Opinion
Civil Action No. 06-004-KAJ.
September 22, 2006
MEMORANDUM ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Before me is a Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award, filed by Remote Solution Co., Ltd. ("Remote Solution"). (Docket Item ["D.I."] 1; the "Motion".) The respondent, FGH Liquidating Corp. f/k/a Contec Corporation ("Contec"), opposed the Motion and requested a confirmation of the arbitration award. (D.I. 10 at 1-2.) For the reasons that follow, the Motion will be denied in all respects.
II. DISCUSSION
Before reaching the merits of the parties' arguments, I am obliged to address the question of subject matter jurisdiction. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Crown Cork Seal Co., 905 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that the court is "obliged to consider, sua sponte, whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction . . ."). Remote Solution claims that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the Motion pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (D.I. 1 at ¶ 5.) However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Federal Arbitration Act "does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 n. 32 (1983). Rather, "there must be diversity of citizenship or some other independent basis for federal jurisdiction." Id. Therefore, contrary to Remote Solution's assertion, the Federal Arbitration Act does not confer the subject matter jurisdiction necessary for a district court to issue an order vacating or modifying an arbitration award. See Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1471 (11th Cir. 1997); Harry Hoffman Printing, Inc. v. Graphic Commc'ns Int'l Union, Local 261, 912 F.2d 608, 611 (2d Cir. 1990).
One of the holdings of the Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. case has been called into question based on subsequent Congressional action. See Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc., 128 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1) "upsets the principal holding of Moses Cone"). However, that is not relevant to the present point.
Remote Solution did not plead diversity jurisdiction or any independent basis for federal jurisdiction other than the Federal Arbitration Act. (D.I. 1 at ¶ 5.) A federal court may, however, "sustain jurisdiction when an examination of the entire complaint reveals a proper basis for assuming subject matter jurisdiction other than one that has been improperly asserted by the pleader . . ." 5 Charles Alan Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1206 at 114-15 (3d ed. 2004); see also Davis v. Ohio Barge Line, Inc., 697 F.2d 549, 552 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that the court can independently ascertain whether the complaint sets forth any basis for subject matter jurisdiction). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), a federal district court has original jurisdiction in cases between "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state" in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. However, the Motion fails to demonstrate that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied. The Motion only sets forth a specific amount in controversy with regard to the claim that the arbitrator incorrectly determined the offset to which Remote Solution was entitled. (D.I. 1 at ¶ 7.g.) Specifically, the arbitrator found the offset to be $620,038.00, and Remote Solution argues that it should have been $692,512.27. (Id.) Therefore, the alleged amount in controversy is only $72,474.27, which is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of diversity jurisdiction. Since the Federal Arbitration Act does not create federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the Motion fails to establish the elements of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, I will deny the Motion.
In noting this conclusion, I do not imply that other requisites of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 have been met.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED.