Opinion
No. 05-03-00229-CV.
Opinion filed March 9, 2004.
On Appeal from the 68th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 02-07327-C.
Affirmed.
Before Justices MOSELEY, RICHTER, and FRANCIS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this restricted appeal, Reatta Resources, Inc. asks us to determine from the face of the record whether a foreign judgment filed in Texas is entitled to full faith and credit. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Wayne Kraft obtained a default judgment against Reatta in an Illinois state court for $6,000 compensatory damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and $200,000 in punitive damages. Six months later, Kraft filed the Illinois judgment in Texas under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. §§ 35.001-.008 (Vernon 1997). Reatta filed this restricted appeal within six months after the Illinois judgment was filed in Texas.
A restricted appeal must: (1) be brought within six months after the trial court signs the judgment; (2) by a party; (3) who did not participate in the trial; and (4) the error complained of must be apparent on the face of the record. Tex.R.App.P. 26.1(c), 30; Sutton v. Hisaw Assocs. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 65 S.W.3d 281, 284 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied). For purposes of a restricted appeal, the face of the record consists of all the papers on file before the judgment as well as any reporter's record. Norman Communications v. Texas Eastman Co., 955 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. 1997).
In two issues, Reatta argues the Illinois punitive damage award is excessive and violates its rights to due process. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). According to Reatta, the award is penal, violates public policy, and is not entitled to full faith and credit in Texas. It argues there is no evidence in the record whatsoever to support the award of any punitive damages under the Supreme Court guidelines in Campbell. Reatta overlooks that it is required to show error apparent on the face of the record in order to bring this restricted appeal. The Illinois judgment recites that the trial court received evidence and "heard and thoroughly considered the testimony of Wayne Kraft" before rendering judgment. Nothing in the record before us rebuts this recital and Reatta has not brought forward a record of this evidence for us to review.
Reatta points to the fact that the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages is apparent on the face of the record and that the ratio here (33 to 1) exceeds the single-digit multiplier the Court in Campbell found would more likely comport with due process. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 1524. However, immediately before discussing the single-digit multiplier, the Court expressly declined to establish a "bright-line" ratio for determining the validity of a punitive damage award:
We decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed. Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate, however, that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process. . . . While these ratios are not binding, they are instructive. They demonstrate what should be obvious: Single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the State's goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with ratios in range of 500 to 1, [ BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,] 582 [(1996)], or, in this case, of 145 to 1.
Campbell, 538 U.S. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 1524.
Thus, there is no bright-line ratio which punitive damages cannot exceed. Id.; see also Gore, 517 U.S. at 582, ("[W]e have consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential damages to the punitive award."). Reatta has not shown error apparent on the face of the record merely by pointing to a 33 to 1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages. Therefore, we are unable to conclude from the ratio alone that the punitive damage award is excessive. We resolve Reatta's issues against it and affirm the trial court's judgment.