Opinion
No. 13-02-220-CV
Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed December 16, 2004.
On appeal from the 148th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
Before Justices HINOJOSA, YAÑEZ, and CASTILLO.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this bill of review, appellant, Johnny G. Reed, appeals the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, Tropic Isles Homeowners Association ("Tropic Isles"). By various "issues," appellant challenges the order granting summary judgment and the findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the judgment. We affirm.
As this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court's decision and the basic reasons for it.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
Background
On September 22, 2000, appellant, a former president of Tropic Isles, filed a pro se "Motion for Judicial Review of Documentation or Instruments Purporting to Create a Lien or Claim" pursuant to section 51.903 of the government code. In his motion, appellant alleged that the documents establishing Tropic Isles's rights and responsibilities were fraudulent. Specifically, appellant challenged Tropic Isles's authority to assess fees for the maintenance and repair of canals, which constitute common areas within the development. Appellant's motion was filed and heard ex parte, which is permitted under the statute. On October 5, 2000, the trial court issued "findings" and signed an order. However, the court made no findings regarding the validity of the challenged documents. On December 5, 2000, the court received a letter from appellant, in which he notes that the court's order "makes no ruling" regarding the validity of the challenged documents. Appellant's letter requests that the trial court "check and initial" her findings. On December 12, 2000, the trial court issued a "revised" order, in which it found that the challenged documents are invalid.
See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 51.903 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
See id. § 51.903(c).
Tropic Isles received no notice of the proceedings and did not learn of the court's action until after the appellate deadline had passed. On February 2, 2001, Tropic Isles filed a bill of review, contending: (1) the trial court's December 12, 2000 "amended" order is void because it was issued outside the court's plenary jurisdiction to amend its earlier findings; and (2) the lack of service of process to Tropic Isles deprived it of an opportunity to present its meritorious defenses in the underlying action.
See id. § 51.903(e) (requiring copy of court's findings of fact and conclusions of law mailed to party who filed fraudulent lien or claim within seven days of date findings are entered).
On January 28, 2002, Tropic Isles filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the trial court lacked authority to amend its original order after thirty days had passed. On January 30, 2002, appellant filed a motion for summary judgment, in which he: (1) contends that the trial court's "incomplete" October 5, 2000 order was not a judgment, and that the court's "corrections" were merely administrative; and (2) requests sanctions against Tropic Isles. Following a hearing on February 20, 2002, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Tropic Isles on the grounds that the amended order was invalid because it was outside the court's plenary jurisdiction. The trial court also denied appellant's motion for summary judgment.
In its response to appellant's motion for summary judgment, Tropic Isles notes that appellant's motion was served by certified mail on January 30, 2002, twenty-one days before the scheduled hearing. Tropic Isles notes that if a motion for summary judgment and notice are to be served by mail, they must be mailed at least twenty-four days before the scheduled hearing. Tropic Isles argues that because appellant's motion is untimely, summary judgment must be denied.
The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which the court found that: (1) the October 5, 2000 order was a final order; (2) on December 12, 2001, the court attempted to amend the prior final order; and (3) appellant's motion for summary judgment was not supported by affidavits or other proper summary judgment evidence. In its conclusions of law, the trial court states that: (1) the December 12, 2001 order is void because it attempted to amend the prior order more than thirty days after the original order and beyond the court's plenary power; and (2) appellant failed to show as a matter of law that he was entitled to the relief sought in his motion for summary judgment and for sanctions.
Although the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law refer to the amended order as "December 12, 2001," the amended order is dated "December 12, 2000."
Standard of Review
When both parties move for summary judgment and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, the reviewing court should review the summary judgment evidence presented by both sides and determine all questions presented and render the judgment the trial court should have rendered. The reviewing court must affirm summary judgment if any of the summary judgment grounds are meritorious. We now turn to the evidence presented and consider whether summary judgment was properly granted.
Tex. Workers' Comp. Comm'n. v. Patient Advocates of Tex., Inc., 136 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. 2004).
Id.
Applicable Law
A trial court retains plenary power to grant a new trial or to vacate, modify, correct or reform a judgment within thirty days after the judgment is signed. Where no post-verdict motions are filed, a trial court's plenary power over a case generally ends thirty days after a final judgment is signed, and the trial court has no authority to set aside a judgment except by bill of review.
In re Dryden, 52 S.W.3d 257, 261 (Tex.App. 2001, orig. proceeding) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d); First Alief Bank v. White, 682 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Tex. 1984); Tex. Prop. Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. De Los Santos, 47 S.W.3d 584, 587 (Tex.App. 2001, no pet.)).
Id.
After a judgment has become final, the trial court may correct only clerical errors by nunc pro tunc judgment, but may not correct judicial errors. Whether an error is a clerical error or a judicial error is a question of law. To be clerical in nature, the error must be one that is not the result of judicial reasoning, evidence, or determination. The court can only correct the entry of a final written judgment that incorrectly states the judgment actually rendered. Even if the court renders judgment incorrectly, it cannot alter a written judgment that precisely reflects the incorrect rendition. Judicial errors are never correctable by the trial court after the court's jurisdiction expires.
Id. at 262 ( citing Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tex. 1986); Andrews v. Koch, 702 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Tex. 1986)).
Id.
Id.
Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 231-32.
Id. at 232.
Dryden, 52 S.W.3d at 262.
Here, appellant's December 5, 2000 letter to the trial court notes that in the original order, "none of the paragraphs in either finding has [ sic] been checked or initialed." The letter states that the order is not a valid court order because it "makes no ruling whatever." We hold there is no evidence to support any conclusion that the December 12, 2000 order was the result of corrected clerical errors. The differences between the October 5, 2000 and December 12, 2000 orders required judicial determination and reasoning.
See id.
Accordingly, we agree that the December 12, 2000 order is void because it was issued outside the trial court's plenary jurisdiction.
See id. at 261; TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d).
We hold that summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Tropic Isles. We AFFIRM the trial court's judgment.