No. 01-03-00042-CR
Opinion issued January 15, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 179th District Court Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 919473.
Panel consists of Chief Justice RADACK and Justices JENNINGS and HIGLEY.
LAURA CARTER HIGLEY Justice.
Appellant, Curtis Randle, pled guilty to aggravated robbery without an agreed recommendation. After a pre-sentence investigation ("PSI") report was completed and a sentencing hearing with testimony was conducted, the trial court found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at 20 years' confinement and a $10,000 fine. In two issues, appellant complains that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not allow appellant to withdraw his plea. We affirm.
Background
Appellant was charged by indictment with aggravated robbery. The trial court appointed counsel to represent appellant. On September 26, 2002, appellant appeared before the trial court and pled guilty to aggravated robbery. Appellant expressly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury, judicially confessed to the offense charged, received the required admonishments, and entered a guilty plea. The trial court found appellant mentally competent and his plea voluntary. The trial court also found that the evidence substantiated the appellant's guilt but withheld a finding of guilt pending the completion of a PSI report. Appellant's case was reset for a sentencing hearing until after the return of the PSI report. Although he was represented by counsel, appellant wrote four pro se letters to the trial court. In these letters, appellant admitted that he had committed aggravated robbery but claimed that he had committed the offense involuntarily. Appellant stated that, before committing the offense, he had voluntarily taken prescription medication for back and neck pain. Appellant claimed that he had fallen asleep after taking the medication and then had awakened in jail after he had committed aggravated robbery. Appellant stated that he had no recollection of committing the offense and had not planned to commit it. Appellant wrote that the medication had made him "temporarily duranged [sic]." In the letters, appellant repeatedly requested the trial court not to send him to prison, to give him a "second chance," and to "have mercy" on him. Appellant sent the four letters to the trial court before appellant's PSI sentencing hearing, which was held on November 25, 2002. At the hearing, appellant testimony was consistent with the four letters that he had written to the trial court. Although he admitted that he had committed aggravated robbery, appellant again claimed that, due to the medication he had taken, he could not remember any details of the offense. Following appellant's testimony, appellant's counsel requested the trial court to place appellant on community supervision. Alternatively, if the court chose to assess prison time, appellant's counsel requested that appellant receive the minimum sentence of five years. In response, the State argued that appellant should not receive the minimum sentence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced appellant to 20 years in prison and assessed a $10,000 fine. Discussion
In two issues, appellant complains that the trial court abused its discretion when it "failed to allow appellant to withdraw his plea of guilty when he raised a potential defense to the allegation of aggravated robbery" and when it "failed to allow appellant to withdraw his plea[,] which was not voluntarily made." Appellant acknowledges that a trial court is not required to withdraw a plea of guilty sua sponte and enter a plea of not guilty for a defendant when the defendant enters a plea of guilty before the court after waiving a jury, even if evidence is adduced that reasonably and fairly raises an issue as to his guilt. See Moon v. State, 572 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978); Brown v. State, 11 S.W.3d 360, 362-63 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd). Appellant correctly points out that this rule has been held inapplicable in cases in which the defendant presents a motion to withdraw the plea, Coronado v. State, 25 S.W.3d 806, 809 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, pet. ref'd), or in cases in which the voluntariness of a plea is questioned for some reason other than evidence raised as to the defendant's innocence, Owens v. State, 836 S.W.2d 341, 344 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, no pet.). Neither of these situations is present in this case. In his brief, appellant writes as follows: Appellant, pro-se and in an informal and imprecise manner, attempted to withdraw his plea and challenge the voluntariness of his plea as reflected by the numerous letters sent to the trial court (which are included in the clerk's record). The trial court implicitly denied appellant's efforts by failing to formally rule on his numerous requests. We do not agree with appellant that his letters to the trial court constituted motions to withdraw his guilty plea. None of the letters mentioned or referred to appellant's plea; rather, the gist of the letters was to request leniency from the trial court in appellant's sentencing. Such a reading is even more apparent when read in the context of the transcript of the sentencing hearing. As stated above, appellant testified that he committed the offense but also stated that he was under the influence of medication. Following appellant's testimony, defense counsel asked the trial court to be lenient in sentencing appellant. Importantly, although the four letters were sent to the trial court prior to the sentencing hearing, neither appellant nor his counsel requested the trial court to withdraw the plea at the hearing. Moreover, even assuming that the letters served as motions to withdraw appellant's plea, appellant was represented by court-appointed counsel when he sent the pro se letters to the trial court. Because appellant was not entitled to hybrid representation, we conclude the trial court could properly refuse the motion on that basis. See Llano v. State, 16 S.W.3d 197, 198 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd); Busselman v. State, 713 S.W.2d 711, 714 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet.). We also do not agree that the letters served to challenge the voluntariness of appellant's plea. Nowhere in the letters did appellant specifically attack the voluntariness of the plea or otherwise alert the trial court that the plea was involuntary. While appellant's claim that he was under the influence of medication when he committed the aggravated robbery could be construed as being material to the issue of appellant's guilt, it cannot be construed as being material to the voluntariness of his plea. As previously mentioned, a trial court need not withdraw a defendant's guilty plea sua sponte even if there is evidence that might raise a question about the defendant's guilt. Moon, 572 S.W.2d at 682; Brown, 11 S.W.3d at 362-63. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in failing to withdraw appellant's plea. We overrule appellant's issues one and two. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.