Opinion
June 7, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Brown, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
This action arises out of a two-vehicle collision during which the minor plaintiff sustained injuries as a passenger on a motorcycle driven by the minor defendant Keith W. Hamilton. The accident occurred after both these parties had consumed beer. The beer had been purchased for them by a third party from a 7-Eleven convenience store operated by the respondents Roy Anderson and Joan Anderson, franchisees of the respondent The Southland Corporation.
The plaintiffs have no viable cause of action against the respondents predicated upon common-law negligence. Our courts have declined to impose liability upon dispensers of alcoholic beverages for the injuries caused by voluntarily intoxicated customers (see, Sheehy v. Big Flats Community Day, 73 N.Y.2d 629, 636; D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76, 83). Furthermore, the liability imposed under General Obligations Law §§ 11-100 and 11-101 is limited to those cases where injuries are caused by an intoxicated minor to whom the allegedly liable person has furnished, or has assisted such minor in procuring, the alcoholic beverages (General Obligations Law § 11-100; § 11-101 [1]; Sherman v. Robinson, 80 N.Y.2d 483, 487; Stewart v. Taylor, 167 A.D.2d 846; Smith v. Guli, 117 A.D.2d 1017). It is clear from the record in this case that the beer was purchased from the 7-Eleven not by Keith Hamilton or the minor plaintiff, but rather by another minor.
We further reject the plaintiffs' contention that under circumstances such as those at bar, General Obligations Law § 11-100, when read in conjunction with Penal Law former § 260.20 (4) and Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 65 (1) and (2), imposes an implied liability upon persons who sell alcoholic beverages to minors. The express language of the General Obligations Law defining the private right of action is an exception to the common law. It therefore must be read narrowly and not enlarged beyond its borders (see, Sherman v. Robinson, supra, at 487; D'Amico v Christie, supra, at 83). Neither should the common law be expanded to impose liability upon a shop for indirect sales involving third-party minors (Sherman v. Robinson, supra, at 489).
We have examined the plaintiffs' remaining contention and find it to be without merit. Lawrence, J.P., Ritter, Copertino and Santucci, JJ., concur.