Opinion
June 12, 2001.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Paul Victor, J.), entered on or about November 22, 2000, which denied defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had not suffered a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d), unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Michael B. Sena, for plaintiff-respondent.
Mario Castellitto, for defendants-appellants.
Before: Sullivan, P.J., Nardelli, Mazzarelli, Rubin, Saxe, JJ.
Contrary to defendants' claim, they were not entitled to preclusion on the ground that plaintiff failed to particularize the category of serious injury in her bill of particulars. Before the sanction of preclusion is granted or a pleading stricken for failure to respond fully to or comply with a demand for a bill of particulars, a showing of willful and contumacious conduct is necessary (see, Kovacs v. Castle Restoration Constr.,; Inc., 262 A.D.2d 165). Here, defendants never asserted, much less demonstrated, that plaintiff's failure to respond properly to their demand for a bill of particulars was willful or contumacious. Defendants' remedy was a motion to compel compliance (id.), which they never made.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment was properly denied since there was competent objective medical evidence sufficient to raise issues of fact as to whether plaintiff suffered a significant injury to, with permanent consequential limitation of use of, her cervical and lumbrosacral spine (see, Verdorosa v. Simonelli, 260 A.D.2d 293; Vargas v. New York City Tr. Auth., 254 A.D.2d 175; O'Sullivan v. Atrium Bus Co., 246 A.D.2d 418).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.