Opinion
Civil Action 23-796
04-23-2024
BRIAN RANDOLPH, Plaintiff, v. JUSTIN MOORE et al., Defendants.
Honorable W. Scott Hardy, United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE: ECF NO. 27
MAUREEN P. KELLY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is a Partial Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim (the “Motion”) filed by Defendants Justin Moore (“Moore”), Larry Boggs (“Boggs”), Eric Haag (“Haag”), and Patricia Carter (“Carter”) (collectively, the “Corrections Defendants”), ECF No. 27, requesting that claims from the Complaint of Plaintiff Brian Randolph (“Randolph”) be dismissed with prejudice.
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion be granted in part and denied in part, with leave to amend certain claims.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Randolph is a prisoner at the State Correctional Institution at Mercer (“SCI-Mercer”). ECF No. 24 at 2. He brings civil rights and product liability claims against Moore, as Fire and Safety Manager; Boggs, as Maintenance Manager; Haag, as Food Service Trainer/Manager; and Carter, as Food Service Instructor, as well as Cleveland Range Corporation (“Cleveland Range”). See ECF No. 24.
Randolph works in the Culinary Department at SCI-Mercer. Id. at 20. Defendant Carter, as the Food Service Instructor, directed and oversaw inmate cooks, including Randolph. Id. at 5. As the Food Service Trainer/Manager, Defendant Haag oversaw equipment and arranged for routine maintenance and upkeep of the Culinary Department. Id. at 11.
The Culinary Department has three steam kettles manufactured by Cleveland Range with industrial lids. Id. at 21. As manufactured, the lids should be attached as a safety feature, akin to a car hood. Id. at 21-22. This allows the lid to stay open and steam to release away from the operator and not fall on the operator's head. Id. The potential for injury or death as a result of improper installation or use of the steam kettles was noted on the equipment's warning labels. Id. at 24.
The three Cleveland Range steam kettles at SCI-Mercer did not have their lids attached. Id. at 21-22. As Fire and Safety Manager, Defendant Moore “stat[ed] the lids need[] to be removed so the steam goes away from the worker to avoid any injuries.” Id. at 14. As part of his duties as Maintenance Manager, Defendant Boggs directed his work crews remove the lids. Id. at 15. Randolph alleges that Haag and Carter were aware of this alteration. Id. at 6, 14-15. He also alleges that inmates were improperly trained on how to use the steam kettles. Id. at 6.
On July 31, 2021, Randolph was closing out his work duties around 2:00 p.m. Id. at 22. This consisted of several tasks, including emptying electric steam kettles that are filled with water, which could be boiling hot. Id. He noticed a Cleveland Range kettle was boiling water with the lid still on, but not attached. Id. Randolph loosened the valve drain on the front of the kettle to let the water out into the floor drain. Id. Once empty, he removed the valve and placed it on a prep table. Id.
With the water drained, Randolph tried to remove the plug screen from inside the steam kettle, which is about 50 inches deep. Id. He had to manually remove the altered lid, which was contrary to the manufacturer's design. Id. After removing the lid, steam vented and severely burned Randolph. Id. He received second degree bums, sustained neck injuries, suffered nerve damage, and was permanently scarred. Id. at 22, 25. Randolph is still undergoing treatment for these injuries. Id. at 27.
After this incident, Carter instructed other staff and inmates to stay away from Randolph and ordered Randolph to work alone. Id. at 7. She also stated to Caucasian inmates that she trusted “their kind more than Randolph's kind,” made derogatory comments inferring that Randolph had a bad odor after he returned from religious services, and called Randolph a “liability.” Id. at 15-16.
Randolph filed multiple grievances as a result of the described conduct. Id. at 7-8, 14-15. As a result of one grievance, Haag “had a serious sit down” with Carter regarding her behavior towards Randolph. Id. at 7. As a result of another grievance, Moore informed Randolph that there would be more safety training about the steam kettles. Id. at 15. The steam kettle lids presently remain unattached and additional training has not occurred. Id. at 14-15.
Randolph filed the operative Complaint on October 25, 2023, including a Memorandum of Law. ECF Nos. 24, 25. As relevant to the instant Motion, he brings claims against the Corrections Defendants arising from the above-noted facts. Id.
Randolph filed a pro se Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights on October 25, 2023. ECF No. 24. That same day, he also filed a Memorandum of Law Filed in Support of Plaintiff's Complaint. ECF No. 25. He incorporates the Complaint into the Memorandum of Law. Id. at 1. For the purposes of considering the instant Motion, the Court considers the averments of the Amended Complaint. See Miller v. Little, No. 23-2037, 2024 WL 957983, at *1 (3d Cir. Mar. 6, 2024) (noting when evaluating a motion to dismiss the court can “consider the allegations in the complaint, the exhibits attached thereto, and matters of public record”).
Randolph claims that the Corrections Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment through their deliberate indifference to his safety when they altered the Cleveland Range steam kettle lids and did not appropriately warn or train him or other SCI-Mercer staff on the safe operation of that equipment. Id. at 16. He alleges this same behavior also violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Id.
Randolph further claims Carter's alleged abusive behavior towards him violated his First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances, his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Id. at 6-8.
As it relates to the Corrections Defendants, Randolph requests compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief to enforce safety protocols and inmate training. Id. at 34.
The Corrections Defendants filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and a brief in support on November 9, 2023. ECF Nos. 27, 28. Randolph filed a Response on January 10, 2024 and a brief in support on January 17, 2024. ECF Nos. 36, 37.
The Motion to Dismiss is ripe for consideration.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Motion to Dismiss
A complaint may be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “[D]etailed pleading is not generally required.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016). Rather, the rules require “only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp, v, Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” by providing facts which “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. ...” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint, the court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). The court, however, need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys, v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) where the factual content does not allow the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that, under Twombly, “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not suffice. The complaint therefore “must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct” that are sufficient “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s of his claim].”). Id. at 233-34.
2. Pro Se Pleadings and Filings
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Pro se pleadings and filings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax, and sentence construction, or litigant's
unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); U.S, ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (A “petition prepared by a prisoner . . . may be inartfully drawn and should ... be read ‘with a measure of tolerance'”); Freeman v. Dep't. of Corr., 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds); see also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Ne. Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).
Even so, there are limits to the court's procedural flexibility - "‘pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim .... [T]hey cannot flout procedural rules - they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Accordingly, because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, the Court will consider the facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
C. DISCUSSION
The Corrections Defendants move to dismiss multiple counts of Randolph's Complaint on various grounds. Each argument will be addressed separately.
1. Sovereign Immunity
Randolph alleges that the Corrections Defendants were responsible for the “faulty” nature of the steam kettles. ECF No. 24 at 6. The Corrections Defendants move to dismiss this product liability claim on the basis that they are entitled to sovereign immunity under applicable Pennsylvania tort law. ECF No. 27 ¶ 7.
Randolph responds that the Corrections Defendants waived sovereign immunity, because they acted wantonly and failed to ensure the safety of Randolph, an individual in their care, custody, and control. ECF No. 36 ¶ 7.
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. Amend. XI. In an official-capacity suit against individual defendants, as is present here, the entity of which the defendant is an agent is the real party in interest. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). As a result, claims against state officials in their official capacities for damages are treated as suits against the state and are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Christ the King Manor, Inc, v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 318 (3d Cir. 2013); Nelson v. Com, of Pa. Dept of Pub. Welfare, 244 F.Supp.2d 382, 391 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
But Eleventh Amendment immunity is not absolute. Three exceptions to sovereign immunity exist: (1) abrogation by an act of congress; (2) waiver by state consent to suit; (3) suits against individual state officials for prospective relief to remedy an ongoing violation. M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. Of City of Newark, 344 F.3d 335, 344-45 (3d Cir. 2003); MCI Telecomm Corp, v. Bell Atl. Pennsylvania, 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001).
Product liability claims, such as Randolph's claim here, are not one of the exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Reynolds v. PBG Enterprises, LLC, No. CIV.A. 10-4373, 2011 WL 2678589, at *10 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2011) (holding “[b]ecause the limited exceptions to sovereign immunity apply to negligence claims only, and not strict liability claims” the plaintiffs products liability claim against a state agency was barred). Therefore, it is recommended that Randolph's product liability claim be dismissed as barred by sovereign immunity.
2. Standalone Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Randolph alleges that the Corrections Defendants' deliberate indifference as to the dangerous conditions of the Cleveland Range steam kettles violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. ECF No. 24 at 16. The Corrections Defendants move to dismiss Randolph's Fourteenth Amendment claim because he does not have a standalone claim. ECF No. 27 ¶ 8.
Randolph responds that he is a citizen that is guaranteed his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. ECF No. 36 ¶ 8.
Under the more-specific-provision rule, “if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process” under the Fourteenth Amendment. Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 260 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n. 7 (1997)). “[T]he Eighth Amendment [is] the primary source of protection after an individual's conviction.” Jordan v. Cicchi, 428 Fed.Appx. 195, 199-200 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Graham v, Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989)). In the prison context, the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide any greater protection than the Eighth Amendment. Betts, 621 F.3d at 260.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit instructs that when a Fourteenth Amendment claim arises out of the same facts as an Eighth Amendment claim, as in this case, a Fourteenth Amendment claim cannot be pursued in tandem. Id. at 261. Therefore, it is recommended that Randolph's Fourteenth Amendment claim be dismissed and consideration be given to the Eighth Amendment claim.
3. Personal Involvement
The Corrections Defendants move to dismiss Randolph's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Moore, Haag, and Boggs for failure to allege personal involvement. ECF No. 27 ¶ 6. They argue that Randolph failed to allege “any actions taken by Defendant Boggs that resulted in a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights.” ECF No. 28 at 6. They also argue that Moore's only alleged involvement was during the grievance process and that Haag's only alleged involvement was during the grievance process and as Randolph's supervisor. Id.
In his brief in opposition, Randolph argues that he “adequately proffered” the personal involvement of the Corrections Defendants, through their actions and inaction. ECF No. 37 at 10-11.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against “every person who,” under color of state law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected,” another person to a deprivation of a federally protected right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that a defendant was “personally involved” in the alleged deprivation of rights. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005). Individual liability can be imposed only if the state actor played an “affirmative part” in the alleged misconduct and “cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Id. (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998)). Without any specific allegations that a defendant helped deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal is appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing claims under Rule 12(b)(6) because the plaintiffs had failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that certain defendants had played an affirmative part in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation).
Responding to a grievance or misconduct appeal cannot by itself show the actual knowledge necessary for personal involvement. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208; Ramos v. Pennsylvania Dept, of Corre., No. 4:cv-06-1444, 2006 WL 2129148, at *2 (M.D. Pa. 2006); Jefferson v. Wolfe, No. cv-04-44, 2006 WL 1947721, at *17 (W.D Pa. 2006); and Rogers v. United States, 696 F.Supp.2d 472, 488 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“If a grievance official's only involvement is investigating and/or ruling on an inmate's grievance after the incident giving rise to the grievance has already occurred, there is no personal involvement on the part of that official.”). Nor can liability be imposed under a theory of supervisor liability in a Section 1983 claim unless that supervisor played an “affirmative part” in the complained of misconduct. See Chincello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986), reaffirmed in Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347 (3d Cir. 2005).
Here, contrary to the Corrections Defendants' assertion, Randolph alleged that Boggs directed his work crews remove the steam kettle lids at issue. ECF No. 24 at 15. “Personal involvement can be shown through allegations that a defendant directed, had actual knowledge of, or acquiesced in the deprivation of a plaintiffs constitutional rights.” Frink v. MacLeish, No. c.a. 07-530, 2009 WL 29444, at *3 (D. Del. Jan. 5, 2009) (citing Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353); see also Parkell v. Pierce, No. cv 17-157, 2018 WL 3104406, at *4 (D. Del. June 22, 2018) (“supervisory liability may attach if the plaintiff asserts facts showing that the supervisor's actions were ‘the moving force' behind the harm suffered by the plaintiff'). Randolph's allegations that Boggs “directed” the removal of the steam kettle lids is an “affirmative action” sufficient to allege personal involvement at this stage of the litigation.
As it relates to Moore, Randolph alleged his involvement in more than just in the grievance process. He also alleged that Moore “staffed] the lids needf] to be removed so the steam goes away from the worker to avoid any injuries.” ECF No. 24 at 14. Reading Randolph's pro se Compliant liberally - as the Court must - the Court interprets this allegation to mean that Moore specifically directed personnel to remove the lids, in violation of the manufacturer's safety manuals. This is also sufficient to allege personal involvement.
As to Haag, Randolph has not pled sufficient facts to allege his personal involvement. As pled, Haag's involvement was limited to supervising Randolph and interacting with Carter as a result of Randolph's grievance.
The Court recommends that the Corrections Defendants' Motion be denied as to Randolph's claims against Boggs and Moore on the basis of their personal involvement and granted as to Haag.
4. Failure to State a Claim
In their Motion, the Corrections Defendants move to dismiss Randolph's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Moore, Haag, and Boggs for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 27 ¶ 6. However, the Corrections Defendants failed to brief this argument. See ECF No. 28. Accordingly, in light of the absence of supporting briefing, it is recommended that the Corrections Defendants' Motion be denied on the grounds that Randolph failed to state a claim.
D. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Partial Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 27, be granted in part and denied in part.
It is recommended the Motion be granted and Randolph's claims be dismissed with prejudice:
• As to his Fourteenth Amendment claim; and
• As to his product liability claim against the Corrections Defendants on the basis of sovereign immunity.
It is also recommended the Motion be granted and Randolph's claim be dismissed without prejudice as to his claim against Haag, given the absence of personal involvement.
Further, it is recommended the Motion be denied:
• On the basis of the personal involvement of Moore and Bogg; and
• As to Randolph's First Amendment claim.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, Randolph may be in possession of additional facts to support his allegations. Therefore, it is recommended that Randolph be afforded a final opportunity to file an Amended Complaint to correct the substantial pleading deficiencies identified in this Report only as to the claim dismissed without prejudice. The Court should further instruct Randolph that an Amended Complaint must be filed within thirty days, must fully allege every claim he wishes to pursue against all parties, and must be a pleading that stands by itself without reference to the original or amended complaint. Young v. Minnick, 809 F.Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections within fourteen days, or seventeen days for unregistered ECF Users. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.