Summary
holding that the Nebraska APA was not applicable to a prison disciplinary proceeding wherein summary process was more appropriate
Summary of this case from L'Heureux v. State Dept. of CorrectionsOpinion
No. 42991.
Filed January 30, 1981.
1. Statutes. Specific statutory provisions relating to a particular subject control over general provisions. 2. Administrative Law: Prisons: Disciplinary Proceedings. The Nebraska Administrative Procedure Act has no application to prison disciplinary proceedings under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-4,109 to 83-4,123 (Reissue 1976). 3. Prisons: Disciplinary Proceedings. Disciplinary procedures in penal institutions are summary in nature and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal prosecution are not applicable to a prison disciplinary proceeding. Only the minimum requirements of procedural due process appropriate for the circumstances must be observed. 4. Administrative Law: Prisons: Disciplinary Proceedings. A prison disciplinary proceeding under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-4,109 to 83-4,123 (Reissue 1976) is not a contested case under the Nebraska Administrative Procedure Act.
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: HERBERT A. RONIN, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Dennis R. Keefe, Lancaster County Public Defender, and Richard L. Goos, for appellant.
Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General, and Linda A. Akers for appellees.
Heard before KRIVOSHA, C.J., BOSLAUGH, McCOWN, CLINTON, BRODKEY, WHITE, and HASTINGS, JJ.
The petitioner, Ronald L. Reed, escaped from the Lincoln Work Release Center on October 26, 1976. The facts relating to the escape are set out in State v. Reed, 205 Neb. 45, 286 N.W.2d 111 (1979), in which the conviction and sentence for the escape were affirmed.
On February 28, 1978, after a hearing before the Nebraska Penal Complex Adjustment Committee, the petitioner was ordered to spend 6 months in the Nebraska Penal Complex Adjustment Center and all of his accumulated good time was forfeited. Upon appeal to the Nebraska Penal Complex Appeal Board, the decision of the disciplinary committee was affirmed.
On May 8, 1978, the petitioner commenced this action in the District Court against the warden of the penitentiary, seeking a review of the decision of the disciplinary committee and a declaratory judgment that the respondents had violated the petitioner's constitutional rights and the rules and regulations of the Department of Correctional Services. The petitioner also sought injunctive relief to restore his good time and expunge matters relating to his escape from the prison records. The petition alleged the District Court had jurisdiction of the action under "section 84-917 to 84-919 of Nebraska Revised Statutes, 1943." The statute referred to is the Nebraska Administrative Procedure Act.
The respondents moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the District Court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action.
The trial court found that the petitioner had no right to relief under the Nebraska Administrative Procedure Act and dismissed the petition. The petitioner has appealed.
In 1976, the Legislature enacted a statute providing for disciplinary procedures in adult institutions administered by the Department of Correctional Services. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-4,109 to 83-4,123 (Reissue 1976). Section 83-4,109 provides specifically: "Disciplinary procedures in adult institutions administered by the Department of Correctional Services shall be governed by the provisions of sections 83-4,109 to 83-4,123."
The act provides that the department shall promulgate rules and regulations relating to disciplinary matters and grievance procedures. Section 83-4,115 provides that "Any review of disciplinary action imposed upon any person shall be pursuant to the provisions of sections 83-4,109 to 83-4,123." There is no provision in the act for direct judicial review of disciplinary action imposed pursuant to the act, but 83-4,123 provides that an inmate's right of free access to the courts in any cause of action arising under 83-4,109 to 83-4,123 shall not be impaired or restricted.
It is a general principle that specific statutory provisions relating to a particular subject control over general provisions. Lentz v. Saunders, 199 Neb. 3, 255 N.W.2d 853 (1977). Sections 83-4,109 to 83-4,123 constitute a special act relating to disciplinary procedures in adult correctional institutions and control over the more general provisions which are found in the Administrative Procedure Act.
The Administrative Procedure Act is a general act which prescribes procedures for proceedings before many state agencies. Generally, these proceedings involve the rights or privileges of members of the general public and are not related to the internal operation of an institution. Although there is general language in the Administrative Procedure Act upon which an argument may be based that the act is applicable in cases such as this, we do not find the argument persuasive.
It has been recognized that disciplinary procedures in penal institutions are summary in nature and the "full panoply of rights" due a defendant in a criminal prosecution are not applicable to a prison disciplinary proceeding. Only the minimum requirements of procedural due process appropriate for the circumstances must be observed. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).
In the Wolff case, the U.S. Supreme Court further recognized that disciplinary proceedings are not adversary proceedings in the nature of a criminal trial and care must be taken to prevent such proceedings from becoming unmanageable. In short, a prison disciplinary proceeding has but few of the characteristics of a "contested case" under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Although there appears to be little precedent in this area, so far as we have been able to determine there is no case which has held that administrative procedure laws are applicable to prison disciplinary proceedings.
A recent text, Hermann Haft, Prisoners' Rights Sourcebook 248 (1973), states that no case has held the federal Administrative Procedure Act applicable to action taken by the federal Bureau of Prisons. In Lesser v. Humphrey, 89 F. Supp. 474 (M.D. Pa. 1950), the court held the Administrative Procedure Act was not applicable to a proceeding before the good time board at a federal correctional institution.
Although the District Court was correct in holding that the petitioner had no right to judicial review of the disciplinary proceeding under the Administrative Procedure Act, it is not clear from the record that the petitioner had no right to declaratory judgment relief. Such relief, if available at all, would necessarily be limited in nature since such an action is a collateral attack upon the decision of the disciplinary committee and any issue concerning the fact of the escape was fully litigated in the criminal prosecution.
We reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the cause for the limited purpose of determining if the petitioner has any right to declaratory judgment relief.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
WHITE, J., concurs in result.