Opinion
Opinion filed October 13, 1945.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Demurrer to deputy sheriff's bill of complaint seeking to recover additional compensation under a private act for service as an officer waiting on Court of General Sessions of Knox county, though somewhat vague and inartificial in form and language, was sufficient to raise question that the private act was invalid as class legislation and as in conflict with general law (Code 1932, secs. 10707(8), 10725 et seq.; Priv. Acts 1919, chap. 182).
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Chancellor had inherent power to deny relief on complaint seeking to recover additional compensation under a private act for services as an officer waiting on Court of General Sessions of Knox county, upon his own motion, where it appeared that a constitutional prohibition would thereby be violated (Code 1932, secs. 10707(8), 10725 et seq.; Priv. Acts 1919, chap. 182).
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The general rule that chancellor has inherent power to deny relief sought upon his own motion when it appeared to him that a constitutional prohibition would thereby be violated is especially applicable when public interest and revenues are involved.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Statutes.
The private act fixing compensation for deputy sheriff for serving as an officer waiting on Court of General Sessions of Knox county is invalid as "class legislation" and because in controversion of general law fixing compensation for such services (Code 1932, secs. 10707(8), 10725 et seq.; Priv. Acts 1919, chap. 182; Const. art. 11, sec. 8.)
FROM KNOX.Appeal from Chancery Court of Knox County. — HON. A.E. MITCHELL, Chancellor.
Suit by J.S. Remine against Knox County and others to recover additional compensation for services as an officer waiting on the Court of General Sessions of Knox County. From a decree sustaining demurrer to complaint, the complainant appeals. Affirmed.
THURMAN AILOR and R.M. VERTREES, both of Knoxville, for complainant, appellant here.
JAMES G. JOHNSON, of Knoxville, for defendant.
This is a suit by a deputy sheriff who has served as an officer waiting on the Court of General Sessions of Knox County and been paid three dollars per day as provided by subsection (8) of Code section 10707, the general fee law, to recover additional compensation in reliance upon Chapter 182 of the Private Acts of 1919 which fixes $3.50 as compensation for such services in Knox County. The chancellor sustained a demurrer and held the private act of 1919 unconstitutional as class legislation and because in controversion of the general law fixing compensation for such services. Remine appealed.
It appears that the chancellor followed particularly the recently published opinion by Mr. Justice GAILOR in the case of Somerville v. McCormick, 182 Tenn. 489, 187 S.W.2d 785, and authorities therein cited, and it is upon this authority that the appellee county now relies.
Learned counsel for Remine raise first the procedural question that the demurrer before the chancellor does not present the issue of constitutionality of this private act and that the chancellor was therefore without authority to pass thereon.
We cannot agree to this for two reasons. First, we think the demurrer as a whole, while somewhat vague and inartificial in form and language, raises the question that the private act in question is invalid because class legislation and in conflict with the general law. In the course of paragraph (b) of the demurrer it is said, "Complainant cannot resort to any special statute different from the regular salary law above referred to [Code section 10725 et seq.], to increase or change the amount fixed by him during the years that he claims additional compensation in the bill." And paragraph (b) reads, "The demurrants further demur and say that any amendment of this public act fixing salaries, undertaking to supplement the salaries of the sheriff, or his deputies, is class legislation and is unconstitutional and void." It is fees rather than salaries which are fixed by this "act," but this is not a material misnomer, both terms referring to compensation.
Second, it was within the inherent power of the chancellor to deny the relief sought upon his own motion when it appeared to him that a constitutional prohibition would thereby be violated. This is the generally recognized rule, which is especially applicable when the public interest and revenues are involved.
On the merits of the cause, there can be no doubt that this private act purported to award to this officer compensation in excess of that fixed by the general law; and, as said in Somerville v. McCormick, supra [ 182 Tenn. 489, 187 S.W.2d 788], "[the act] violated section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution in that it conferred special benefits on an individual," here a deputy sheriff.
The judgment is affirmed.