Opinion
No. 10-15-00147-CR
03-10-2016
FRANCIS LESIRELLE REDER, III, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
From the 18th District Court Johnson County, Texas
Trial Court No. F48432
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In three issues, appellant, Francis Lesirelle Reder, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for burglary of a habitation, burglary of a building, and tampering with oil and gas rigs. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 30.02(c)(1)-(2) (West 2011); see also TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.389(a) (West 2011). Because we conclude that the evidence supporting Reder's convictions is sufficient, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This case involves the burglary of Rosendo Gonzales's house, the burglary of a Johnson County Special Utility District building, and tampering with a Devon Energy gas-compressor station occurring on or about January 11 and 12, 2014. Reder was charged by indictment with committing these three offenses. Additionally, the indictment included enhancement paragraphs referencing Reder's prior felony convictions for burglary of a habitation and possession of a firearm by a felon. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found Reder guilty of the charged offenses and assessed punishment as follows: (1) life imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for the burglary-of-a-habitation count; (2) life imprisonment for the tampering-with-oil-and-gas-rigs count; and (3) twenty years' confinement for the burglary-of-a-building count. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The trial court certified Reder's right of appeal, and this appeal followed.
Lead operator David Brown testified that Devon Energy is now known as EnLink Midstream. --------
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals expressed our standard of review of a sufficiency issue as follows:
In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction, a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979);
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This "familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. "Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction." Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.Id.
Our review of "all of the evidence" includes evidence that was properly and improperly admitted. Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). And if the record supports conflicting inferences, we must presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793. Furthermore, direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally: "Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt." Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Finally, it is well established that the factfinder is entitled to judge the credibility of the witnesses and can choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties. Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
The sufficiency of the evidence is measured by reference to the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). A hypothetically-correct jury charge does four things: (1) accurately sets out the law; (2) is authorized by the indictment; (3) does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability; and (4) adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Id.
III. BURGLARY OF A BUILDING
In his second issue, Reder argues that the evidence is insufficient to show that he was the person who committed the offense of burglary of a building. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law
As charged in the indictment, a person commits the offense of burglary of a building if, without the effective consent of the owner, the person enters a building and commits theft. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(3). Appropriation of property is unlawful if it is without the owner's effective consent. Id. § 31.03(b)(1).
On appeal, Reder challenges the identity element of the offense of burglary of a building. The State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the person who committed the crime charged. Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref'd) (citing Johnson v. State, 673 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Rice v. State, 801 S.W.2d 16, 17 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1990, pet. ref'd)). Identity may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. (citing Earls v. State, 707 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 162 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd); Creech v. State, 718 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1986, no pet.)). "In fact, identity may be proven by inferences." Id. (citing United States v. Quimby, 636 F.2d 86, 90 (5th Cir. 1981)); see Clark v. State, 47 S.W.3d 211, 214 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, no pet.); see also Jones v. State, 900 S.W.2d 392, 399 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, pet. ref'd) (explaining that the jury may use common sense and apply common knowledge, observation, and experience gained in ordinary affairs of life when giving effect to inferences that may reasonably be drawn from evidence).
B. Discussion
In the early-morning hours of January 11, 2014, Dean Krokum, the water-maintenance foreman for the Johnson County Special Utility District, received a call that the Grandview plant had gone offline. Krokum went to the plant to assess the situation. Upon arriving, Krokum observed that the padlock on the double gate had been cut by bolt cutters. At that time, he also saw a vehicle leaving the facility. Krokum stopped at a building on the facility to determine if there was any damage. As Krokum came within a few feet of the door, a person wearing a dark-colored hoodie exited the building. Krokum yelled at the person to stop, but the hooded person took off running in the direction of County Road 305. The hooded person was joined by another individual, and both of them got into the vehicle that Krokum had seen earlier. Krokum got in his truck and began to follow the vehicle.
At trial, Krokum described the vehicle as a green or blue Japanese, four-door sedan with the partial license-plate number CMP 307. Realizing that it was not safe for him to continue following the vehicle, Krokum returned to the building to assess the situation and reroute water to customers from other plants. Krokum saw wiring outside the building, small wiring cut and placed in a bucket inside the building, large gauged wiring coiled up, conduits cut and the wiring removed, and damage done to the main panel. Numerous pictures of the damage were admitted into evidence. Krokum testified that Reder did not have permission to enter the premises, nor did he have permission to take anything from the building.
The record also reflects that, on January 12, 2014, a dark green, four-door Acura sedan with the license plate number CMP3076 was found abandoned just outside the second gate of the damaged Devon Energy gas-compressor facility, which, as described later, was the scene of another offense involving the theft of wiring. The vehicle was registered to Anne Turner, Reder's mother, and Reder's identification card was found inside the vehicle. Turner testified that she had bought the vehicle for Reder; that Reder lived with her in Benbrook, Texas; and that she had not seen Reder during the evening hours of January 11, 2014 and the early-morning hours of January 12, 2014—after Reder had visited Kristen Cromeans, who was incarcerated in the Johnson County Law Enforcement Center.
Additionally, pursuant to a Tarrant County court order in a prior DWI case involving Reder, witnesses testified that the vehicle was equipped with an interlock device that prevented the vehicle from starting unless a sober Reder breathed into the device. And while defense counsel emphasized in his questioning of witnesses the possibility that the vehicle had been stolen, neither Turner nor Reder filed an official written report alleging that the vehicle was stolen. In fact, when Reder went to the Johnson County Sheriff's Office on January 13, 2014, to report the vehicle as stolen, Lieutenant Michael Gaudet of the Johnson County Sheriff's Office informed Reder that the report had to be in writing and had to include identifying details about the car and the theft. Upon hearing this, Reder, who was wearing a hoodie that day, declined to make a written report and left the Sheriff's Office.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, a rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Reder was involved in the commission of this offense. See Johnson, 673 S.W.2d at 196; Clark, 47 S.W.3d at 214; Roberson, 16 S.W.3d at 167; Jones, 900 S.W.2d at 399; see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 99 S. Ct. at 2788-89; Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 894. Accordingly, we cannot say that the evidence pertaining to the identity element of the charged offense of burglary of a building is insufficient. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(3); see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 99 S. Ct. at 2788-89; Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 894; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. As such, we overrule Reder's second issue.
IV. BURGLARY OF A HABITATION
In his first issue, Reder contends that the evidence supporting his conviction for burglary of a habitation is insufficient because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the person who committed the offense.
A. Applicable Law
A person commits the offense of burglary of a habitation if, without the consent of the owner, the person enters a habitation and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft, or assault. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(3); see Reyes v. State, 422 S.W.3d 18, 23-24 (Tex. App.—Waco 2013, pet. ref'd). A person commits theft if "he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a) (West Supp. 2015).
Direct evidence of entry is not required; that element may be established by inference, just as inferences may be used to prove the elements of any other offense. Poncio v. State, 185 S.W.3d 904, 905 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A defendant's unexplained possession of property recently stolen in a burglary permits an inference that the defendant is the one that committed the burglary. Id.
Generally, if a defendant offers an explanation for his possession of the stolen property, the record must demonstrate that the explanation is false or unreasonable. Adams v. State, 552 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Whether a defendant's explanation for possession of recently-stolen property is true or reasonable is an issue to be determined by the trier of fact. Id. The falsity or unreasonableness of an explanation may be shown by circumstantial evidence. See id.; see also Reyes, 422 S.W.3d at 24. Direct evidence refuting the explanation is not required. Reyes, 422 S.W.3d at 25. Therefore, it is enough that the State establish the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, which may be by only circumstantial evidence of entry without the owner's effective consent by proving possession of the recently-stolen property and that there is sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, that would support the jury's rejection of the defendant's explanation as false or unreasonable, including the jury's ability to simply reject the defendant's explanation as incredible. Id. at 25-26.
B. Discussion
Similar to issue one, Reder challenges the identity element of this offense. Deputy Carlos Davis testified that he responded to a reported burglary on January 12, 2014. The complainant, Gonzales, informed Deputy Davis that the front door to his house had been pried open and that his DeWalt power tools, his black and green work boots, three large cooking pots filled with tools, and a GPS device were stolen. Deputy Davis also testified that the breaker panel in Gonzales's house had been pulled off the wall and that copper wiring was missing. Moreover, Deputy Davis indicated that Gonzales "did not give anybody permission to enter the house at all."
The record also reflects that numerous items were found inside Reder's green Acura sedan, including several items that belonged to Gonzales. Among the items found were several DeWalt tools with serial numbers that matched those that were stolen from Gonzales's house. Additionally, a GPS device, blue and green work boots, two large cooking pots, and a power saw all belonging to Gonzales were found inside Reder's vehicle.
Given that numerous items stolen from Gonzales's house were found inside Reder's vehicle; that the record does not contain a reasonable explanation from Reder regarding the location of the stolen property inside his green Acura; and that the jury could have reasonably inferred Reder's involvement in the burglary based on his connection to the vehicle used in the commission of the offenses, we cannot say that the evidence pertaining to the identity element of the burglary-of-a-habitation offense is insufficient. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(3); see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 99 S. Ct. at 2788-89; Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 894; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; Poncio, 185 S.W.3d at 905. In other words, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, a rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Reder was involved in the commission of this offense. See Johnson, 673 S.W.2d at 196; Clark, 47 S.W.3d at 214; Roberson, 16 S.W.3d at 167; Jones, 900 S.W.2d at 399; see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 99 S. Ct. at 2788-89; Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 894. We overrule Reder's first issue.
V. TAMPERING WITH OIL AND GAS RIGS
In his third issue, Reder asserts that the evidence supporting his conviction for tampering with oil and gas rigs is insufficient because the State failed to show that: (1) he caused damage or tampered with any of the equipment or property located at the well site; (2) the damage was caused at an oil and gas well or associated gas-gathering equipment; and (3) any damage was done for the specific purpose of controlling or limiting the operation of the well or associated equipment.
A. Applicable Law
Section 85.389 of the Texas Natural Resources Code, entitled "Criminal Penalty," provides the following:
A person who is not the owner or operator of an oil well, gas well, or oil and gas well, a purchaser under contract of oil, gas, or oil and gas from a well, a gatherer with written authorization from the owner, operator, or purchaser, or an authorized representative of the commission who knowingly destroys, breaks, removes, or otherwise tampers with or attempts to destroy, break, remove, or otherwise tamper with any cap, seal, or other device placed on an oil well, gas well, oil and gas well, or associated oil or gas gathering equipment by the owner or operator for the purpose of controlling or limiting the operation of the well or associated equipment commits an offense.TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.389(a). Subsection (b) indicates that an offense under subsection (a) is a third-degree felony. See id. § 85.389(b).
B. Discussion
About thirty to forty-five minutes after responding to Gonzales's burglary complaint, Deputy Davis was dispatched to a gas-compression station operated by Devon Energy. When he arrived, Deputy Davis immediately observed Reder's green Acura "with the nose of it off in a ditch in front of the compressor station." Deputy Davis then spoke with Emanuel Montes, formerly a natural-gas-compressor mechanic for Devon Energy. Montes showed Deputy Davis and other officers around the facility. Deputy Davis saw "several wires that were strung out across the ground that looked like they had been cut. Also there was some form of computer equipment that was laying on the ground that obviously didn't belong there." Inside some of the buildings of the station "were computer monitors, computer parts thrown on the ground, a place where a wire had been cut, several cabinets open and some bags had been drawn out—or strung out."
Later, Montes testified to the following:
Well, I got the call and I drove up to the lease road which is the first gate—two gates before you get to the gas plant. First gate was closed. Went through. Everything seemed pretty normal. When I got to the second gate, there was a car in the ditch, the gate was wide open, which it's about 98 percent of the time always closed unless somebody is inside working. And when I pulled up there was a whole lot of copper wire laying on the ground so I kind of knew something was suspicious there and then I saw a gentleman out in the pasture kind of making his way out towards the brush.According to Montes, the assailant and another accomplice were in the surrounding brush wearing hoodies. Montes also explained that all of the gas wells feed into the compressor station; that the station is considered a natural-gas plant; and that the assailants were not employees of Devon Energy, owners or operators of the station, purchasers of the gas compressed at the station, or were authorized to be at the station.
Montes described the damage at the station as follows:
Yes, sir, there was copper wiring kind of strung out everywhere. Of course after everything was kind of done, evidently two of our electrical buildings were destroyed, computers were thrown everywhere, wires were cut everywhere, and we found a lot of equipment outside around the compressor station kind of tossed aside.Montes agreed that the assailants had tampered with the station.
Lead Operator David Brown described the compressor station as such:
Okay. It's basically where all—it's a central location where all the gas comes from all the wells that y'all see everywhere out. It's all piped into this compressor station. It comes in at about 100, 150 pounds of pressure and it's compressed and it comes out about 900 pounds of pressure and ties straight into like Atmos Energy and then it comes to all the cities and the homes and everything.Brown further noted that about 300 gas wells feed this compressor station. Brown estimated that the damage caused to the compressor station "was around $60,000" and that the station was down for twelve to fourteen hours as a result of the damage caused in this incident.
Deputy Ken Moser of the Johnson County Sheriff's Office recounted that he received a call on January 13, 2014 from Devon Energy regarding property found at the compressor station that did not belong to the company. Deputy Moser testified that he recovered three small, canvas bags, an extra-large coat, and two or three spools of wire. Detective Kevin Link of the Johnson County Sheriff's Office later testified that the canvas bags contained power tools that belonged to Gonzales.
Given that witnesses observed Reder's green Acura at the compressor station with property stolen from Gonzales's house; that Deputy Moser recovered three canvas bags containing power tools taken from Gonzales's house at the station; and that we have concluded that the jury could have reasonably inferred Reder's involvement in this copper-wire crime spree based on his connection to the green Acura used in the commission of the offenses, we cannot say that the evidence pertaining to the identity element of the tampering-with-oil-and-gas-wells offense is insufficient. See Johnson, 673 S.W.2d at 196; Clark, 47 S.W.3d at 214; Roberson, 16 S.W.3d at 167; Jones, 900 S.W.2d at 399; see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 99 S. Ct. at 2788-89; Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 894.
And as shown by the evidence outlined above, the compressor station is part of an integrated transmission system for gas products. Furthermore, Montes and Brown described that, as a result of the tampering done by the assailants, the compressor station sustained $60,000 in damage. We therefore conclude that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, a rational factfinder could conclude that Reder caused damage to an oil or gas well or associated equipment and that the damage resulted in the limiting of the operation of the compressor station for twelve to fourteen hours. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.389(a); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 99 S. Ct. at 2788-89; Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 894; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; see also Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (noting that the jury may infer intent or knowledge from any facts that tend to prove its existence, including the acts, words, and conduct of the accused); Giddens v. State, 256 S.W.3d 426, 434 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. ref'd) (stating that a culpable mental state is invariably proved by circumstantial evidence). Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support Reder's conviction under section 85.389 of the Texas Natural Resources Code. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.389; Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 99 S. Ct. at 2788-89; Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 894; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. We overrule Reder's third issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
Having overruled all of Reder's issues on appeal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
AL SCOGGINS
Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed March 10, 2016
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