Opinion
A148462
09-27-2018
DALIA RASHDAN (MOHAMED), Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PACIFIC, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG13682622)
Appellant Dr. Dalia Rashdan (Mohamed), a dentist licensed in Egypt, enrolled in the University of the Pacific's (University) two-year, International Dental Studies Program to obtain a degree which would allow her to become a licensed dentist in the United States, subject to passing board exams. Appellant completed her courses, but, before her anticipated graduation, the University determined that she had not satisfied the practice requirements. University allowed her to continue for one year to demonstrate her competence in two clinical areas. Her appeal of that decision to the review committee was denied. Instead of completing the remediation, Appellant withdrew from the program and filed this suit. After adverse rulings on her complaint and first amended complaint, she filed her second amended complaint alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and negligence. The trial court sustained the demurrer to all three claims on the ground that she had not alleged exhaustion of administrative remedies, but granted leave to file for mandamus, which she did. Upon trial on the administrative mandamus claim, the court decided she had not met the statutory requirements and the undisputed evidence did not support her claim. The court entered judgment for University. She appeals from both the court order sustaining the demurrer and the judgment after trial. We find no error and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant, a dentist licensed in Egypt, enrolled in University's two-year, International Dental Studies Program to obtain a degree which would allow her to become licensed to practice dentistry in the United States, subject to passing board exams. At the end of the two-year program, University's Student Academic Performance and Promotion Committee (SAPPC) evaluates each student and recommends action to the dean. SAPPC determined that Appellant (and three other students not involved in this case) had not satisfied the graduation requirements. SAPPC recommended that Appellant participate in clinical training to allow her to demonstrate competence in two areas: restorative dentistry and removable prosthetics. Just before her anticipated June 2009 graduation, University's dental school dean advised Appellant of the SAPPC recommendation and that he agreed with it. He said she could appeal to the Student Appeals Committee (SAC), which she did. The SAC unanimously agreed that her appeal should be denied, and the dean concurred. Appellant began the extended clinical program in July 2009, and successfully completed the training in removable prosthetics, but—after the faculty decided that she had not achieved the requisite skills in restorative dentistry to independently treat patients—Appellant took a leave of absence from which she did not return. Appellant did not seek internal grievance review by SAC.
Appellant filed a United States District Court complaint alleging federal discrimination and state law tort and contract claims. The district court granted summary judgment on the discrimination claims, and declined jurisdiction on the state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that decision.
While the federal appeal was pending, Appellant filed her complaint in this case seeking monetary damages for various causes of action against University and various faculty and administrators. After the court's ruling on the demurrer to her complaint and the motion for judgment on the first amended complaint—neither of which is the subject of this appeal—she filed her second amended complaint. University again demurred, and the court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. We summarize the order here because: it is a subject of the appeal; it set the course for the litigation; and it states the legal authority upon which judgment against Appellant was ultimately entered.
The complaint and first amended complaint included causes of action against University professors and administrators Marc Geissberger, Faroud Hakim and Eugene LaBarre (Individual Defendants). The court granted the Individual Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the first amended complaint, without leave to amend, concluding: "[Individual Defendants] are not properly named in claims alleging that [University] damaged [Appellant] by refusing to allow her to graduate with a D.D.S. degree."
"[Appellant] seeks to recover monetary damages based on [University's] refusal to allow her to graduate. . . . [including] restitution of funds paid to [University and] the loss of her earning capacity as a dentist. [Appellant] alleges that she was not allowed to graduate because of decisions by [University's] Student Academic Performance and Promotions Committee and Student Appeals Committee ("SAC") . . . .
"In order to find that [Appellant] suffered compensable damage from the decision to bar her from graduating in June 2009, the court necessarily would have to determine that [Appellant], at the time of the decision by [University], was scholastically qualified to graduate from dental school and that [University] committed arbitrary, capricious or bad faith conduct by refusing to allow her to do so. Similarly, in order to determine that [Appellant] was not given a fair opportunity to remediate her performance, the court would need to find that her academic performance did not merit the additional hurdles to graduation that were imposed from September 2009 to January 2010. Only the appropriate authorities of the dental school are qualified to make such determinations. [(]Wong v. Regents of University of California (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 823, 830-831 [(Wong).)] [Appellant's] allegations show that [University] provided [Appellant] with quasi-judicial hearings. [Appellant's] remedy for claims that the decisions made in those hearings were arbitrary, capricious, or unfair is a claim for administrative mandamus. [(]Gupta v. Stanford University (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-413 [(Gupta)]; [(]Gutkin v. University of Southern California (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 967, 980 [(Gutkin).)]
"[Appellant] alleges that she is not required to exhaust her administrative remedies because the hearings provided by [University] were not fairly conducted or they did not provide an effective remedy. [Appellant] alleges that the process was futile because Marc Geissberger had personal animus toward her and he exerted influence over [University's] committees. [Appellant] also alleges that the hearing before the SAC was futile because under the University of the Pacific catalog, in academic matters related to promotion or dismissal, the SAC will not attempt to substitute its judgment for the academic judgment of faculty or the administration. To the extent that [Appellant] is claiming that she is not required to exhaust her administrative remedies because [University] did not provide an adequate quasi-judicial proceeding, [Appellant's] remedy is not a claim for damages based on the money she would have made as a dentist or for restitution of her tuition. [Appellant] must bring a claim for writ of mandate seeking an order to require [University] to give her a fair hearing. [(]Valvo v. University of Southern California (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 887, 896.[)]
"[Appellant] is granted leave to amend to plead causes of action for writ of mandate and/or writ of administrative mandamus."
Appellant filed the third amended complaint for writ of mandate pursuant to both Code of Civil Procedure sections 1094.5 and 1085. The trial court sustained University's demurrer with leave to amend to properly state a claim for administrative mandamus and reiterated the law applicable to both statutory remedies: "If [University] provided [Appellant] with a quasi-judicial hearing, her remedy is a claim for administrative mandamus challenging the fairness of the hearing. [Citation.] If [University] did not provide a quasi-judicial proceeding, [Appellant's] remedy is a claim for writ of mandate seeking an order that [University] is required to give her a fair hearing. [Citation.] [Appellant] does not allege that [University] did not provide a quasi-judicial hearing to challenge the relevant decisions, and therefore a claim under section 1085 has not been stated. Further, [Appellant] has never suggested that she can state such a claim and the court concludes that it is not reasonably likely that she can do so. [¶] . . . [¶] [Appellant] has not stated a claim for a writ of administrative mandamus under section 1094.5. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Leave to amend is granted to state a claim for administrative mandate under section 1094.5."
Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Appellant filed the fourth amended complaint alleging one count for writ of mandate under section 1094.5. The trial court overruled University's demurrer: "[Appellant] alleged that the University provides the right to an evidentiary hearing before the Student Appeals Committee with regard to decisions made by the SAPPC. . . . [Appellant's] allegations are sufficient to state a claim for writ of administrative mandamus based on failure to provide a fair hearing."
The matter was tried to the court without witnesses, on documentary evidence: a 500-page record of all the proceedings. The trial court issued a statement of decision including findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court decided that Appellant was not entitled to relief pursuant to 1094.5:
"Section 1094.5 applies to any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board or officer. It is intended to apply in all cases where the subject decision is the product of a proceeding in which a hearing and related procedural protections are required by law. (Delta Dental Plan of California v. Banasky (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1598, 1608[.])
"In the event that section 1094.5 applies, mandamus will set aside the dismissal of a medical student 'if the dismissal was arbitrary, capricious or in bad faith.' (Valvo v. University of Southern California (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 887, 896[.]) However, a petitioner is not entitled to a writ of mandate reinstating him or her as a medical student because in doing so, a trial court would have to determine the student was scholastically qualified to continue in his or her study of medicine. Only the appropriate authorities of the medical school may make such a determination, which is consistent with the rule of judicial nonintervention in scholastic affairs. (Wong, [supra,] 15 Cal.App.3d [at pp.] 830-831.)
"[Appellant] is not entitled to relief pursuant to section 1094.5 for the following reasons:
"19. First, the [University] Dean's decisions in June 2009 to transfer [Appellant] to the extended program of [University] and to deny her appeal, are not final administrative orders. [Appellant] was not dismissed from [University] but was offered the option of doing remediation work in order to graduate at a later time. As a result, her status at [University] remained active.
"20. Second, and as an independent reason to 19, above, based on the Catalog, the decision to extend [Appellant's] studies was not made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given and evidence is required to be taken. The Catalog described for all incoming students the role of the faculty-based SAPPC, which evaluated [Appellant's] academic performance. These procedures, which control how faculty members evaluate students, are defined in the Catalog and do not provide for any type of hearing or method by which to take evidence.
"21. Although section 1094.5 does not apply for the reasons stated above, this court observes that even if section 1094.5 did apply, [Appellant] would still not prevail against [University's] affirmative defense of laches. [Appellant] did not file a mandamus petition for over five years. Now, over six years have gone by since June 2009. [Appellant] seeks equity asking this court to order [University] to certify her for graduation. Alternatively, she suggests that she be able to demonstrate her clinical skills to an independent reviewer or panel such as dentists who have had their license suspended to demonstrate her competence. This court would not, in any event, order either form of relief because it has no authority to do so and believes this type of academic decision belongs to [University]—not a judicial officer.
"22. Finally, [Appellant's] remaining remedy is unworkable. She is in the difficult position of, all these years later, asking [University] to convene re-hearings of the SAPPC and/or the SAC, to reconsider whether she was suitable for graduation as of June 2009. Reconsideration of scholastic performance that occurred over six-and-a-half years ago is impractical and likely prejudicial to [University]."
The court entered judgment for University and the Individual Defendants. Appellant appeals from both the order sustaining the demurrer to the second amended complaint and the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
The trial court's decision to sustain a demurrer to a complaint is reviewed de novo to determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 879 (Cantu); see Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) If the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we determine whether the trial court abused its discretion and only reverse if there is a reasonable probability that the defect could have been cured by amendment. (Cantu, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at pp. 889-890; County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Company (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 314; Montclair Parkowners Assn. v. City of Montclair (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 784, 790.) Appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the court's ruling on the demurrer was erroneous. (Cantu, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 879; Coutin v. Lucas (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1016, 1020, citing Tayofa v. Hastings College (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 437, 440.)
We review the decision to deny a petition for writ of mandate for substantial evidence. We exercise our independent judgment and conduct a de novo review of questions of law. (Munroe v. L.A. County Civil Service Comm'n (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1301; Lanigan v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1029; Moore v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 373, 380.)
II. Analysis
a. The Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint
Appellant's second amended complaint—like her two prior pleadings—seeks monetary damages from the University arising from the decision to delay her graduation until she demonstrated practical proficiency in removable prosthetics and restorative dentistry. She satisfied the requirement as to the former, but not the latter and—rather than complete the training, a course which could have resulted in graduation—she took a leave of absence and pursued legal claims, in both federal and state courts. The trial court relied on controlling authority including Gupta, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at pages 411-413, which presents a remarkably similar fact pattern, and sustained the demurrer with leave to amend.
Gupta was accused by Stanford of copying the work of two students and—after an evidentiary hearing before a judicial panel—suspended, placed on probation and ordered to complete community service, as a prerequisite to continued study and graduation. Rather than follow the prescribed course, he sued Stanford and two faculty members and—in his first amended complaint—alleged inter alia breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and various tort claims. (Gupta, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 410.) The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. "The doctrine of exhaustion of judicial remedies precludes an action that challenges the result of a quasi-judicial proceeding unless the plaintiff first challenges the decision th[r]ough a petition for writ of mandamus. [Citation.] Administrative mandamus is available for review of 'any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or officer. . . .' (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5, subd. (a).) [¶] . . . The remedy of administrative mandamus is not limited to public agencies; rather it applies to private organizations that provide for a formal evidentiary hearing. [Citations.] Moreover, failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a proper basis for demurrer. [Citation.] [¶] We reject Gupta's assertion that the provisions of section 1094.5 do not apply to the case of a student who is subject to university disciplinary proceedings. The remedy of administrative mandamus applies to any organization that provides for an evidentiary hearing. Whether the aggrieved party is seeking redress for termination of employment, denial of tenure or academic discipline is irrelevant to the applicability of section 1094.5." (Id. at p. 411.)
The Gupta court relied on Gutkin, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 967, where the plaintiff sued a private university for breach of contract and tort for an adverse decision, without first exhausting administrative remedies. "Gutkin's failure to seek administrative mandamus precluded his ability to bring his tort and contract causes of action in superior court. As such, the court affirmed the trial court's decision sustaining the demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend." (Gupta, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.)
The court relied on Gupta and Gutkin and sustained the demurrer, but allowed Appellant to amend and provided direction—as it did in prior orders—on the prerequisites for either writ of mandate seeking a fair hearing (§ 1085) or writ of administrative mandate if she contended that a hearing was conducted, but the resulting decision was "arbitrary, capricious or unfair." (§ 1094.5.) The court prefaced those instructions by referring Appellant to Wong, supra, 15 Cal.App.3d 823, which states the rule of judicial nonintervention in scholastic affairs. (Wong, supra, 15 Cal.App.3d at pp. 830-831, quoting Connelly v. University of Vermont and State Agr. Col. (1965) 244 F.Supp. 156.)
" 'This rule has been stated in a variety of ways by a number of courts. It has been said that courts do not interfere with the management of a school's internal affairs unless "there has been a manifest abuse of discretion or where [the school officials'] action has been arbitrary or unlawful," [citation], or unless the school authorities have acted "arbitrarily or capriciously", [citation], or unless they have abused their discretion, [citations], or acted in, "bad faith", [citation].'
" 'The effect of these decisions is to give the school authorities absolute discretion in determining whether a student has been delinquent in his studies, and to place the burden on the student in showing that his dismissal was motivated by arbitrariness, capriciousness or bad faith. The reason for this rule is that in matters of scholarship, the school authorities are uniquely qualified by training and experience to judge the qualifications of a student, and efficiency of instruction depends in no small degree upon the school faculty's freedom from interference from other noneducational tribunals. It is only when the school authorities abuse this discretion that a court may interfere with their decision to dismiss a student.' [Citation.]
" 'The rule of judicial nonintervention in scholastic affairs is particularly applicable in the case of a medical school. A medical school must be the judge of the qualifications of its students to be granted a degree; Courts are not supposed to be learned in medicine and are not qualified to pass opinion as to the attainments of a student in medicine.' " (Wong, supra, 15 Cal.App.3d at pp. 830-831, quoting Connelly v. University of Vermont and State Agr. Col., supra, 244 F.Supp. at p. 159-161.)
That rule is equally applicable to dental schools. We agree with the trial court that, absent an allegation of exhaustion of administrative remedies—which would not have been supported by the undisputed facts—Appellant could not proceed on her breach of contract and tort claims and first had to seek either a writ of mandate or administrative mandate. There was no error.
The Writ of Administrative Mandate
The parties went to trial on the fourth amended complaint, which alleged only a claim for administrative mandate pursuant to section 1094.5. We review the record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the denial of the writ of administrative mandate and exercise our independent judgment on questions of law.
The trial court meticulously reviewed the voluminous 500-page record and made factual findings, fully supported by the record, which provide substantial evidence for the court's conclusion that "[Appellant] is not entitled to relief pursuant to section 1094.5." The court found: "there is no evidence of any 'material omissions of or errors in facts available to the SAPPC' at the time it unanimously decided to recommend extending [Appellant.] There is also no evidence that there were 'process errors that could have substantially impacted the deliberations of the SAPPC.' " The court found that the SAPPC, which is responsible for evaluating student academic performance and progress, evaluated Appellant consistent with University procedures and that there were academically-valid reasons for University's decision to defer her graduation and to require clinical remediation. Based on its review of the record and consistent with the principle of nonintervention in academic decisions, the court found that University provided Appellant a "fair procedure on appeal."
In multiple orders, the court informed Appellant of all the prerequisites for section 1094.5 relief. Section 1094.5 tests "the validity of any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board or officer." After trial, the court decided that the procedural prerequisites for section 1094.5 were not met. The SAPPC proceedings did not satisfy the necessary elements for administrative mandate, and the challenged University orders were not final decisions.
Appellant completed the remedial removable prosthetics training, but, when the faculty decided she needed further restorative dentistry remediation, Appellant took a leave of absence from which she did not return. Appellant was not dismissed; her graduation was merely deferred. University's decisions in June 2009 to transfer her to the extended program and to deny her appeal, were not final administrative orders. But for her decision to depart she remained on active status.
The record is also clear that the procedures for SAPPC, which evaluated her academic performance, do not provide for any type of hearing or method by which to take evidence, and therefore are not proceedings which are subject to section 1094.5 inquiry. (§ 1094.5(a).)
As a further basis for her decision, the court made factual findings and ruled for University on its affirmative defense of laches. Appellant filed a mandamus petition more than five years after the challenged decisions were made, and another year elapsed before trial. Appellant sought alternate equitable remedies: either an order certifying her for graduation or creation of a review board, independent of University, to evaluate her clinical skills. The trial court made a factual finding that Appellant's delay in seeking mandamus was unreasonable. Following the rule of judicial nonintervention in scholastic affairs, the court rejected Appellants' proposed remedies and refused to substitute a judge for the academic dentists, who had the professional expertise to evaluate the clinical skills necessary to practice dentistry. The court rejected the proposal that University be required—more than six years after Appellant's attendance—to reconsider appellant's clinical skills and found that to do so would be unduly prejudicial to the University.
Applying the law to the undisputed factual record, we uphold the trial court's decision to deny section 1094.5 relief. We find substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings and—having conducted an independent review of the questions of law—agree that appellant was not entitled to section 1094.5 administrative mandate relief.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall be entitled to recover its costs on appeal.
/s/_________
Ross, J. We concur: /s/_________
Siggins, P.J. /s/_________
Pollak, J.
Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.