Opinion
No. 422, 2003.
Submitted: January 16, 2004.
Decided: March 2, 2004.
Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Sussex County, Cr. A. Nos. IS01-02-0120; 0121; 0122; 0125; 0126; 0127; 0128; 0574.
Before BERGER, STEELE and JACOBS, Justices.
ORDER
This 2nd day of March 2004, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The defendant-appellant, Jerome Reed, filed an appeal from the Superior Court's August 6, 2003 order denying his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. We find no merit to the appeal. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
(2) In October 2001, Reed was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of Robbery in the First Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Kidnapping in the Second Degree, two counts of Burglary in the Second Degree, Felony Theft, Theft From a Senior, and Misdemeanor Criminal Mischief. Reed was subsequently sentenced as an habitual offender to a total of 66 years incarceration at Level V, to be followed by probation. Reed's convictions and sentences were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.
Reed v. State, Del. Supr., No. 641, 2001, Steele, J. (June 21, 2002).
(3) In this appeal, Reed claims that the Superior Court erred as a matter of law, first, by denying his motion for postconviction relief on the basis that he had not demonstrated that his counsel provided ineffective assistance and, second, by improperly injecting race into its order denying postconviction relief.
(4) In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a "strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990).
(5) Our review of the order denying Reed's motion for postconviction relief does not reflect any error of law on the part of the Superior Court. The Superior Court utilized the proper standard in determining whether Reed had demonstrated that his counsel provided ineffective assistance and properly determined, based upon the evidence in the record, that he had not. Moreover, the Superior Court's order does not reflect any improper references to race.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.