Opinion
February 25, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Donovan, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the appellant's motion is granted, the plaintiff's cross motion is denied, and the complaint is dismissed.
The complaint served by the plaintiff, wherein the defendant American Allsafe Company (hereinafter Allsafe) was referred to as John Doe Corporation No. 1 or 2, was insufficient to alert Allsafe to the fact that it was an intended defendant (cf., Tobin v St. Paul's Lutheran Evangelical Church, 136 Misc.2d 801). Therefore, it was jurisdictionally defective (see, Connell v Hayden, 83 A.D.2d 30, 34-36), and its service upon the sheriff did not serve to invoke the 60-day provision of CPLR 203 (b) (5) (i) (see, Frerk v Mercy Hosp., 99 A.D.2d 504, affd 63 N.Y.2d 635). Thus, the Supreme Court erred in denying Allsafe's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and in granting the plaintiff's cross motion to dismiss its first through fourth affirmative defenses that the action should be dismissed as barred by the Statute of Limitations, for lack of personal jurisdiction, and for failure to state a cause of action against Allsafe.
Furthermore, that branch of the plaintiff's cross motion which was purportedly for leave to amend the complaint to reflect Allsafe's name, was actually one to add a new party (see, Creative Cabinet Corp. v Future Visions Computer Store, 140 A.D.2d 483; see also, Berg v Mather Mem. Hosp., 131 A.D.2d 618), and was improperly granted after the Statute of Limitations had expired (see, Tabolt v KMZ Enters., 52 A.D.2d 995, affd 43 N.Y.2d 687). Thompson, J.P., Brown, Sullivan and Miller, JJ., concur.