Opinion
Civil Action 1:20-CV-2232
06-07-2021
CLARENCE ROBERT RANKIN, Plaintiff v. TAWNI RUBY, et al., Defendants
CONNER, D.J.
WILLIAM I. ARBUCKLE, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this action in an apparent challenge to a York County, Pennsylvania support order. This Court previously granted Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint, after concluding that Plaintiff's filings failed to state a claim or comply with Rule 8 pleading requirements. Because Plaintiff has not filed a new amended complaint, and because multiple deficiencies in his first amended complaint warrant dismissal, I recommend dismissal of this case without further leave to amend.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
On November 30, 2020, Clarence Robert Rankin (“Plaintiff”) initiated this pro se civil rights action against Defendants Tawni Ruby and Theresa K. Gross (Doc. 1). With his Complaint, Plaintiff filed eighty (80) pages of exhibits (Doc. 3) and a Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2). On December 2, 2020, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 6) and 167 pages of exhibits (Docs. 61, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4). I granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis on December 3, 2020. (Doc. 4). On December 4, 2020, Plaintiff filed an affidavit with exhibits (Doc. 7). On February 12, 2021, I issued an Order (Doc. 8) after conducting a screening analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. 6) and affidavit with exhibits (Doc. 7). I concluded that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (Doc. 8). Instead of recommending dismissal, I gave Plaintiff one month to file a new amended complaint. Id. Plaintiff's new amended complaint was due on March 12, 2021. Id. Plaintiff has not filed a new amended complaint.
Under this statute, the Court is required to dismiss any action that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
As I detailed in my prior Order (Doc. 8), Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. 6) does not contain any clear factual allegations. Instead, it contains a list of legal assertions and conclusions introduced by “Affiant is aware that.” Id. These statements include the following:
Affiant is aware that: Plaintiff is not a lawyer and does not practice law nor does he intend to. Thus, he cannot be held to the same standards as one.
....
Affiant is aware that: The Supremacy Clause of the United States Cont (Art VI, clause 2) state courts are bound by the supreme law of the land; in case of conflict between federal and state law, the federal law must be applied, even state constitutions are subordinate to federal law. Affiant realizes that there is a conflict of interest concerning support obligation in relation to federal law. 31 USC §6305 Using Cooperative Agreements (An executive agency shall use a cooperative
agreement as the legal instrument reflecting a relationship between the U.S. Government and State, a local government or other recipient), The federal government and state/local subdivisions are working in cooperative agreements with each other to administer the scheme of the Title IV-D program. The Plaintiff's due process rights cannot not be upheld due to the agencies working in cooperative agreements/treatys with each other.
Affiant is aware that: He will be afforded all the due process rights as a foreign Citizen dwelling within the UNITED STATES, INC.
Affiant is aware that: The civil proceeding between the Plaintiff and Defendant concerns violations of Due Process, Taxation, Liens, Levys, and Contracts.
Affiant is aware that: He can never be adjudicated as a 14thAmendment citizen due to his status correction and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Dred Scott v. Sanford 60 U.S. (19 How) 393 (1857), Debates of the 90th Congress 1stSec Vol 113-Part 12 June 12 1967.
Affiant is aware that: Under the U.S. Constitution 11th Amendment states that: Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens of Subjects of any Foreign State.
Affiant is aware that: Under Title 23 ch.43 Support Matters, Sub ch A, Cooperation of Commonwealth Agencies § 4304 2.b that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is authorized to enter into an agreement (arrangement is another word for treaty) with financial institutions concerning support matters.
Affiant is aware that: This is a conflict of interest when lodging a civil complaint against an independent financial agency (45 CFR 302.12) such as York County Domestic Relations Section that does commerce/business in the Commonwealth.
....
Affiant is aware that: Based upon the aforementioned facts, the Domestic Relations Section obtained its jurisdiction by color of law,
threats, force, coercion, deception, fear, warrants, compelled association, mail fraud, conspiracy, and the use of the other parent.
....
Affiant is aware that: According to the 4th Amendment searches and seizures, for a warrant to be issued there must be probable cause and is support by an oath of affirmation, describing the place and person to be seized. Probable cause means that a crime must have been committed or someone is in the commission or act of a crime. This means that no man/woman's property can be seized for searched. No warrant can be issued by any agency that is not bring for a claim that it an injured party.(Doc. 6, pp. 1-3) (emphases and typographical errors in original).
Attached to his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff provides a copy of a Court Order from the York County, Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Section listing him as a defendant and ordering him to appear for a hearing on November 24, 2020 regarding allegations that he “willfully disobeyed an Order of Court for support.” (Doc. 6, p. 5).
Plaintiff describes the additional exhibits in support of his Amended Complaint as follows:
- Order of Court dated Oct 26th 2020, stating in bold “IF YOU DO NOT APPEAR IN PERSON, THE COURT MAY ISSUE A WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST AND YOU MAY BE COMMITTED TO JAIL. Exhibit A
- Notice of Intent Cover Letter, Table of Contents, Exhibit B
- Notice of Rejection of Summons, Exhibit C
- Notice of Error for alleged debt and unauthorized administration of the CLARENCE ROBERT RANKIN ESTATE, OFFICE OF EXECUTOR, Exhibit D
- Affidavit Notice of Liability Regarding Trespass, Fee Schedule and Remedy, Exhibit E
- Copies of Certified Mailings proving that the Plaintiff has attempted to resolve this matter out of court many times over the years. Plaintiff has contacted BOCSE, OCSE, AG, HHS, DRS, DFAS to try validate an alleged debt, Exhibit F
- Notice of Interest to the Federal, State, and Local Agencies informing them of the Plaintiff's Status[ ]Notice and Knowledge, Ecclesiastical Deed Poll, Notice of Condition Precedent, Evidence of Life, Notice of Status, International Public Notice of Intellectual Property, Judicial Notice/Demand For Rights, Notice of Removal, Immediate withdrawal of Consent, Security Agreement, Declaration of Understanding,
- Notice From Office of the Estate Executor, Public Safety Warranty, Declaration of Vaccination Exemption, Testimony in the Form of an Affidavit with the registered mail tracking numbers on written on them. (30 pages total) Exhibit G
- As verification, print out copies taken from the USPS website validating the tracking numbers were delivered: [list of thirty-two (32) tracking numbers] .... (33Pages Total) Exhibit H
- As verification and in conjunction with the USPS Registered Mail Tracking Numbers, copies of proof from PS Form 3877 (6 pages) that the Plaintiff mailed all Notice of Intent with all documents listed on the back of page 2. Exhibit I
- As verification and exhibit, a copy of a letter dated Oct 14, 2020 from Theresa K. Gross (RE910191882US), received the Notice of Intent letter explaining my Status. The Clerk of Court, Georgine Keiser was put on notice (RE910191848), as well as Tawni Ruby, the Case Worker (RE910191879). (4 pages) Exhibit J(Doc. 6, pp. 3-4).
These exhibits consist of a variety of disjointed and incoherent affidavits, images of envelopes, postal tracking information, and mail return receipts. (See Docs. 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4). The documents Plaintiff provided as exhibits (Doc. 3) to his Original Complaint (Doc. 1) similarly contain affidavits that read more as manifestos than legal documents, other papers signed by Plaintiff, birth certificates, power-of-attorney forms, and tax forms. These documents include notices that Plaintiff's name when in all capital letters is a “fictitious entity registration” (Doc. 3 at p. 1) and assertions that he is not subject to federal jurisdiction (Doc. 3-2 at p. 6).
As I noted in my prior Order (Doc. 8), Plaintiff identifies himself as “:Clarence-robert::Rankin: suae potestate esse All Rights Reserved: UCC 1-207/308;UCC 1103.6/2-207” in signing his Amended Complaint (Doc. 6, p. 4). I decline to adopt this manner of address. This case is docketed as being brought by Clarence Robert Rankin, his real and legal name. The style or capitalization of Plaintiff's name in the caption of this or other documents has no legal significance, and it is used merely to identify Rankin as the Plaintiff bringing this action. See Jaeger v. Dubuque County, 880 F.Supp. 640, 643 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
As defendants, Plaintiff names Tawni Ruby and Theresa K. Gross (“Defendants”). (Doc. 6). Plaintiff appears to identify Defendants as working for the York County Domestic Relations Section. See id. Plaintiff does not specify what personal involvement, if any, Defendants had in the matter he seeks to raise in his Amended Complaint.
For a remedy, Plaintiff states that he “seeks relief from violations of due process rights, Uniform Commercial Codes and an alleged contractual obligation and a refund from ab initio related to all liens/levys placed upon the real man/party of interest and his property.” Id. at p. 3.
II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR REVIEWING COMPLAINTS FILED BY PRO SE PLAINTIFFS PROCEEDING IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Having been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff is subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Under this statute, the Court is required to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by litigants given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court must dismiss any action that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, among other grounds for dismissal. The statute states the following, in relevant part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that -
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal--
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See also Atamian v. Burns, 236 Fed.Appx. 753, 755 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he screening procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) apply to in forma pauperis complaints filed by prisoners and non-prisoners alike.”); Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 828 (10th Cir. 1979) (“[T]here is no constitutional right to the expenditure of public funds and the valuable time of federal courts to prosecute an action which is totally without merit.”).
In performing this mandatory screening function, the Court applies the same standard it uses in evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion to dismiss standard provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff does not need to provide detailed factual allegations. But a plaintiff must “plead more than the possibility of relief” and do more than just “allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). A complaint's factual allegations must raise the right to relief above a speculative level, so that a claim is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff can meet this facial-plausibility standard by pleading “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Further, the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (quotation omitted).
Accordingly, the Court conducts the following three-step inquiry to test the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6):
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id.Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation omitted). But “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Mikhail v. Kahn, 991 F.Supp.2d 596, 611 (E.D. Pa.) (“Pro se litigants cannot expect wholesale indulgence of whatever they claim and however they claim it.”), aff'd, 572 Fed.Appx. 68 (3d Cir. 2014). A pro se complaint must contain more than legal labels and conclusions and must recite factual allegations that raise a claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. When a complaint that “fails to state a claim lacks even an arguable basis in law, Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915(d) both counsel dismissal.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989).
III. ANALYSIS
A. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER RULE 12(B)(6)
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is devoid of factual allegations. (See Doc. 6). Plaintiff provides only a list of convoluted, nonsensical legal assertions and directs the Court to a series of attached exhibits. Id. at p. 3. The exhibits do not indicate what relief Plaintiff may be seeking or on what legal basis he seeks it. Plaintiff states that he “seeks relief from violations of due process rights, ” id., but he does not specify what the due process violation is, or how Defendants are involved. The Court is left to guess that Plaintiff is disputing an action to enforce a support order issued in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Pennsylvania, in which Plaintiff is the defendant. See id. at p. 5. The plaintiff in that support action, however, is not either of the named Defendants here.
Because it is not clear what conduct Plaintiff is challenging or the legal basis for that challenge, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. 6) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Mala, 704 F.3d at 245; Santiago, 629 F.3d at 130.
B. COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 8
In addition to failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 provides that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). When “nothing in the complaint [] qualifies as a short and plain statement of a federal claim, ” dismissal is appropriate. See, e.g., Scibelli v. Lebanon County, 219 Fed.Appx. 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007). Dismissal under Rule 8 is also proper when “the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Tillio v. Spiess, 441 Fed.Appx. 109, 110 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir.1995)).
Here, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not contain any statement of a claim. Even looking to Plaintiff's attached exhibits, the information presented in them “is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Tillio, 441 Fed.Appx. at 110. Plaintiff's Complaint plainly fails to meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
C. PLAINTIFF'S SECTION 1983 DUE PROCESS CLAIM
Plaintiff does not clearly make any legal claims, but he states that he “seeks relief from violations of due process.” (Doc. 6, p. 3). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a person may be civilly liable for “depriv[ing] another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Shuman v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must prove the deprivation of a federally protected right and must also establish that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005). Liability in a Section 1983 action is personal in nature, and a defendant must have been personally involved in the wrongful conduct to be liable. See Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042 (2015).
Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendants are state actors, how they were personally involved, or what federally protected right they deprived him of. Therefore, even if the Court construes Plaintiff's vague reference to “violations of [his] due process rights” as a claim under Section 1983 for a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights, he has not alleged any conduct to support the existence of liability.
D. EFFECT OF YOUNGER ABSTENTION
Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), federal courts must abstain from deciding matters that will interfere with certain ongoing state proceedings, including domestic relations disputes. Dixon v. Kuhn, 257 Fed.Appx. 553, 555 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying Younger abstention to child support dispute) (citing Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating Younger abstention is appropriate in certain child custody disputes)). The Younger doctrine requires a district court to decline to hear a matter if three requirements are met: “(1) there must be an ongoing state judicial proceeding to which the federal plaintiff is a party and with which the federal proceeding will interfere, (2) the state proceedings must implicate important state interests, and (3) the state proceedings must afford an adequate opportunity to raise the claims.” Yang, 416 F.3d at 202. Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to enable the Court to determine whether it would be appropriate to address Plaintiff's claims, or whether Younger abstention would apply.
E. LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, falls short of the Rule 8 pleading requirements, provides insufficient facts to state a claim under Section 1983, and may be barred by Younger abstention. This Court previously granted Plaintiff leave to file a new amended complaint by March 12, 2021 to cure these deficiencies. (Doc. 8). He failed to do so. “District courts are to offer amendment in pro se civil rights cases unless doing so would be ‘inequitable or futile.'” Flynn v. Dep't of Corr., 739 Fed.Appx. 132, 136 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007)). Because Plaintiff was already granted leave to amend and did not do so, granting further leave would be futile.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) without granting further leave to amend.
(2) The Clerk of Court should be directed to CLOSE this case.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT UNDER LOCAL RULE 72.3 AND 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the
Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.