Opinion
No. CV 04 4000554S
January 4, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs are the owners of property located at 54 Clark Hill Road, Prospect, Connecticut. The defendants are the owners of property located at 59 Clark Hill Road in Prospect, essentially across the street from the plaintiff's property. The instant action involves the placement of the defendants' mailbox along the right-of-way on the plaintiff's property. Clark Hill Road exists in a rural post office delivery route. All of the mailboxes are located on the plaintiffs' side of Clark Hill Road. Initially, the defendants' mailbox was located in the corner of the plaintiffs' property, adjacent to the street line, opposite the location of the plaintiffs' driveway. In November 2003, the defendants unilaterally moved their mailbox to the middle of the plaintiffs' front yard, adjacent to the street line. The plaintiffs requested that the defendants return the mailbox to its original location. The defendants refused. Accordingly, on August 2, 2004, the plaintiffs brought this action seeking an injunction related to placement of the defendants' mailbox and monetary damages for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress associated therewith. This Court initially heard the case on the application for a temporary injunction. The Court continued the hearing and scheduled a full trial on the matter. In the interim, defendants have filed the instant motion to dismiss. Defendants claim that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds: (1) that the United States Postal Service has the exclusive authority over these issues, and (2) that the plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies with the United States Postal Service. The matter was argued before the Court on January 3, 2005 wherein the Court took the papers in order to consider the legal issues raised by the parties in their arguments and briefs.
II. DISCUSSION
Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. England v. Coventry, 183 Conn. 362-64, 439 A.2d 372 (1981). The claims made by the plaintiff determine whether federal jurisdiction excludes state jurisdiction. Shea v. First Federal Savings Loan Assn. Of New Haven, 184 Conn. 285 (1981). The plaintiffs do not invoke any federal statute or regulation in their complaint.
The doctrine of federal preemption is based upon the supremacy clause in Article VI of the United States Constitution. Under the supremacy clause, state laws that "interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution" are invalid. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). It involves a congressional intent to supplant state authority in a particular field. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977).
Section 8 of Article I of the United States Constitution vests Congress with the exclusive authority to establish post offices and post roads. Congress created the United States Postal Service to carry out the duties regarding the delivery of the mail. 39 U.S.C. Sec. 101(a) and 102 (1988). The postal service is required by Congress to maintain an efficient system of mail delivery nationwide. 39 U.S.C. Section 403. Pursuant to its postal powers, Congress may designate the route over which the mail shall be carried and what may be carried in the mail, and it may prescribe all measures necessary to secure the mail's speedy transit and prompt delivery. In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 12 S.Ct. 374, 36 L.Ed. 93 (1892).
In the case of Shea v. First Federal Savings Loan, supra at pp. 292-93, the Connecticut Supreme Court defined the parameters of federal preemption wherein it stated that: "Ordinarily a state's exercise of its police power is not superseded unless: (1) congress has clearly manifested an intent to exclusively occupy a field; (2) compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility; or (3) state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of congress." It is important to note that the possibility that federal law has preempted the substantive state law upon which a plaintiff has relied and that the averments are therefore not legally sufficient does not deprive a court of subject matter jurisdiction. "Therefore, unless Congress expressly vested jurisdiction exclusively in the federal courts we should presume state courts have concurrent jurisdiction." Id. at pp. 289-90.
Title 39 of the Code of Federal Regulations incorporates by reference what is known as the "Domestic Mail Manual." 39 CFR Section 11.1 (2004). Section D041.2.7 of the Domestic Mail Manual provides in relevant part:
Subject to state laws and regulations, a curbside mailbox must be placed to allow safe and convenient delivery by carriers without leaving their vehicles. The box must be on the right hand side of the road in the direction of travel of carriers on any new rural route or highway contract route, in all cases where traffic conditions are dangerous for the carriers to drive to the left to reach the box, or where their doing so would violate traffic laws and regulations.
Clearly, Congress intended that state law and regulations would concurrently apply to the issue of mailbox placement along rural routes. Therefore, the first class of the preemption test does not apply.
Likewise, the second class of the preemption test does not apply. This case does not present a situation where compliance with both federal and state law is a physical impossibility. The plaintiffs do not seek to move the mailbox to a location where it would not be in compliance with the applicable federal regulations. The plaintiffs seek to have the mailbox returned to its original location, where it was also in compliance with the applicable federal regulations.
This case does not fall within the third class of cases which justify federal preemption. There is nothing in the application of Connecticut's common law regarding property rights, injunctive relief, rights-of-way and torts which would present an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the federal regulations regarding mailbox placement.
The parties have cited one Connecticut 1945 lower court decision dealing with this issue. In Gomez v. Ursone, 13 Conn.Sup. 359 (1945), the plaintiff sought to remove the defendant's mailbox from her property entirely. Unlike the instant case, a representative of the postmaster had designated the specific location for the placement of the defendant's mailbox, pursuant to a petition from the surrounding residents. The Court in Gomez deferred to the decision of the postmaster regarding the placement of the mailbox. Although the Gomez decision predates the Shea decision it would appear to this court that Gomez would not survive the scrutiny of any of the three classes of Shea, in that any contrary ruling of a state court would both frustrate the federal regulations, and be contrary to the direction of the postmaster. The present case does not present such an issue. The location of the mailbox was never directed by the postmaster and the mailbox is requested to remain on the same side of the street, so as not to impede the delivery of the mail.
It had been held that "only when state control involved a direct, physical interference with federal activities under the postal power or some direct immediate burden on the performance of postal functions will state regulation be deemed unconstitutional." Aldens, Inc. v. Packel, 379 F.Sup. 521, 531 (1974).
Defendants have cited the cases of Black v. City of Berea, 32 N.E.2d, 1, 2 (1941), and Miller v. Nichols, 526 A.2d 794, 795 (1987), in support of their claim. Both cases are distinguishable on their facts. In Black, the court held that the placement of the mailbox did not constitute a nuisance, because the postal regulations required the mailbox to be placed close enough to the road so that the carrier did not have to leave his postal vehicle. Miller concerned a case wherein the plaintiff did not want a neighbor's mailbox on his property after the post office directed that it must be located on the plaintiff's side of the road.
Plaintiffs have cited the case of Lawson v. Simple, 319 Ark. 543, 893 S.W.2d 757 (1995), which involves an identical fact pattern as the instant case. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the doctrine of preemption did not apply to this similar fact pattern. The Court opined that "state court jurisdiction is barred only when the federal statutory or regulatory scheme expressly provides that the exclusive jurisdiction is in the federal district courts or a federal agency. State courts can, and often due, interpret federal law. Accordingly, we do not dismiss for lack of state court jurisdiction."
The defendant's claim of plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies is also without merit. The regulations cited deal with situations wherein the postmaster has directed the location of a mailbox and the homeowner may appeal that decision through an administrative process. The instant case does not relate to a decision by the postmaster regarding the location of the mailbox.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that the preemption doctrine does not apply to this case and the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust any administrative remedies, since they were inapplicable to this situation. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is denied.
THE COURT
Dennis Eveleigh, Judge