, 2020)).
The fact that the Defendant Gateway Rehab contacted the police does not make them a state actor because there was no concerted effort or conspiracy between the police and Defendants to have the Plaintiff arrested. Carey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 823 F.2d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir. 1987). Defendants conducted a warrant check and became aware of an outstanding warrant, which was reported to the police. Disclosing the location of an individual is not solely within the power of the state. Defendants did not exercise any powers that are traditionally the powers of the government nor was the government responsible for the actions taken by the Defendants.
Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendants are state actors under the provision.
1. Leave to Amend the Complaint Would be Futile
This Court recognizes that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that, in civil rights cases, a court must give a plaintiff the opportunity to amend a deficient complaint-regardless of whether the plaintiff requests to do so-when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim, unless doing so would be inequitable or futile. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).
Here, any attempt to amend would be futile. Defendants are not state actors, and therefore, Plaintiff is unable to state a claim against them pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)&(C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.